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INTRODUCTION

The rapid development of digital technologies is profoundly
altering the means by which transborder disputes are settled and,
in turn, how rules governing transborder activity are developed. A
defining characteristic of digital technologies is their ability to
transcend territorial boundaries, thereby challenging the unfettered
jurisdiction of any single nation-state and complicating the application and enforcement of existing legal rules. Disputes implicating
such technologies account for an increasingly significant portion of
commercial litigation, and digital commerce has become a central
feature of contemporary economic activity. National governments
and private parties have thus come under pressure to find new
ways to cut through the complex, cross-border disputes of the type
that digital technologies engender.
Can existing lawmaking and dispute settlement mechanisms
handle these growing pressures? The number of institutions
operating outside the confines of national borders have
become more numerous and heterogeneous in the last decades
of the twentieth century. Indeed, their growth appears exponential.1 Whether created by governments2 or by private
1. See ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIALARBrTRATION44-58 (1999) (discussing profusion of venues for institutional and
ad hoc arbitration); Jonathan I. Charney, Is InternationalLaw Threatened by Multiple
InternationalTribunals?,271 RECUEILDES COURS 101, 121-23 [COLLECTED COURSES OFTHE
HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] (1999) (discussing recent growth in number of
international courts and tribunals); Laurence R. Heifer, Forum ShoppingforHumanRights,
148 U. PA. L. REv. 285, 298-99 (1999) [hereinafter Heifer, Forum Shopping] (discussing
expansion of fora in which international human rights claims can be reviewed).
2. Dispute settlement institutions created bygovernments include permanentjuridical
bodies expressly empowered to hear claims concerning violations of treaties and more
informal quasi-judicial tribunals or review bodies, whose interpretive and remedial powers
are more ambiguous. Compare, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055 (establishing International Court of Justice), and Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, [hereinafter
DSU], and Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement]; and Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, Annex 2, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-RESULTiS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 31, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) (establishing
WTO dispute settlement panels and Appellate Body), and Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as amendedbyProtocoINo. 11, Eur. T.S. No. 155
(establishing permanent European Court of Human Rights), with, e.g., Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res.
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parties,' however, international dispute settlement mechanisms
4
(broadly construed as encompassing classical international,
supranational,' and anational6 mechanisms) share a common
characteristic, one that might be termed "deliberative construction."
International dispute settlement mechanisms do not spring up
2200,21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, at 52, 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) (establishing U.N. Human Rights Committee), and International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212-38 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (establishing the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination).
3. Institutional and ad hoc arbitration are the principal mechanisms by which private
parties settle their differences internationally. See, e.g., the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), at http//www.icewbo.org (last visited Oct. 2, 2001); the London Court of
International Arbitration (LCIA), at http:/www.lcia-arbitration.com/Icia (last modified May
24, 2001); the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), at
http:J/www.worldbank.orgicsid (last visited Oct. 2,2001). For a complete list of institutional
and ad hoc arbitration options, see http-Jwww.intemationaladr.com/coordina.htm (last
visited Oct. 2, 2001). For a discussion of how international arbitration operates, see infra
Part lI.B.
4. The term "international" generally refers to the classic public international law
paradigm that conceives of international law and its institutions as exclusively affecting
nation-states. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (4th ed.
1990) ("It is states and organizations (ifappropriate conditions exist) which represent the
normal types of legal person on the international plane.").
5. The term "supranational7 is "typically used to identify a particular type of
international organization that is empowered to exercise directly some of the functions
otherwise reserved to states." Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towarda Theory
of Effective SupranationalAdjudication,107 YALE L.J. 273, 287 (1997). These functions are
exercised in part by forming linkages with private parties, including individuals, groups,
corporations, and voluntary organizations. Supranational adjudication, therefore, has been
defined as
adjudication by a tribunal that was established by a group of states or the
entire international community and that exercises jurisdiction over cases
directly involving private parties-whether between a private party and a
foreign government, a private party and her own government, private parties
themselves, or, in the criminal context, a private party and a prosecutor's office.
Id. at 289.
6. The term "anational" has frequently been used to describe efforts to 'de-localize"
commercial arbitration between private parties in different jurisdictions and to reduce the
control that national legal systems exercise over such arbitration. Hans Smit, A-National
Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629,631 (1989). From a broader perspective, two features have
historically distinguished anational laws and institutions from international and
supranational ones. First, anational institutions (including their dispute settlement
mechanisms) are created principally by private parties with no or only limited assistance
from states. Second, anational laws are not always an autonomous body ofrules distinct from
national law; rather they often incorporate or draw upon one or more national law sources.
Id. at 632-33.
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overnight. Instead, they are carefully built, often with agonizing
slowness, through a process of give-and-take among negotiators
wrangling over the subject matter of disputes, the procedures for
adjudicating them, the identity of parties who can bring claims, and
7
the authority of the decision makers who will rule on those claims.
Deliberative construction also allows governments and private
parties the time to create checking mechanisms to control the power
of international dispute settlement decision makers and to
maintain the fidelity of those decision makers to the goals of the
institution's founders. These checking mechanisms, in turn, prompt
decision makers to adopt methodologies that internalize those
goals. Deliberate speed thus serves to legitimize international
institutions, which lack the intrinsic authority of national institutions of democratic states. 8
Yet even when slowly and carefully built, international dispute
settlement structures still intrude on national sovereignty by
supplanting (or rivaling) the role of national courts or the use of
national laws as rules of decision. And parties to international
disputes often have a choice of venues where their controversy
might be decided.9 As a result, international institutions exert only
a tenuous hold on actors, and maintaining legitimacy and the
appearance of legitimacy is crucial to their success.10 The jurists,
arbitrators, and experts who serve on international dispute settlement bodies are aware of these concerns and respond to them by
7. HenryH. Perritt, Jr., The Internet isChangingthePubliclnternationalLegalSystem,
88 KY. L.J. 885, 896 (2000) ("The actual process of treaty negotiation begins with months or
even years ofpreparatorywork."); Kal Raustiala, Democracy, Sovereignty, and the Slow Pace

of InternationalNegotiations, 8 INT'L ENVTL. A F. 3 (1996) (noting the slow pace of
international negotiation and lawmaking).
8. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create GlobalNorms, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 469,503-15 (2000) [hereinafter Dinwoodie, A New
Copyright Order].
9. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
CoMMERIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 7
(1996) (notingthe "competition" among different arbitral centers); Andrea Kupfer Schneider,

Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International Trade
Organizations,20 MICH. J. INT'LL. 697,770 (1999) (noting that states that are parties to the
NAFTA and the WTO Agreement may choose the dispute settlement mechanism of either
body as a forum in which to commence proceedings).
10. See infra Part III.B.1. (discussing the importance of legitimacy to international
dispute settlement).
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adopting incrementalist decision-making strategies. That is, they
typically seek to build their authority slowly by paying careful
attention to the written agreements that created them and by
adhering closely to the mandates given by those who constructed
the institution." In addition, it often takes years for a functioning
dispute settlement institution to reach maturity, attracting a
steady diet of cases and developing a reputation as a place where
controversies can be handled fairly and effectively.'
11. For recent examples, see Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United Mexican States ICSID (W.
Bank) No. ARB(AFY98/2 If 8-9 (June 2,2000) (strictly interpreting conditions precedent to
NAFTA chapter 11 dispute settlement and dismissing claim where claimant had not fully
complied with those conditions); Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Austl. and N.Z. v. Japan),
Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Aug. 4, 2000 (ICSID panel refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over claims based on overlappingfisheries conservationtreaties where one treaty
arguably required consent of all contesting parties); RobertAzinian v. UnitedMexicanStates
ICSID (W. Bank), No. ARB(AF)/97/2 (Nov. 1, 1999) (first NAFTA chapter 11 dispute
settlement decision, construing expropriation narrowly and refusingto exercise jurisdiction
over breaches of concession agreements); United States--Import Prohibitionof Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products,VIT/DS58/AB/R [ 151-56 (Oct. 12, 1998) (WTO Appellate
Body crafting a balancing test between the right of WTO members to preserve exhaustible
natural resources and the duty to respect the trade rights of other members); India-Patent
Protectionfor PharmaceuticalandAgricultural ChemicalProducts,WT/DS50/AB/R (WTO
Appellate Body, Dec. 19,1997) (WTO Appellate Body remindingthe first WTO TRIPS dispute
settlement panel that the agreement ofthe parties as expressed in the treaty is paramount
in interpreting the TRIPS agreement).
12. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 50 & n.76 (noting that as of 1996,
International Chamber of Commerce handled 9000 arbitration cases since its founding in
1923, of which more than 5000 were filed after 1980); Philip Alston, Effective Functionof
BodiesEstablishedPursuantto UnitedNationsHumanRightslnstruments:FinalReport on
Enhancingthe Long-TermEffectiveness ofthe UnitedNationsHumanRights TreatySystem,
U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 1517, U.N. Doc. E/CN.41997/74 (1996) (noting recent
increases in the number of communications being processed under the various United
Nations human rights complaints procedures); Robert Y. Jennings, The InternationalCourt
of Justice after Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 493, 497-505 (1995) (noting recent growth in
the docket of the International Court of Justice and discussing proposals to alleviate it); The
European Court ofHuman Rights: Historicalbackground,organisationandprocedure If
6-7 at http'/Awww.echr.coe.intlengtEDocs/InfodocRevised2.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001)
(discussing large increase in Court's case law in 1980s after Court's founding in 1950s). See
generally Katrina C. Szakal, Book Annotation: Manual on International Courts and
Tribunals,32 N.Y.U. J. IrNr L. & POL. 829, 858 (2000) ("International judicial institutions,
some in place since the end ofWorld War II, have seen their dockets expand greatly, andnew
courts and tribunals have been created to address specific aspects of international law and
to hear cases arising under various international conventions and treaties."). One exception
to this trend occurs in special-purpose tribunals and claims commissions, which receive an
initial flurry of claims and then spend years adjudicating them and issuing only a select
number of decisions on the merits. REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 1, at 59 & nn. 17-18
(discussing the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the United Nations Compensation
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For social activity such as digital commerce that reinvents itself
on a daily basis, however, reliance on leisurely processes to address
transborder issues is particularly inapt and inept. Yet any attempt
to establish too swiftly an institution to resolve such conflicts, or
the too rapid enhancement by such an institution of its powers to
deal with the new issues raised by digital activity, would clash with
the deliberative construction and incrementalist decision-making
qualities that have historically characterized international dispute
settlement. Far more ominously, such efforts also may subvert both
the legitimacy of international systems and the ability to create
checking mechanisms that constrain the authority of dispute settlement decision makers.
In this Article, we address the challenge confronting private
parties and governments seeking to resolve the problems of inherently transborder activity such as that generated by digital
technologies."i We explore and critically assess the rapid growth of
a new form of lawmaking, which we call "non-national,""' that has
developed contrary to the traditional premises of deliberative construction and incrementalist decision making and that, in less than
Commission).
13. The Internet almost necessitates a non-national mindset. However, although digital
activities have begn a precipitating factor in the recent development of non-national
lawmaking, we do not restrict our analysis to laws affecting on-line activities. Many
transborder events or disputes implicate normative and pragmatic issues that are similar
to those that Internet-based disputes have forced us to consider. Indeed, an undernoted
service of the Internet may have been to cast light on the false premises of existing analyses
of the off-line world. Cf Andrd Lucas, Aspects de DroitInternationalPrivdde la Protection
d'Oeuvres de Droits Connexes Transmis Par Rdseaux Numiriques Mondiaux [Private
International Law Aspects of the Protection of Works and Objects of Related Rights
Transmitted Through DigitalNetworks], WIPO Doc. No. GCPIC/l, 118 (Nov. 25, 1998) ("It
is indeed the great achievement of [the] Internet, after satellites, to have created an
obligation to rediscover the international aspects of this discipline, too long masked, by
overshooting the timid territorialism .....
).
14. In this Article, we use the term "non-national" to refer to lawmaking and dispute
settlement structures that arise outside the sphere in which the nation state operates (both
internally and in its relations with other states). Non-national lawmaking, like national
lawmaking, has several institutional components. Here, we focus primarily on the dispute
settlement mechanisms ofnon-national systems. These mechanisms themselves possess the
capacity to make law through the generative power of adjudication. And by their reflection
on (and of) the process by which they were created, they influence and offer insights into the
broader lawmaking process. For a discussion of the diverse elements that comprise nonnational systems, see infra Part II.A. and III.A. (discussing hybridization of non-national
rules and their enforcement through private technologies).
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two years, has established itself as the leading exemplar for
resolution of transborder problems.15 The Uniform Domain Name
Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP or the Policy) was promulgated
by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) 16 in late 1999 to govern a narrow class of conflicts between
domain name registrants and trademark owners.17 The UDRP is a
new legal creature unlike any of its international dispute settlement antecedents. It is a hybrid system containing an amalgam of
elements from three decision-making models-judicial, arbitral, and
ministerial-and it draws inspiration from international and
national legal systems. However, neither the UDRP's substantive
content nor its prescriptive force necessarily depend upon the laws,
institutions, or enforcement mechanisms of any single nation-state
or treaty regime.
It should come as no surprise that intellectual property law is
providing the paradigm for new legal regulation of the transborder
issues raised by digital technologies. Nowhere is the pressure to
devise new lawmaking and dispute settlement mechanisms more
keenly felt than in intellectual property law. 1 Intellectual property
rights are at the heart of cyberspace: they protect the computer code
that forms the architecture of cyberspace, the text, images, and
sounds that comprise the bulk of on-line content, and the symbols
15. Cf Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights, WTO, Electronic
Commerce Work Programme:Submission from Australia,Doc. No. IP/C/W/233, 44 (Dec.
7,2000) [hereinafterElectronicCommerce Work Programme](suggestingthat the UDRPhas
"arguably become a de facto international standard" for the resolution of cybersquatting
disputes), availableat http://docsonline.wto.orgDDFDocumentstAIP/C/W233.doc; WIPO.
16. ICANN is a not-for-profit corporation that was created by the U.S. government to
operate the domain name system, among other things, in accordance with parameters set by
the Commerce Department. Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (1998). As explained more fully below, it authorizes individual registrars to issue
domain names in the generic top level domain names, and the administration ofcountry code
top level domains is delegated by ICANN (formerly by the Internet Assigned Numbers
Authority) to authorities ("managers") in the relevant country. See infra Part I.B.3.
17. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), at http:J/www.
icann.orgludrp/udrp-poicy-24oct99.htm thereinafter Policy]; Rules for Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy (Oct. 24, 1999), at http'/www.icann.orgludrpludrp-rules24oct99.htm [hereinafter UDRP Rules].
18. See TorstenBettinger& Dorothee Thum, TerritorialTrademarkRightsin the Global
Village - InternationalJurisdiction,Choice of Law and Substantive Law for Trademark
Disputes on the Internet (PartOne), 31 I.I.C. 162, 163 (2000) ("Hitherto, the most frequent
cause of legal disputes on the internet has been the infringement of trademark rights.").
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that guide consumers through the maze of e-businesses. 9 However,
the very same technologies that make intellectual property rights
an increasingly pervasive part of a digitally networked world also
enable infringements of those rights on a massive scale, generating
new tensions between intellectual property owners and users over
the allocation of legal entitlements and the proper definition of
legitimate, noninfringing on-line activities.
Yettheinternationalintellectual property system has historically,
and paradoxically, been territorial in nature. Rather than developing a worldwide dispute resolution mechanism or a globally
uniform intellectual property code, states that are parties to the
major intellectual property treaties adopted a more decentralized
approach during more than a century of incremental treaty
revisions. They consigned the day-to-day enforcement of intellectual
property rights to private party actions before national courts
applying treaty-inspired domestic intellectual property laws and
conflicts rules.20 Serious and systemic treaty breaches were
reserved for state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms, such as
the one now operated under the auspices of the World Trade
Organization.21 Such a system may function effectively when the
19. See WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE (1995); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHERLAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology:A TeleologicalApproach to TrademarkLaw,
84 IOWA L. REV. 611 (1999) (discussing effect of technological advances on trademark law);
Sabra Chartrand, Trademarks GainAttention as Passportsto the Internet andfor a Critical
VoteAhead in Congress,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 25,2000, at C8 (noting the increasingly important
role of trademarks to Internet commerce because of the effect that trademark ownership has
on the ability to obtain corresponding domain names).
20. The "inspiration" came in the form of substantive minimum standards of protection
embodied in the treaties. See generally Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order,supra note 8;
Laurence R. Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPAgreement: The Case
for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INTVL L.J. 357, 367 (1998) [hereinafter
Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims]. Adherent states are, however, free to provide
protection in excess of the minimum standards. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 1C; LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS-REsuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), art. 1(1).
21. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2. Leading pre-TRIPS international intellectual
property agreements permitted a claim for violation of the treaty to be referred to the
International Court of Justice. Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and Artistic
Works (1971 Paris text), 1161 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 33; Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1967, art. 28, 21
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. However, because of a lack of effective enforcement
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key acts relating to intellectual property ownership and infringement can be localized within a particular national jurisdiction, but

it is ill-suited to address the kinds of fast-developing, multi22

jurisdictional conflicts that digital technologies can engender.

Indeed, the speed with which transborder conflicts now arise, both
in the intellectual property context and elsewhere, suggests that a
leisurely pace of lawmaking and institution building may simply be

inadequate to the challenges at hand.
Precisely because of its departure from preexisting (and slower)
models of lawmaking, the UDRP has received widespread press

coverage and public scrutiny.2 It has already been touted by
scholars and policy makers as a model for settling cyberspace
intellectual property disputes generally' (including digital copymechanisms, no state invoked the dispute settlement provisions. J.H. Reichman, Enforcing
the EnforcementProceduresof the TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INTL L. 335, 339 n.17 (1997).
22. Fora recent discussion, see American BarAssociation GlobalCyberspace Jurisdiction
Project,AchievingLegal andBusiness Orderin Cyberspace:A Report on GlobalJurisdiction
Issues Createdby the Internet 120-31 (July 11, 2000), reprintedat 55 BUS. LAW. 1801 (2000)
[hereinafter Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project]; Dinwoodie,ANew Copyright Order,supranote
8, at 483-85 (discussing the need for dynamism in international copyright law); i at 490-94
(discussing the limits of the classical model of public international copyright law).
To some extent, developments in EU intellectual property demonstrate that public
international lawmaking can respond effectively to the demands ofdigital technologies. But
intellectual property lawmaking in the EU is markedly different in character from the
classical form ofinternational intellectual property lawmaking law found at the global level
Id. at 495-97. To replicate the EU developments globally would require structural political
reforms, includingthe transfer of sovereignty and the establishment ofstanding institutions,
which almost no countrywould currently contemplate. And there would be no guarantee that
what has worked well in a relatively homogenous region such as the EU could do so in a
more diverse global setting. See generallyTHE EU, THE WTO AND THE NAFTA TOWARD A
COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (J.H. Weiler ed., 2000).
23. See, e.g., Susan Carpenter, Who Owns Your Name? Usually, It's Whoever Registered
It First,NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 2000, at C14; Jeri Clausing, In New Forumfor DomainName
Disputes, Trademark Holders Dominate, N.Y. TIMES, CyberLaw Journal, May 19, 2000,
available at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/05/cyber/cyberlaw/19law.html; Orrie
Dinstein & Elisabeth Cappuyns, PitfallsinlCAN'sDomainNameDisputePolicy,N.Y.L.J.,
Sept. 19,2000, at 1; ICANN Call It What I Want, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 9, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 8143536; Clive Mathieson, Easy Groupplays down domain name setback, THE
TIMES OF LONDON, Sept. 21, 2000, at 33; Jon Swartz, ProfiteersGet Squat for Web Names:
CybersquattersLose IntellectualPropertyRulings, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2000, at 1B; Wall
Street Journalwins domain name case, THE TORONTO GLOBE &MAIL, Sept. 21,2000, at T2.
24. See, e.g., Victoria Carrington, Internetneeds fast,fair dispute resolutionprocess, THE
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov. 17, 2000 (asking "whether the UDRP system that is now confined
to bad faith registrations ought to be and/or is capable of being expanded to include a broader
range of intellectual property disputes that take place on the Internet").
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right),2 and even for all Internet-related disputes. 26 Demand to

extend the UDRP is likely only to increase as the pressures of
globalization and the digital economy render traditional forms of
lawmaking less practical and less normatively compelling.
At present,2 7 however, the UDRP covers only a narrow segment
ofthe myriad ofintellectual property disputes currently percolating
in cyberspace. In essence, the UDRP establishes fast and inexpensive on-line procedures28 that allow trademark owners to
25. Some have suggested that a system modeled on the UDRP would supplement or even
supplant national court adjudication of the copyright infringement issues raised by the
"notice and takedown" rules imposed upon Internet Service Providers in the United States
and Europe. For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
26. See Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project, supra note 22, 1 1.4.7 (describing UDRP as a
"promising example" for creating "new forms of dispute resolution" by private parties and
governmental bodies for Internet disputes that cross national borders); see also Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunicationsofthe House Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. (2000) (testimony of D. Vinto G. Cerf,Chairman ofICANN) (referring favorably
to unnamed commentator who labeled the UDRP as "widely viewed as a model of dispute
resolution for the 21st Century'); HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Courtsand Intellectual
Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Mark A.
Thurman of the American Intellectual Property Law Association) (The UDRP is a good
example of an administrative procedure specifically developed for the Internet context. The
efficacy of this administrative procedure suggests that similar procedures might be effective
in resolving other types of Internet disputes."); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA andthe Constitution,50 DUKE L.J. 17
(2000) [hereinafter Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace] (suggesting both extended and
novel applications of ICANN's private lawmaking model); House Subcommittee Explores
InternetJurisdictionIssues, 1 INTERNET L. & Bus. 822, 824 (2000) (reporting testimony of
government officials concerning development of "private sector codes of conduct" for on-line
consumer transactions enforced through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms); Tim
Cole, ICANN Domain Name Dispute Policy - Year One, METRO. CORP. COUNs. 31 (2001)
(Assistant Director of Arbitration for National Arbitration Forum heralding UDRP "as a
model of dispute resolution for the 21st Century- a system specifically designed to serve
specific parties with specific issues").
127. Within six months ofthe commencement of proceedings under the UDRP, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) announced that it was undertaking a studyofthe
proposed expansion of the Policy at the behest of a number of countries. WIPO has just
issued its final report recommending some expansion of the UDRP. See WIPO, The
RecognitionofRights and the Use ofNames in the InternetDomainName Process,Report of
the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process(Sept. 3, 2001) [hereinafter FinalReport,
Second WIPO Internet DomainName Process], availableat http'//wipo2.wipo.int/process2/
report/pdf. For further discussion ofWIPO's lawmakingrole with respect to the domain name
system, see infra Part I.B.3.
28. Digital filing ofpleadings and e-mail communication between the dispute settlement
panel and the parties is the norm. The cost of initiating the proceeding ranges from $750 and
$2000 per challenged domain name for a one-person panel and $2200 to $4500 for a threeperson panel. Procedural rules and timetables are strictly enforced, with most decisions
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recapture domain names held by persons who register and use
domain names containing those marks in bad faith.2 9
Although the substantive content of the UDRP raises important
issues of intellectual property law, we are concerned primarily
with the process by which the UDRP was created, the way in which
it is operating, and the conditions necessary for its replication.'0
Therefore, while recognizing the important interconnections
between substance and process, Part I provides an historical
overview of the UDRP's genesis: from the initial proposal by a
consortium of Internet stakeholders, to its advocacy by the United
States government, to its study by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), and the final revisions and implementation
by ICANN. We also explain in Part I how the UDRP evolved from
three different decision making models: adjudication, arbitration,
and ministerial decision making. Although the drafters of the
UDRP chose this hybrid structure to suit the needs of its inherently
transborder setting, they did not foresee that the blending of these
three systems would produce a confused mandate for UDRP panels.
Part I builds upon this insight by explaining the problematic
nature of the checking functions within the UDRP. It contrasts the
new hybrid dispute settlement system with its separate arbitral,
ministerial, and judicial antecedents, noting in each case the
inadequate or skewed checking functions established
to control
UDRP panels. We contend that the conceptual blurring of checking
mechanisms created strong incentives for panelists to eschew
incrementalist decision-making methods and inevitably gave
momentum to the development of the Policy beyond its purportedly
limited scope.
issued within 45 days of the filing of a complaint. For details concerning each of the four
UDRP dispute settlement providers, see http'J/www.arbforum.com/domains/domainrules02010l.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001); http-/arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/rules/
supplemental.html (lastvisited Oct. 3,2001); http'/www.cpradr.org/ICANNRulesAndFees.
htm (last visited Oct. 3,2001); and http'/www.eresolution.ca/servicestdnd/p-r/supprules.htm
(last modified Sept. 23, 2001).

29. The UDRP rests upon several central concepts defined in the Policy, principally"bad
faith" registration and "use" by persons who have no "rights or legitimate interests" in a
domain name. For a discussion ofthese terms, see infra Part I.B.3.
30. Cf Paul B. Stephan, The Futilityof UnificationandHarmonizationin International

CommercialLaw, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 743, 796 (1999) (attempting to "shift the focus of private
international law scholarship from substantive law to the lawmaking process").
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In Part III, we first address whether the UDRP can be applied in
the absence of exclusive technological control of the type that
ICANN now exercises over the domain name system. We conclude
that such technological control is a sufficient but not a necessary
condition for replicating the UDRP. But such replication should not
occur without first questioning how a non-national paradigm ought
to be structured. In particular, we identify the conceptual variables
that will affect the viability of all non-national structures. These
variables primarily flow from our analysis of the TDRP, but they
have relevance far beyond that context. Indeed, legitimate and
effective non-national structures cannot be developed without first
giving careful attention to the parameters within which such
structures operate, and to their relationship with national, international, and supranational institutions that until now have been
the sole mechanisms for regulating transborder conduct.
I. HYBRID NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE UDRP
In this Part, we present a historical overview of the UDRP's
formation. In particular, we focus on how its progenitors came
to establish a hybrid decision-making structure that draws on
elements found in arbitration, adjudication, and ministerial
decision-making systems. We also illustrate the complex interplay
between government and private lawmaking bodies that characterized the UDRP's evolution. In doing so, we contrast the drafters'
official history, which emphasizes the openness of the lawmaking
process that created the UDRP, with the views of critics who
challenge its legitimacy. Before turning to these narratives, we first
explain the context in which trademark-domain name disputes
arise.
A FramingTrademark-DomainName Conflicts
The need for domestic and international laws to regulate the
interface between trademarks and domain names arises from the
complex nature of domain names. Domain names designate
Internet Protocol addresses used by computers linked to the
Internet, and they may also act as source-identifiers (i.e. as
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trademarks).' Indeed, existing trademarks can be registered as
domain names.3 2 However, various aspects of the domain name
system pit that system against basic principles of trademark law.
The low cost of domain name registration relative to the costs of
building goodwill in a trademark, the uniqueness of each string of
alphanumeric characters as an Internet address, and the global
Internet presence that each address establishes, have spawned
repeated conflicts between the owners of trademarks and domain
name registrants. It is, however, the first-come-first-served registration policy for second level domain names 3 in the three principal
Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs)"4 that is the primary cause of
conflict. This policy permits ownership of a domain name incorporating a trademarked term to reside in someone other than the
relevant mark owner.
Reconciling the competing interests of trademark owners and
domain name registrants has not proved an easy task, either

31. Dan L. Burk, TrademarksAlong the Infobak" A FirstLook at the Emerging Law of
Cybermarks, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1,
30 (Spring 1995), at http:/www.richmond.
edu/JOLT/vliliburk.html ("Domain names ... appear to be both names and addresses; they
both locate and identify Internet resources."); Marshall Leaffer, Domain Names,
Globalization and Internet Governance, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139, 145 (1998)
(domain names both designate where information is to be sent on the Internet and they often
"indicate origin").
32. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National)Trademark Laws and the (NonNational) Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 495 (2000) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie, NationallNon-Nationall.
33. Registration by individuals or corporations occurs with respect to the second level
domain names, that is, the part of the domain name appearing before the top level domain
name. For example, in the domain name coke.com, "coke" is the second level domain name
and .com is the generic top level domain. No single individual owns the top level domains.
34. The present generic top level domain names include .edu, .com, .gov, .org, .net, .int,
and .mil, although ICANN has approved the creation of a variety of new top level domain
names. In addition to the generic top level domains, domain names can be registered in
country code top level domains (ccTLDs). The administration of ccTLDs is delegated by
ICANN (formerly bythe InternetAssigned Numbers Authority) to authorities inthe relevant
country. See generallyDiane Cabell, ForeignDomainName Disputes2000,17 COMPUTER&
INTERNET LAW. 5 (Oct. 2000).
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nationally,3 5 or internationally. 6 The territorial nature of trademark rights, the lack of a single body of rules governing trademarkdomain name disputes, the difficulty oflocating registrants, and the
possibility that different domain name registrants own multiple
iterations of a preexisting mark all make the prospect of litigating
before national courts protracted, expensive, and perhaps even
futile. Not surprisingly, trademark owners have expressed interest
in streamlined and inexpensive non-national dispute settlement
alternatives, particularly for disputes with a class of domain name
registrants known as cybersquatters"
This demand for non-national cybersquatting dispute resolution
has persisted even as national legislatures have enacted new
statutes specifically to combat cybersquatting, 8 and national courts
have applied existing unfair competition laws against it. 9 Two
reasons in particular explain this continued pressure. First, the
ability of national law to reach domain name registrants located
35. Even within the United States, which has the most developed body of case law
concerning domain name conflicts, courts have struggled to adapt traditional trademark
doctrines such as likelihood of confusion, dilution, and trademark fair use to the domain
name system. See Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain
Name System, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 149,151,154 (2000) (noting the mixed success
by U.S. trademark owners seeking to use "the trademark law already on the books" to
challenge ownership of domain names assigned under the first-come-first-served policy).
36. See WIPO Joint Resolution on Well-Known Marks, Joint Resolution Concerning
Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, General Report ofthe Assemblies of the
Member States of WIPO, 34th Annual Meeting, Doc. A/34/16 15 171-83 (Sept. 1999)
(adopting provisions on the use ofwell-known marks in domain names).
37. In its narrowest incarnation, cybersquatting is the act of registering a second level
domain name that utilizes a preexisting trademark for the exclusive purpose of selling that
domain name to the trademark owner for a profit. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR CoMPETrIoN §§ 25.69.1, 25.77 (1999). In courts, legislatures, and commentaries,
cybersquatting has provoked an almost moral outrage and is often labeled as a form of
blackmail, ransom, or piracy that is a clear abuse ofthe domain name system. See id. § 25.77
(characterizing cybersquatting as "ransoming [a domain name] back to the legitimate
owner"); Litman, supranote 35, at 155 (noting that "domain name speculators struck courts
as profoundly offensive").
38. E.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1536 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999)).
39. Dinwoodie, National/Non-National,supra note 32, at 508 n.43 (citing cases from
China, France, Germany, India, and the United Kingdom); see also Domain Name
CybersquatterLoses in GroundbreakingJapaneseLitigation,15 WIPO REP. 7 (2001) (same
under Japanese Unfair Competition Law); Seoul DistrictCourtEnjoins Use ofMastercard
DomainName, 14WIPO REP. 394 (2000) (reportingthe use of Korean unfair competition law
against cybersquatting of registrations in the Korean country code domain).
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in foreign jurisdictions is unsettled and controversial.' Second,
litigating even easy cases under national laws in national courts
imposes significant costs, creating incentives for trademark owners
to pay the ransom cybersquatters demand rather than litigate.
Inexpensive, non-national dispute settlement could resolve both of
these concerns, eliminating the uncertainty of applying national
laws extraterritorially and placing a cap on the price a squatter
could extract from the mark owner. But whether a non-national
dispute settlement system in fact achieves these results depends
entirely on its structure, a subject to which we now turn.
B. The Evolution of Non-NationalDispute Settlement for
Cybersquatting
Although the earliest conflicts between trademark owners and
domain name registrants date back to the opening of the Internet
to commerce in the early 1990s, proposals to develop non-national
mechanisms
to resolve these conflicts are of a far more recent
41

vintage.

40. For example, U.S. courts may not exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign
registrants merely because they have registered a domain name with a registrarbased in the
United States. See Heathmount A.E. v. Technodome.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va.
2000). For this reason, among others, Congress extended the basic cause of action available
under the ACPA to such registrations based upon the attachment jurisdiction ofthe courts.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). But even that cause ofaction cannot enable
U.S. courts to reach foreign domain name registrants who register domain names with a
foreign registrar. The value of this in rem provision to trademark owners is seen in the
concern expressed by the International Trademark Association that provisions in the draft
Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Judgments, see infra Part III.B.7.,
might require the United States to repeal the provision. See International Trademark
Association, Comments on the Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and the
RecognitionofJudgments(Dec. 1,2000), availableat http'/www.uspt.gov/web/offlces/dcomr
olia/tmcybpiracy/haguecomments.pdf.
41. Between 1995 and November 1999, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) sought to
implement a series ofnondiscretionaryrules to regulate conflicts between trademark owners
and domain name registrants. Briefly stated, that policy used temporal priority to establish
rights to second level domain names that were identical to registered trademarks. If the
trademark owner's registration predated the registrant's purchase ofthe domain name, and
if the registrant could not establish its own superior trademark rights, then NSI put the
contested domain name on hold. The parties were then forced to initiate judicial proceedings
to determine ownership of the domain name, with NSI maintaining the status quo pending
a court order concerning ownership. For a useful review, see Milton Mueller, Technology and
InstitutionalInnovations:InternetDomain Names, 5 INT'L J. CoMM. L. & POL. 1, 7-8 (2000)
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1. The gTLD-MoU's Administrative Challenge Panels (ACPs)
In 1996, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) and
the Internet Society42 organized the Internet Ad Hoc Committee
(IAHC) to revise the increasingly outdated structure of the Internet
domain-name system. 3 In February 1997, IAHC published a
document known as the Generic Top Level Domain Memorandum
of Understanding (gTLD-MoU or the Memorandum)." The gTLDMoU's principal objective was to establish a self-regulating, marketoriented mechanism for governing the domain name system. It
advocated the creation of several new generic top level domains to
be operated by a consortium of private, geographically-dispersed
domain-name registrars operating under a common registration
45
policy.

A key component of that policy was an expedited, on-line dispute
settlement system applicable to all registrars operating within
the new gTLDs. As discussed in greater detail below, the centerpiece of this system was the Administrative Domain Name
Challenge Panels (ACPs) to be located within WIPO's Arbitration
and Mediation Center. The ACPs were to receive complaints by

[hereinafter Mueller, Technology and Institutional Innovations], available at
http://www.ijclp.org5_2000/pdf.ijclp-webdoc.-l_5_2000.pdf. The NSI policy was roundly
condemned from all sides, and all but ignored in subsequent proposals for domain name
dispute settlement.
42. The Internet Society is a nongovernmental international organization for global
cooperation and coordination for the Internet and its internetworking technologies and
applications. All About the Internet Society, at http:J/www.isoc.org/isoc/ (last visited Oct. 8,
2001). The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (LANA) is the central coordinator for the
assignment of unique parameter values for Internet protocols. See Robert Shaw, Internet
Domain Names: Whose DomainIs This?, at http'//people.itu.int-shaw/docs/dns.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2001).
43. IAHC was comprised of an unusual consortium of international organizations,
domestic governmental bodies, and private entities, including the Internet Architecture
Board, the IANA, the Internet Society, the International Telecommunications Union, the
International Trademark Association, the National Science Foundation, and WIPO. IAHC
was dissolved on May 1, 1997. See http://www.iahc.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
44. Internet Ad Hoc Committee, Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, Establishment
of a Memorandum of Understanding on the Generic Top Level Domain Name Space of the
Internet Domain Name System (gTLD-MoU) (Feb. 28, 1997) [hereinafter gTLD-MoUJ],
available at http://www.gtrd-mou.org/gTLD-MoU.html.
45. See id. § 2(d); Developments in the Law-The Law ofCyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1574, 1666-67 (1999).
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certain intellectual property owners concerning second level domain
names registered in these gTLDs.'
a. The gTLD-MoU's Authority for Creatingthe ACPs
The authority of IAHC to establish the ACPs was somewhat

uncertain. On the one hand, the Memorandum contemplated
that the International Telecommunications Union would act as a
public depository for signatories to the gTLD-MoU, much in the
way a treaty would be administered,4 7 Yet the drafters of the
Memorandum expressly disclaimed its status as a source of public
international law, an entirely sensible position given the non-

governmental character of some of its proposed signatories.4"
In the absence of any clear legal antecedents, the true source of
legitimacy for this novel dispute settlement system was to be found,

if at all, in the sovereignty of netizens in matters of the Internet.49
More practically, if a broad consensus on the content of the
dispute settlement policy could be achieved, the policy could then
be enforced through a web of nominally consensual contractual
relationships between domain name registrants and registrars."0
46. gTLD-MoU, supra note 44, §§ 2(f), 8.
47. Id. pmbl. The International Telecommunications Union is a specialized agency ofthe
United Nations; see also Mueller, Technology and InstitutionalInnovations,supranote 41,
at 17 (noting that the drafters of gTLD-MoU "organized an official signing ceremony in
Geneva in an attempt to assume all of the trappings of an international treaty agreemen").
48. [Revised] Substantive Guidelines Concerning Administrative Domain Name
Challenge Panels, at 3 (May 23, 1997), at http://www.gtld-mou.org/docs/racps.htm
[hereinafter Revised Substantive Guidelines] ("[T]he establishment of this procedure is not
in any way the creation of an international law ...."); see also Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. 2(1), opened for signatureMay 23,1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention] (defining a 'treaty" as an international agreement concluded between
States), availableat http'/www.sils.org/Docs-Text-VCT.htm.
49. See infra Part lI.B.1. (discussing sources of legitimacy for non-national Internet
regulation); see also Joseph P. Liu, Legitimacy and Authority in Internet Coordination:A
Domain Name Case Study, 74 IND. L.J. 587, 603 (1999) (arguing that informal and
participatory consensus model used to adopt the Internet's technical standards is ill-suited
to public policy questions such as the structure and ownership ofthe domain name system).
50. Domain name registrars who joined a Council of Registrars (CORE) contemplated
that the Memorandum would bind them to implementACP decisions. Individual registrants,
in turn, would submit themselves to the jurisdiction ofthe ACPs when applying to register
a domain name with any such registrar. Memorandum of Understanding for the Internet
Council of Registrars arts. 7(b), 7(c) (May 1, 1997), available at http'i/www.gtldmou.org/docs/core-mou.htm.
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Yet the gTLD-MoU did not attract a broad spectrum of
adherents. National governments declined to support the plan,
and some critics claimed it was unduly beholden to trademark
interests.51 Others challenged the new system's accountability,
asserting that the proposal "would tighten control of the Internet by
IANA and the engineering community, thereby leaving a group of
academics in charge of an increasingly commercial Internet."52 As
a result, the gTLD-MoU failed to achieve a critical mass of support
and was soon short-circuited by the United States government's
plan to privatize key aspects of the domain name system. 3
b. The Hybrid Nature of ACP Dispute Settlement
Notwithstanding the failure of the gTLD-MoU to achieve
widespread acceptance, the ACP proposal is worthy of analysis,
both because of the difficulty of situating it within any preexisting
model of dispute settlement and as an antecedent to similar
conceptual ambiguities found in the later-adopted UDRP. In
particular, the ACP proposal would have created a new dispute
settlement creature that blended public and private elements and
that was not wholly ministerial, judicial, or arbitral in nature.

51. Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private,14 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 1071, 1081 (1999); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Semi.Private International
Rulemaking: Lessons Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process,at 10 (Aug. 26, 1999)
[hereinafter Froomkin, Semi-PrivateRulemaking] ("Critics of the gTLD-MoU charged that
its author and proponents were over-solicitous of trademark interests .... "), availableat
http'lwww.law.miami.edu/-froomkinarticles/tprc99.pdf (draft on file with authors);
Mueller, Technology and Institutional Innovations, supra note 47, at 16 (gTLD-MoU
contained "concessions to trademark owners" which gave them "extraordinary power over
domain name registrations').
52. Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 1666; see also Heather N. Mewes,
MemorandumofUnderstandingon the Generic Top-LevelDomainNameSpace oftheInternet
DomainNameSystem, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 235,242 (1998) (characterizing gTLD-MoU's
as a"self-appointed, unaccountable, and illegitimate decision-making body" based in part on
its failure to include national governments in the decision-making process and the
participation of United Nations specialized agencies).
53. Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 1666. The United States government
exercised de facto veto power over the domain name system as a result of its control over the
domain name root server. See Milton Mueller, ICANN and internet governance: sorting
through the debris of 'self-regulation,' 1 INFO 497, 498 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter Mueller,
ICANN and internet governance].
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Throughout the public comment and revision period, the ACP
guidelines sought to downplay the power and authority of dispute
settlement panels. The guidelines stated that ACPs would perform
solely "an administrative function" in deciding disputes between
intellectual property right owners and domain name registrants."
They rejected the contention that the ACPs constituted "an
international court" or even "a legal authority," and renounced any
"jurisdiction over persons, or over the interpretation and
enforce55
ment of national or regional intellectual property laws."
In a limited way, this nondiscretionary "administrative" vision
(approximating ministerial decision making) was accurate.56 The
guidelines for the first iteration of the proposal set forth "objective
standards and criteria" to be applied by the ACPs. Those criteria
preceded by the word "shall" were deemed to be conclusive, such
that "if met, they automatically result in fulfillment of the
standard." 7 For example, under the first iteration of the policy, if
a complaining party could show thirty-five or more trademark
registrations for the same goods or services in at least four
geographical locations, the panel would be required to conclude
that its mark was "internationally known" and thus eligible for
protection under the policy.5"
Yet numerous other provisions of the proposal belie the claim
that the ACPs were merely performing a ministerial function. For
54. Third Revised Draft, Substantive Guidelines Concerning Administrative Domain
Name Challenge Panels (Jan. 16,1998) at 2 [hereinafter Third Revised Draft], availableat
http:/www.gtld-mou.orgldocs/tracps.htm.
55. Revised Substantive Guidelines, supra note 48, at 3(c). The gTLD-MoU sought to
justify this narrow interpretation of the ACP powers by emphasizing that panels would in
no way "inhibit, affect or prevent the power of the appropriate national or regional courts to
hear cases interpreting and enforcing intellectual property rights that fall within their
jurisdiction." gTLD-MoU, supranote 44, § 8(c); see also Third Revised Draft, supra note 54,

at 2 (parties to ACP proceedings not precluded from filing complaints before national courts
or initiating other forms of dispute settlement).
56. For a definition of "ministerial" in this context, see infra notes 244-46 and

accompanying text.
57. Revised Substantive Guidelines, supranote 48, § IV 2.
58. Id. §§ IV, IV(A). The decision as to whether a registration relates to the same goods
or services is not necessarily a nondiscretionary one, however. For example, United States
trademark registrations may, because of their limitation to the goods upon which the mark

has been used, contain quite different descriptions of goods and services than those found
elsewhere. Thus, wouldregistrationinthe same international class be sufficientto constitute
the same goods or services, orwould the standard require a complete identity of description?
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example, in its final request for comments, the gTLD-MoU's Policy
Oversight Committee asserted that the ACPs would "solv[e]
difficult international jurisdictional and choice of law issues," would
"efficiently deal with the problem of domain name trafficking," and
would "uniquely, take into account the interests of legitimate
domain name users as well as trademark owners."5 9 No administrative body with purely ministerial powers could solve such
intractable problems or engage in such delicate balancing of
competing policies.
How, then, would the ACPs achieve these ambitious goals? As
even a cursory review of the ACP guidelines makes clear, the ACPs
were also granted broad powers that were decidedly judicial in
nature.6 0 The panels were to apply numerous sets of "criteria" and
"factors" to decide questions such as the nature and scope of the
claimant's intellectual property rights, the countervailing rights of
the respondent domain-name owner, and the interests of third
parties, including governmental or regional authorities. 61 Above all,
panels were to balance all the relevant
circumstances and the
6
competing rights of all parties involved.
The broad and discretionary scope ofremedies available to panels
was equally suggestive of a judicial procedure. Panels could
provisionally suspend or permanently exclude any second level
domain name from use by the registrant or anyone other than the
complainant. In exceptional cases, ACPs could even proactively
exclude a second level domain name from use throughout the gTLD
system by anyone other than the intellectual property owner.
Finally, subject to the agreement of both parties, panels could
modify the domain name, for example by reassigning it to a
different gTLD, or by indexing or web site linking.6 3 ACP decisions,
including an apportionment or award of costs, were to be published
59. gTLD-MoU Policy Oversight Committee, Requestfor Comments, at 2 (Jan.16,1988),
availableat http:J/www.gtld-mou.org/docs/notice-98-O1.html.
60. For a more detailed discussion of the scope of ACPs' substance and powers, see G.
Peter Albert, Jr., Eminent Domain Names: The Struggle to Gain Control of the Internet
DomainName System, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 781, 795-814 (1998).
61. See Third Revised Draft, supranote 54, § V; IAHC, FinalReportof the International
AdHoc Committee:RecommendationsforAdministrationandManagementofgTLDs, § 7.1.2
(Feb. 4, 1997), availableat http-/lwww.gtld-mou.orgdraft-iahc-recommend-O0.html.
62. Revised Substantive Guidelines, supra note 48, §§ IV, V(A).
63. Third Revised Draft, supra note 54, § III(A).
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on WIPO's web site. Affected parties dissatisfied with a decision
could appeal it to a three-member ACP Appeal Panel, which would
have possessed discretionary jurisdiction to decide whether the
panel made "an obvious and material mistake of fact or was
manifestly unreasonable."6
The ACPs judicial functions on matters of substance, however,
were situated within a broader framework of international
arbitration. The gTLD-MoU proposal required WIPO's Arbitration
and Mediation Center to draft a comprehensive set of procedural
rules for ACPs. The rules, which on the whole paralleled those
of established centers of international commercial arbitration,
including those of the WIPO Center,65 addressed such traditional
arbitral concerns as the selection, composition, and qualifications
of the panelists, and the conduct of the proceedings. They also
conferred upon the WIPO Center certain oversight functions,
including the consolidation of claims, the appointment of the panel
from its roster of decision makers, and review of party challenges
to individual arbitrators.66
c. Narrowingthe Scope of EligibleDisputes
Perhaps as a result of the ACPs' novel features, the stakeholders
to be affected by ACP rulings sought to narrow the scope of
registrant conduct eligible for mandatory panel review. Thus, the
revised versions of the proposal introduced a screening device67 that
64. Id. § VII. The Appeal Panel's discretionary authority emanated from its power to
"summarily dismiss the appealifit is apparent that the determination made no such mistake
or was not manifestly unreasonable." Id.
65. See WIPO Arbitration Rules (effective Oct. 1, 1994) (on file with authors).
66. See Tricia A. Hoefling, The (Draft) WIPO Arbitration Rules for Administrative
ChallengePanelProceduresConcerningInternetDomainNames, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 173
(1997). The WIPO ACP Arbitration Rules themselves are reproduced in Stuart Levi et al.,
The DomainName System & Trademarks,520 PLI/Pat 9, 93 (1998).
Other traditional features of international arbitration were wholly absent from the ACP
proposal These included the voluntary decision by both parties to submit to arbitrationin
the first instance; the choice of substantive and procedural rules and participation in
appointing the panel; and the nonfinality of any award for purposes of subsequent review by
national courts. The existence of an appeal panel also departed from the traditional arbitral
model. See Hoefling, supra note 66, at 178 n.15, 184-85; Revised Substantive Guidelines,
supranote 48, § V(A).
67. This narrowing of the scope of the proposal was offset, to some extent, by changing
the entities eligible to file ACP complaints. The initial proposal allowed complainants to file
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permitted panels to hear a complaint against a domain name owner
only if that person had "manifestly acted in bad faith" or if there
was a"[mianifest [imbalance [bletween the [rights and [ilnterests
of the [p]arties."6 The policy listed domain name "trafficking" as
the only concrete example of conduct falling within these jurisdictional limits, although it gave that term a rather broad and openended interpretation.6 9 For other types of cases, such as those
involving "conflicting but evenly balanced intellectual property
rights," the policy required the panel to find that the case was not
appropriate for the ACP and permitted it to recommend other forms
of dispute resolution.7"
2. The WIPO DomainName ConsultativeProcess
Each of these three attributes of the failed ACP proposal-the
questioning of its authority and legitimacy, the hybrid nature of its
dispute settlement architecture, and a narrowing of the subject
matter of disputes eligible for review-was to be repeated as the
focus of policymaking shifted in 1998 to the United States
government and then back to WIPO. Initially, it was the U.S.
aclaim with the ACP only ifits trademark was"internationallyknown." Revised Substantive
Guidelines, supranote 48, § II (characterizing international knowledge of trademark as the
"entry standard" for ACP proceedings). This hurdle was abandoned in subsequent proposals
to allow all trademark owners to submit complaints to the ACPs. It would be consistent with
international (and most national) trademark law to accord owners of well-known marks
greater protection than owners of marks generally. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Federalized
Functionalism:The FutureofDesignProtectionin the EuropeanUnion,24AM. INTELL. PROP.
L. Ass'N Q.J. 611, 655 n.123 (1996) (discussing the linkage in intellectual property law
between thresholds for protection and the scope of protection).
68. Third Revised Draft, supranote 54, § V(B). This screening requirement, however, did
not apply to the separate proposal to allow trademark owners proactively to exclude on an
ex parte basis domain name ownership by anyone other than themselves.
69. Id. The policy stated:
The ACP may make a determination in favor of a Party when it finds
that the other Party has engaged in trafficking (cybersquatting,
cyberjesting or warehousing), through the deliberate registration of an
SLD [second level domain name] without relevant rights, on account of
the SLD being identical or confusingly similar to the alphanumeric string
that is the subject ofthe Claimant's intellectual property right, in order
to hoard or to resell the domain name, or for other cognate purposes.
Id.
70. Id.
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Department of Commerce that intervened in the debate over the
structure of the domain name system. In its February 1998 Green
Paper and its June 1998 White Paper, the Department proposed a
plan to transfer control of the domain name system to a private,
nonprofit corporation.7 '
In addition to addressing larger questions of Internet governance,
the White Paper also considered how trademark-domain name
controversies should be resolved. Responding to public comments
suggesting the need for an on-line dispute resolution mechanism to
provide inexpensive and efficient alternatives to litigation, the
White Paper proposed a process of international consultations
conducted under the auspices of WIPO. These discussions were to
culminate in a proposal to the new corporation concerning three
issues: (1) a uniform dispute settlement system, (2) protection of
famous trademarks, and (3) the effect of creating new gTLDs on
intellectual property rights.72 The White Paper acknowledged that
these issues were highly controversial. For this reason, it urged
that the jurisdiction of any new dispute settlement body be limited
to instances of"cybersquatting and cyberpiracy," leaving to national
courts cases in which"legitimate competing rights" are concerned. 7

71. Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed.
Reg. 8826 (Feb. 20, 1998); Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg.
31,741 (June 10, 1998) [hereinafter White Paper].
72. The White Paper's core recommendation providedThe U.S. Government will seek international support to call upon the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to initiate a balanced
and transparent process, which includes the participation of trademark
holders and members ofthe Internet community who are not trademark
holders, to (1) develop recommendations for a uniform approach to
resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberpiracy (as
opposed to conflicts between trademark holders with legitimate
competing rights), (2) recommend a process for protecting famous
trademarks in the generic top level domains, and (3) evaluate the effects
... of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on
trademark and intellectual property holders. These findings and
recommendations could be submitted to the board ofthe new corporation
for its consideration in conjunction with its development of registry and
registrar policy and the creation and introduction of new gTLDs.
White Paper, supra note 71, at 31,747.
73. Id.
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a. Authority for WIPO Consultationsand Proposals
Before turning to the substance of the proposals WIPO generated
in response to the White Paper, it is necessary to address the
source of WIPO's authority (upon the request of the United States
government) to engage in these consultations and to publish its
proposals. As we indicate below, there is a significant debate over
that issue.
From one perspective, WIPO's consultative process was a natural
and unobjectionable outgrowth of its functions as a specialized
agency of the United Nations charged with "promot[ing] the
protection of intellectual property throughout the world. ' 4 As
part of this treaty-based mandate, WIPO administers the major
intellectual property conventions, provides legal and technical
assistance to national governments, organizes international
conferences, creates expert commissions and standing committees,
prepares studies on intellectual property issues, and holds
conferences at which new international intellectual property
agreements are negotiated. According to the WIPO secretariat, the
two hallmarks that characterize all of these activities are
"communication and international cooperation."75
True to this tradition, WIPO initiated a multi-staged and broadbased consultative process to consider the issues raised in the
White Paper. In July 1998, it issued an initial Request for
Comments to "obtain[] consensus on the issues to be addressed,"
followed by a period during which it solicited comments and held
consultations with interested parties.76 WIPO also convened a
geographically and ideologically balanced panel of experts to advise
it on drafting recommendations. It published an interim report in
late December 1998, 7' invited a further round of comments and
74. Convention EstablishingtheWorld IntellectualProperty Organization, July 14,1967
(as amended on Sept. 28, 1979), art. 3(i) [hereinafter WIPO Convention], available at
http:/www.wipo.intmembers/convention/Conl.htm. As of January 1, 2000, 171 membercountries belonged to WIPO.
75. WIPO, General Information, at http:/www.wipo.inttabout-wipo/cn/gib.htm (last
modified June 2000).
76. WIPO, Interim Report of the WIPO Domain Name Process 25 (Dec. 23, 1998)
[hereinafter Interim Report], available at http://wipo2.wipo.intprocessl/rfc/3/index htmL

77. Interim Report, supra note 76.
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consultations, and then drafted a detailed and comprehensive final
report on April 30, 1999, nine months after initiating the process. 78
Throughout this period, WIPO solicited input from a wide
spectrum of interested parties, including national governments,
intergovernmental organizations, professional associations, and
private corporations and individuals. It also used four distinct
modalities to maximize that input: (1) a trilingual web site for
publication of information, documents, and commentary; (2) an
open, unmoderated listserve discussion forum; (3) the mailing of
hard copies of the requests for comments to the governments and
industrial property officers of each of its more than 170 member
states and to each nongovernmental organization accredited as a
WIPO observer; and (4) a series of open consultation meetings held
in the major regions of the world. 9
Notwithstanding these multifarious efforts to promote public
awareness and input, the WIPO process merits careful scrutiny.
First, WIPO was engaged in an act of collaboration between public
and private entities quite unlike its historical role.80 It acted upon
a request from a single national government (the United States) to
convene a study that would ultimately be submitted for consideration not by other national governments, or by a conference of
governmental representatives negotiating a new treaty, but rather
by a private corporation that was not even in existence at the time
the WIPO study commenced. This private corporation had the
power, through its control over the domain name system and its
relationship with the United States government, to implement the
WIPO proposals without further consultation with or approval by
any of the many affected national governments."
78. WIPO, FinalReport of the WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (Apr. 30, 1999)
[hereinafterFinalReport],available
athttp//wipo2.wipo.inttprocessl/reporfinalreport.html;
see also Harald Tveit Alvestrand, My comments to the WIPO process and its result, at
http//www.alvestrand.noietf/wiponote.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (member of panel of
experts referring to final stages of WIPO consultative process as a 'fast and furious
endgame").
79. Interim Report, supra note 76,
24-29; FinalReport, supra note 78, ' 26-31 &
Annexes II & III.
80. Professor Michael Froomkin has referred to this collaboration as an act of "semiprivate rulemaking." Froomkin, Semi-PrivateRulemaking, supranote 51, at 2.
81. WIPO does on occasion advise and provide technical assistance to single governments
on the development of intellectual property laws. However, the laws that result from this
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To be sure, WIPO's legislative body, the General Assembly,
authorized the WIPO Secretariat to conduct the process and later
approved the final report (five months after the Secretariat had
submitted it to ICANN)."2 These endorsements, however, do not
alter the fact that the consultative process sharply diverged from
traditional forms of WIPO contributions to rulemaking, such as the
drafting of model national laws or expert reports to support
multilateral treaty negotiations.' In the latter instances, WIPO's
proposals-no matter how expertly researched or enriched by input
from affected constituencies-are filtered through one or often
several layers of additional review as individual national governments decide whether (and with what modifications) to enact the
model law or ratify the treaty. In contrast, these traditional
democratic checks on WIPO's powers were wholly absent from the
domain name process.
IfWIPO's consultations were truly broad-based and transparent,
much of the force of this legitimacy critique might be blunted.
advice are typically national in nature, and directly affect only the country that is seeking
advice and guidance.
82. WIPO, GeneralReport adoptedby theAssemblies ofthe MemberStates,Item 14 ofthe
ConsolidatedAgenda: Intellectual Property and the Electronic Commerce 156 (Sept. 15,
1998) (approving of Secretariat's undertaking of consultative process), available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/document/govbody/wogb/aa33_8-14.htm#643_157650; WIPO
General Assembly, Twenty-Fourth (14th Ordinary)Session, Report adoptedby the General
Assembly, WIPO Doc. No. WO/GA/24/12
13 (Sept. 29, 1999) (approving of results of
consultative process and submission of final report to ICANN), available at httpJ/wipo.
org/cng/document/govbody/wo.gb.galga2412.htm.
83. WIPO is engaging in a variety ofnew soft-law initiatives that are more removed from
these typical roles. See, e.g., WIPO, Assemblies ofthe Member Statesof WIPO, Thirty-Fourth
Seriesof Meetings (Sept. 1999), JointResolution ConcerningProvisionson the Protectionof
Well-Known Marks, WIPO Doc. No. A/34/13 9, at 3 (Aug. 4, 1999) ("Ihiscreates no legal
obligation for any country, but following such a recommendation would produce practical
benefits."), available athttp'/wvww.wipo.int/eng/document/govbody/wo-gb-ablpdf/a34_ 13.pdf;
WIPO General Assembly, GeneralAssembly, Twenty-Third (10th Extraordinary)Session,
Activities of the Standing Committee on the Law ofPatents (SCP), the Standing Committee
on the Law of Trademarks,IndustrialDesigns and GeographicalIndications(SCT) and the
StandingCommitteeon Information Technologies(SCIT), WIPO Doc. No. WO/GA/23/1 (Sept.
4, 1998) (noting the establishment of standing committees and discussing their activities),
availableat http'/www.wipo.org/eng/documentgovbody/wo-gb-ga/ga23_l.htm. Some of these
are attracting scholarly criticism. See William R. Cornish, Genevan Bootstraps, 19 EUR.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 336 (1997) (complaining that WIPO's publication of Notes on the Model
Provisions on Unfair Competition was an attempt to promote a particular, expansive
interpretation of international treaty obligations).
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Filtering proposals through national governmental processes serves
as a democratic check on lawmaking because those processes
provide a vehicle for airing a range of views held by interested
actors. But if Internet participants can contribute directly to the
process of creating the norms that govern their on-line conduct,
why settle for an indirect, second-best alternative?
Theoretically, two rejoinders apply. First, direct participation via
active Internet communities has been subjected to persuasive
critiques by those who doubt its efficacy as a tool of representational lawmaking."' Second, states may have interests apart from
the citizens who participate directly in Internet activities because
states represent the interests of many who, although uninvolved in
the construction of the Internet, are affected by it.
Yet even assuming these theoretical challenges can be overcome,
practical difficulties of ensuring an open and representative lawmaking process remain. As U.S. law professor and WIPO expert
panelist Michael Froomkin has argued in articles and position
papers published during and after the WIPO consultations, 5 formal
transparency in theory cannot ensure broad-based participation in
fact. From Froomldn's perspective as a critical insider, the consultative process was "not well understood by the public or even key
participants" 6 and suffered from a number of flaws, including an
unduly rushed timetable for review and comments, domination of
meetings by commercial and intellectual property interests, and the
addition of new information by WIPO staff after the close of the
public comment period and with insufficient input from the panel
of experts.8 7
These critical observations by a key participant do not negate
WIPO's significant ' accomplishments, but they clearly affect the
84. E.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance:A Skeptical View From
LiberalDemocraticTheory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395 (2000) (critiquing claim that a self-governing
cyberspace would more fully realize liberal democratic ideals).
85. A. Michael Froomkin, OfGovernments and Governance, 14 BERKLEYTECH. L.J. 617
(1999) [hereinafter Froomkin, Governance]; Froonkin,Semi.PrivateRulemaking,
supranote
51; A. Michael Froomkin,A Commentaryon WIPO's The ManagementoflnternetNamesand
Addresses: Intellectual Property Issues (May 19, 1999) [hereinafter Froomkin, WIPO
Commentary], availableat http://www.law.miniami.edu/-amf/cornmentary.htm.
86. Froomkin, Semi-PrivateRulemaking, supra note 51, at 2.
87. Froomkin, WIPO Commentary, supranote 85, 11 N-17.
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"perceptions of fair and encompassing process" upon which the
political legitimacy of this novel lawmaking exercise depended. 8
They also made WIPO more vulnerable to the charges of its critics
that it was acting as an advocate for one view of intellectual
property protection rather than as a neutral exponent of a more
balanced policy. 9
WIPO's past participation in the failed gTLD-MoU regime, which
some observers viewed as unduly pro-trademark, also fueled this
perception of bias.9" Recall that the gTLD-MoU proposal for ACPs
would have set up WIPO's Mediation and Arbitration Center as the
sole arbitral body to hear intellectual property complaints against
domain name owners.9" The Center opened in 1994 but had been
only sporadically used by private parties to resolve intellectual
property controversies.9 2 The failure of the gTLD-MoU meant that
the WIPO Center would continue to function on the margins of
international arbitration. With intellectual property dispute settlement again on the table during the consultative process, WIPO
stood to benefit both financially and in terms of prestige from
recommending a dispute settlement system in which its Center
would likely play an active and prominent role.

88. Froomkin, Semi-Private Rulemaking, supra note 51, at 4. Among WIPO's
accomplishments, in Froomkin's view, was its willingness to make substantial albeit
insufficient changes to the interim report, and its clear definition of cybersquatting (which
was superior to definitions that preceded it). Id. at 17, 20.
89. See id. at 10 (noting public perception that WIPO was beholden to trademark
interests); Mueller, Technology and Institutional Innovation, supra note 41, at 21-22
(characterizing WIPO's "constituency" as "the major multinational intellectual property
holders").
90. See Froomkin, Semi-PrivateRulemaking,supra note 51, at 13 ("[Many of those who
opposed the gTLD-MoU decided WIPO was in cahoots with those who sought to expand the
rights ofexisting trademarks holders to additional world-wide rights online."); see alsosupra
notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing public perceptions and criticisms of gTLDMoU).
91. See supraPart I.B.1.
92. See Julia A. Martin, Arbitratingin the Alps RatherThan Litigatingin Los Angeles:
TheAdvantages ofInternationalIntellectual
Propery-SpecificAlternativeDisputeResolution,
49 Stan. L. Rev. 917, 965-66 (1997); see also RONALD BERNSTEIN ET AL, HANDBOOK OF
ARBITRATION PRACTICE § 10-49 at 547 (3d ed. 1998) (questioning whether it was "necessary
or useful to create the WIPO Center' if it merely siphoned cases away from other arbitral
institutions).
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b. The Scope and Hybrid Nature of Dispute Settlement Under
93
WIPO's Proposals
In considering the shape of a domain name dispute settlement
system, WIPO revived two core features of the ACP proposal: (1)
modifying domain-name registration contracts to require all registrants to submit to a uniform dispute settlement system, and (2)
endowing that system with an amalgam of ministerial, judicial, and
arbitral attributes.94 However, the WIPO proposal also differed with
respect to the subject matter of the controversies falling within the
new system and the discretionary authority given to panelists to
decide cases. As to these two issues, WIPO significantly narrowed
its preliminary recommendations to accommodate concerns raised
by nontrademark interests.
(1) WIPO's Interim Report
Like the ACPs before it, the proposed dispute settlement system
that emerged from the WIPO consultative process was a conscious
hybrid. The interim report characterized the proposal as designed
to harness the advantages of arbitration while modifying and
simplifying those advantages to account for the nondiscretionary
administrative functions to be performed by the panels.95 In fact,
however, with the exception of(1) restricting the available remedies
to complaining parties to the cancellation or transfer of contested
93. The discussion that follows provides an overview of the WIPO proposals from the
perspective of the themes raised in this Article. Readers interested in a more extended
discussion of the WIPO proposals should consult the interim and final reports and Professor
Froomkin's detailed critiques of them.
94. In theory, WIPO's proposal for a mandatory uniform dispute settlement system was
more far-reaching than the ACP proposal, the acceptance of which was contingent on a
registrarwho voluntarlyjoined the Council of Registrars within the gTLD-MoU. In practice,

however, the gTLD-MoUs drafts anticipated that all registrars would eventually accept the
ACP dispute settlementpolicy. See Mueller, Technologyand InstitutionalInnovations,supra
note 41, at 16.
95. InterimReport, supranote 76, 1[ 139-40. These arbitral "advantages" included the

creation of a procedure in which the parties would participate in choosing a neutral decision
maker to hear their dispute in a neutral venue subject to procedural rules that reflected

various legal traditions, and that would lead to a binding, enforceable decision on the merits.
See id. 1 140.
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domain names,96 and (2) routinizing and expediting review of
"typical cases of clear abuse,"97 the interim report would have
conferred powers on panelists that were far more judicial than
ministerial in nature.
For example, notwithstanding the White Paper's recommendation that dispute settlement should apply solely to cases of
"abusive registrations," 8 WIPO advocated instead that panels
should be empowered to hear "any disputes concerning the alleged
violation of intellectual property rights through a domain name
registration."9 As for the legal rules applicable to this broad
category of controversies, panels were given the discretion to choose
from among "the laws that, in the light of all the circumstances of
the case, are applicable," and "a set of [seven] guiding principles.""0
According to WIPO, these principles "represented a distillation of
the dominant approaches that have been adopted by national
courts," but which, in fact, could not be found in any single national
jurisdiction.'0 ' A chief feature of these principles was the discretion
96. Id. 1 156.
97. Id. 170; see also i&L 1 148(iii), 170 ("Cases involving instances of alleged abusive
registrationof domain names would not be likely to involve burdensome and complex factual
and evidentiary investigations" and thus "should be resolved within a matter of days or
weeks.") (emphasis added).
98. The interim report did, however, attempt to define acts by a domain name registrant
that would qualify as abusive. It stated that the complaining intellectual property owner
would need to demonstrate
that the registration or use of the domain name by the domain name
holder is without relevant rights or interests and unfairly: (i) capitalizes
on the goodwill associated with the complainant's legitimate rights,
whether by way of trademarks, personality rights, geographical
indications or otherwise, or (ii) frustrates the complainant's desire to
reflect its rights in a domain name.
Id. 244. The Report then listed five "circumstances" for panels to consider in determining
whether abuse existed. For a'detailed criticism of this approach as overbroad and
insufficiently protective of free expression values, see A. Michael Froomkin, A Critique of
WIPO's RFC3 1 162-65 (Mar. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Froomkin, RFC3 Critique],available
at http'l/www.law.miami.edu/-amf (on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
99. InterimReport, supranote 76, 150 (emphasis added).
100. Id. 198. These seven principles were: (1) "The rights and interests of the parties;"
(2) "The use of the domain name;" (3) "The length oftime of registration;" (4) "The nature of
the top-level domain in which the domain name is registered;" (5) "Abusive Registration of
the Domain Name;" (6) "Identical or confusingly similar," (7) "First-come, first-served
principle." Id. 199.
101. Id- [ 196, 197-98; see Froomkin, RFC 3 Critique, supranote 98,
22, 155, 155-59
(criticizing the interim report for adopting a "smorgasbord approach" to governing law and
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they conferred on panels to balance the rights and interests
of intellectual
property owners against those of domain name
10 2
registrants.

That WIPO intended panels to engage in the court-like function
of developing a non-national trademark-domain name jurisprudence is shown by the interim report's recommendation that panel
decisions be published whenever possible." 3 Not only would the
publication of panel decisions develop "a body of persuasive
precedents" to "enhance the predictability of the dispute-resolution
system and contribute to the development of a coherent framework
for domain names," it would also entice complaining parties away
from litigating their claims in national courts.10 4 Under WIPO's
proposal, domain-name registrants were required to submit to the
administrative procedure; but both parties were free to initiate
national court litigation before, during, or after the procedure
had been commenced. 0 5 The new system would thus need to
demonstrate its comparative advantages in time, cost, and predictability to attract cases away from national courts (and national
laws). Developing an autonomous non-national domain name
jurisprudence applicable without regard to national borders or
conflicting national interests would engender confidence in the
"credibility and consistency of decisions" and achieve precisely this
result.'l 6

for setting out "guiding principles" not found in their entirety in national law). Many legal
texts that seek to bring together disparate constituent approaches ultimately articulate a
composite approach found in no single constituent law. Indeed, such a nonconflictual
approach to multistate lawmaking may be precisely the type of approach needed in the nonnational setting, although the application of a national rule rather than a composite nonnational rule may be appropriate where national interests predominate. We discuss this
issue further in Part III.B.6.
102. Interim Report, supranote 76, 199(ii).
103. Cf Dinwoodie,ANew CopyrightOrder,supranote 8, at 524-25 (noting the relevance
of publication of decisions to the development of norms by arbitral panels).
104. Interim Report, supranote 76, if 186, 133.
105. Id. J 140. But see Froomkin, RFC 3 Critique,supranote 98, 1 118-24 (noting that
the system proposed by WIPO would severely disadvantage domain-name registrants who
would often have no practicable forum inwhich to bring suit or no substantive cause ofaction
upon which to base a challenge to a panel ruling ordering cancellation or transfer of a domain
name).
106. InterimReport, supranote 76, 140.
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(2) WIPO's FinalReport
Domain name registrars, individual registrants, organizations
representing the Internet's technical community, and certain
members of the panel of experts widely criticized WIPO's interim
report as unduly favoring intellectual property owners and granting
them rights in excess of those that existed in any single national
jurisdiction.'0 7 In response to these criticisms, WIPO narrowed its
proposal for a dispute settlement system in two critical ways. First,
it limited the system to "deliberate, bad faith, abusive, domain
name registrations or 'cybersquatting"' and excised from the panels'
jurisdiction "disputes between parties with competing rights acting
in good faith." 8 Second, it restricted the class of eligible complaints
to trademark owners and excluded other intellectual property
rightholders from the system.0 9
WIPO's rationale for narrowing the proposal in this fashion was
expressly premised on the need for an incrementalist approach."'
Consistent with that tradition, participants in the consultative
process had expressed profound unease about granting expansive
powers to a new and untested dispute settlement system that
had "the capacity to affect valued rights.""' Given this climate of
107. See, e.g., Froomkin, RFC 3 Critique, supra note 98; Mueller, Technology and
InstitutionalInnovations, supranote 41, at 22 & n.22.
108. FinalReport, supranote 78, 1 135(i). As we discuss below, the topic of competing
trademark rights on the Internet has since been taken up by the WIPO Standing Committee
on Trademarks. See infra Part HIL.B.7. (discussing the relations between non-national and
international systems). But the distinction between abusive registrations and competing
rights cases is less concrete than this institutional allocation might suggest. If "competing
rights" are conceived more broadly than competing exclusive trademark rights (for example,
if the phrase is thought to include the nonexclusive right to use a mark that is descriptive
or to use a mark in a particular way such as parody or criticism), then a delineation of the
contours of cybersquatting will inevitably implicate the question of what are "competing
rights." See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Private International Aspects of the Protection of
Trademarks,WIPO Doc. No. WIPO/PIIJOI/4 82 n.200, (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Dinwoodie,
Private InternationalAspects], available at http:/www.wipo.org/pil-forumlen/documents/
pdf/piLOl4.pdf. This dilemma is being considered by the Standing Committee at present in
finalizing its proposals and also has infused panel determinations under the UDRP. See infra
Part II.B.7.
109. FinalReport, supranote 78, 135(ii).
110. Id. 168 ("We are persuaded by the wisdom of proceeding firmly but cautiously and
of tackling, at the first stage, problems which all agree require a solution.").
111. Id. 133.
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reticence, and given the nonharmonization" 2 of national laws
addressing trademark-domain name disputes,"' WIPO saw virtue
in focusing, at the outset, on behavior that "was universally condemned throughout the WIPO process as an indefensible activity
that should be suppressed."11 4
To this end, WIPO sought to draft a definition of disputes that
would sweep within its purview only egregious violations of
trademark owners' rights. Eschewing the term "cybersquatting" as
insufficiently precise, WIPO adopted the phrase "abusive registrations" and defined it as existing only when three defined
conditions were met." 5
112. Difficult private international issues will occur with frequency when national laws
are not entirely harmonized, or choice-of-law principles do not invariably lead to the
application of the law of a single jurisdiction. But these issues arise even in the wake of
harmonization of laws, because harmonization remains largely premised upon notions of
national sovereignty and upon the sanctity of national institutions in applying harmonized
rules. This adherence to national lawmaking models can (sometimes appropriately)
undermine the objectives of harmonization. -See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Integrationof
Domestic and InternationalIntellectualPropertyLawmaking, 24 CoLuM.-VLAJ.L. &AhTs.
307 (2000) (discussing the limits of harmonization of national laws); Dinwoodie, Private
InternationalAspects, supranote 108, It 86-90 (discussing choice of law problems in the
context of public international trademark law).
113. Indeed, one could argue that the lack of equivalent rights under any national law
should not, in this instance, have precluded the recognition of non-national rights for
trademark owners. After all, national systems were only beginning to grapple with these
issues, andthe lack of developed national solutions should hardlybe surprising. In fact, those
national solutions that have since developed have also proven favorable to trademark
owners. See e.g., Referee Enter., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24,
2001) (granting a preliminary injunction under the ACPA to the owner of Referee Magazine,
previously denied reliefunder the UDRP, against defendants registration of domain names
"including the term 'referee' in any form"), available at http'l/www.loundy.com/CASES/
RefereeEnt_vPlanetRef.htmL The argument for incrementalism thus derives as much
from the need to establish the legitimacy of the new non-national system as from any
substantive objection to the rights that would have been conferred on trademark owners.
Although much criticism was leveled at the interim report on the latter ground, our focus is
on the systemic development of non-national models.
114. FinalReport,supranote 78, Executive Summary I V.
115. I& 171. These conditions were:
(1)... (i) the domain name is identical or misleadingly similar to a trade
or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and (ii) the holder
ofthe domain name has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the
domain name; and (iii) the domain name has been registered and is used
in bad faith.
Is
The final report then set out four specific examples which panels could treat as
"evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith":
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Given this narrowing of the dispute settlement policy, WIPO was
also able to eliminate some of the ambiguity concerning the rules
that panels were to apply. In particular, WIPO jettisoned the
reference to the seven autonomous guiding principles advocated in
its interim report. In its place, WIPO adopted a choice-of-law
provision which would permit-but by no means compel" 6panelists to apply the laws of the national jurisdiction with the
most substantial connections to the parties and their dispute. 7
Finally, WIPO made a variety of other modifications to its
preliminary proposals. It recommended the use of three-person
rather than single-member panels.11 8 These panels were to be
appointed by accredited dispute resolution service providers with

(2) ... (a) an offer to sell, rent or otherwise transfer the domain name to the
owner of the trade or service mark, or to a competitor of the owner of the trade
or service mark, for valuable consideration; or
(b) an attempt to attract, for financial gain, Internet users to the domain name
holder's website or other on-line location, by creating confusion with the trade
or service mark of the complainant; or
(c) the registration of the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the
trade or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain
name, provided that a pattern of such conduct has been established on the part
of the domain name holder, or
(d) the registration of the domain name in order to disrupt the business of a
competitor.
Id. With respect to nonabusive registrations, the Report was somewhat less exact. It did,
however, state that good faith registrations, registrations for legitimate noncommercial or
expressive purposes, and claims between competing rights owners should not be grounds for
transferring or canceling a domain name. Id. q 172.
116. Id. I 177(ii) (recommending that "in applying the definition of abusive registration,
the panel of decision-makers shall, to the extent necessary, apply the law or rules of law that
it determines to be appropriate in view of all the circumstances of the case"). Given this tepid
endorsement of a traditional, conflictual approach to choice of law, it seems incorrect to
characterize WIPO's actions as rejecting "any attempt to create a lex mercatoriaor a freestanding trans-national law of domain names." Froomkin, WIPO Commentary, supra note
85, 72.
117. FinalReport, supra note 78, 176:
For example, if the parties to the procedure were resident in one country, the
domain name was registered through a registrar in that country and the
evidence of the bad faith registration and use of the domain name related to
activity in the same country, it would be appropriate for the decision-maker to
refer to the law of the country concerned in applying the definition [of abusive
registration].
Id.
118. Id. 207.
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no input from the parties. 119 Cases were to be decided by panels
within forty-five days of the filing of a complaint.10 WIPO also
rejected the need for a body to hear appeals from panel decisions,"2
and it drafted a detailed and comprehensive set of model procedural
rules to be used by service providers.12 2 In all other respects,
however, WIPO's final report preserved the hybrid nature of the
new dispute settlement system.'
c. Assessment of the WIPO Process
Although WIPO's narrowing ofthe scope of dispute settlement in
the final report resolved some of the controversies between
intellectual property owners and other Internet stakeholders, it
did not lay to rest the doubts expressed by some observers
concerning the organization's capacity to engage in a balanced
consultative process. By reviving the core features of the gTLDMoU Administrative Challenge Panels, WIPO resuscitated a
proposal of dubious political pedigree. Moreover, because of the
expedited nature of the subsequent ICANN review process, WIPO's
own revisions of that proposal were quickly entrenched.
Nominally, WIPO's recommendations were only advisory and
were intended to be submitted to ICANN for further review. In fact,
however, the recommendations were given a presumption of
validity by participants in the ICANN drafting process.12 4 As we
119. Id. 209.
120. Id. 203.
121. Id. 222.
122. Id. Annex V.
123. In both its preliminary and final reports, WIPO recommended that owners of wellknown trademarks be allowed to block issuance of domain names containing those marks or
their near equivalents. Id
245-91. That proposal has not yet been acted upon by ICANN,
although so-called "sunrise"mechanisms have been used in the recent development of new
generic top level domains such .info and .biz. See ICANN Approves Seven Top-Level
Domains;Winners Continueto Negotiate the FinePrint,5 ELEc. COMM. &L. REP. 1139 (Nov.
22, 2000) [hereinafter ICAN Approves Seven Top-Level Domains] (discussing ICANN's
approval of new gTLDs, including their dispute settlement and intellectual property
protection provisions).
124. WG-A Final Report to the ICANN Board (Aug. 3, 1999) [hereinafter WG-A Final
Report] (noting that, according to the provisional Names Council charged with reviewing
dispute settlement policy for ICANN Board, "[tihe WIPO Final Report may be considered to
represent a consensus of most interested stakeholders"), availableat httpA/www.dnso.org/
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explain below, that presumption allowed the hybrid nature of the
dispute settlement proposal to go unexamined, setting the stage for
the conflict of institutional mission that was to plague the UDRP's
decision makers.
3. ICANAN's Review and Implementation of the UDRP
Within weeks after WIPO submitted its report on April 30, 1999,
ICANN began an expedited process to study and implement WIPO's
recommendations. Recognizing that ICANN's organizational structure is both Byzantine and likely to be unfamiliar to many readers,
we briefly outline that structure below. We then highlight the
critiques of ICANN made by various observers, focusing on the
organization's authority to adopt a mandatory dispute settlement
policy. Finally, we explore the ways in which ICANN narrowed
WIPO's recommendations prior to adopting them as the UDRP
while maintaining the hybrid character of the new dispute
settlement system.
a. Expedited Implementation Timetable
On May 27, 1999, ICANN's Interim Board referred the dispute
settlement proposals in WIPO's final report to the ICANN Domain
Name Supporting Organization (DNSO), one of the three supporting organizations established under ICANN's bylaws to develop
and recommend substantive policies to the Board. 5 The Interim
Board asked the DNSO to submit its recommendations by July 31,
1999, and it invited interested persons to comment by August 20,
dnso/notes/19990804.NCwga-to-ICANN.html (on file with the William and Mary Law
Review); see also Posting of Kathryn Kleiman, KathrynKL@aol.com, to commentudrp@icann.org, ConcernsaboutICANN UniformDisputeResolution Policy (Aug. 24,1999)
(characterizing ICANN's treatment of WIPO report as "far too deferential"), available at
http:l/www.icanaorg/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/msgOO012.html(onfilewiththe
William and Mary Law Review).
125. The DNSO is composed of a General Assembly and a Names Council. Seven
Constituency Groups, representing a different domain-name stakeholder perspective, each
elect three members of the Names Council, which considers substantive domain-name
policies on a "community consensus" basis and forwards its recommendations to the ICANN
Board. Domain Name Supporting Organization of ICANN, at httpl/www.dnso.org/dnso/
aboutdnso.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (on fie with the William and Mary Law Review).
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1999, prior to its next meeting in late August.1 26 In mid-June, the
DNSO's Names Council' formed a working group to study the
WIPO recommendations. The working group submitted its report
at the end of July, which the Names Council adopted with minor
modifications and submitted to the Board as a consensus recommendation in early August.' Later that month, a group of
accredited domain-name registrars also submitted to the Board a
proposal for a voluntary dispute resolution policy.1 9
On August 24, 1999, ICANN staff submitted to the Board a
report on the Names Council and registrar proposals and posted
it on ICANN's web site.3 0 Only two days later, the Board accepted
the DNSO's recommendations and instructed the staff to convene
a small drafting committee composed of representatives of different Internet stakeholder groups to prepare implementing
documents using the registrar's model policy as a starting point."3 '
* On September 29, the staff posted a report on those documents and
invited public comment during the next two weeks on a few
remaining open issues.1 12 Finally, on October 24, 1999, the ICANN
Board approved the final version of the implementing documents
-the "Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy" and the
"Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy"-as
revised in light of a second staff report. 3 3

126. ICANN, Minutes ofMeeting, Res. 99.45, 99.46 & 99.47 (May 27, 1999), availableat
http://www.icannorghninuteshninutes-27may99iitm (onfile with the William and MaryLaw
Review); see also ICANN, Timeline for the Formulationand Implementationof the Uniform
Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy [hereinafter Timeline], available at
http'/www.icann.org/udrpudrp-schedule.htm (last updated Oct. 17, 2000) (on file with the
William and Mary Law Review).
127. See supranote 125 (explaining Names Council).
128. Timeline, supra note 126.

129. Id.
130. ICANNICANNStaffReport: UniformDisputeResolutionPolicyforgTLDRegistrars,
(Aug. 24,1999), availableat http-l/www.icann.org/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm (onfilewith
the William and Mary Law Review). The report noted that eleven written comments on the
proposals had been submitted by the August 22 deadline. Id.
131. Timeline, supranote 126.
132. Id.
133. Id.; see supra note 17.

180

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:141

b. ICANN's Authority for Creatingthe UDRP
The current challenges to ICANN's authority over the domainname system are considerable and beyond the scope of this
Article."3 4 Even accepting for purposes of argument the legitimacy
of a private, nonprofit corporation engaging in domain-name
policymaking, three more particularized attacks against ICANN are
relevant to the UDRP approval process. These include challenges
to the structure and composition of ICANN's Board of Directors, the
unduly accelerated pace of the proceedings, and review procedures
which limited participation by all affected constituencies.
First, the accountability of ICANN's interim Board is questionable. During the five months when the dispute settlement
proposal was being considered, the Board consisted solely of nine
members appointed by the IANA."' It was not yet composed in the
manner set out in ICANN's articles and bylaws, which require
nine directors appointed by the three Support Organizations and
an additional nine directors elected from ICANN's "at large"
membership.1"' According to some observers, ICANN's decision to
press forward with highly contested domain-name policies such
as the UDRP while its interim board lacked accountability or
representational diversity fatally tainted its decisions." 7 Several
critics have even gone so far as to urge that all of the Interim
Board's decisions, including its approval of the UDRP, be subject to
38
a reauthorization vote once the new Board has been elected.
A second challenge to ICANN's authority concerned the extremely expedited nature of the UDRP approval process and the
limited number of comments received." 9 Both the bodies within
ICANN considering the dispute settlement proposals and the
134. For articles identifyingthese challenges, see Liu, supranote49; Mueller, ICANNand
internetgovernance, supranote 53, at 497; Zittrain, supranote 51.
135. See Mueller, ICANN and internetgovernance, supra note 53, at 507.
136. Id. at 508.
137. Id. at 509.
138. Internet Democracy Project, Yokohama Statement on Civil Society and ICANN
Elections, 1 1, 4 (June 27,2000) (draft), available at http:/www.icannwatch.orgarchives/
civil-society.andicann-elections.htm (on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
139. In total, ICANN received just over 100 e-mail comments, not all of them substantive
in nature. See http-/www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/maillist html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2001).
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individuals drafting and reviewing those proposals repeatedly
expressed dissatisfaction with the time allotted for reflection and
comment by interested observers and the public. 4 ' This limited
timeframe also gave a patina of legitimacy to the results of the
WIPO consultative process, which appeared languorous and
thoughtful by comparison."'
The third critique of ICANN's procedures concerned the lack of
adequate participation by stakeholders who favored a narrow
dispute settlement policy. For example, the Provisional Names
Council of the DNSO and the working group charged with considering WIPO's recommendations did not contain the proper
complement of members required by ICANN's rules. 4" The
missing entity was the Non-Commercial Domain Name Holders
Constituency, which represented the views of a diverse group
of noncommercial organizations concerned with freedom of
expression."4 Some participants also claimed that the manner in
which documents were drafted and the procedures used to review
them privileged trademark owners' interests and failed to forge a
consensus among all affected stakeholders.' As we explain below,
140. See, e.g., WG-A Final Report, supranote 124 (questioning whether recommendation
to adopt UDRP represented a genuine consensus of the DNSO given the "shortness of time
available to WG-A to solicit input from the DNSO constituencies"); Posting of A Michael
Froomkin, froomkin@law.tm, to comment-udrp@icann.org, A Catalogof Critical Process
Failures;Progresson Substance;More Work Needed (Oct. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Froornkin,
Catalog] (criticizing the fourteen-day commentperiod as "the only opportunity that mostnonregistrar stakeholders have ever had to comment on the major features of' the UDRP), at
http://www.icann.org/comments-mailcomment-udrplcurrentfmsgOO10 .html (onfile with the
William and Mary Law Review); Posting of David Post, Postd@erols.com, to commentudrp@icann.org, Comment (Oct. 10, 1999) (urging ICANN Board to give affected parties
additional opportunities to comment on UDRP proposals prior to adopting them), at
http'//www.icann.org/comments-mail/comment-udrp/currentfmsg00067.html.
141. See supranotes 75-78 and accompanying text.
142. WG-A Final Report, supranote 124, at 2.
143. See id.; Kleiman, supranote 124; Posting of Association for Computing Machinery's
Internet Governance Committee, to comment-udrp@icann.org, ACM-IGC Petition for
Reconsideration on Cybersquatting (Aug. 16, 1999), available at http'J/www.icann-org/
comments-maillcomment-udrpcurrentlmsg.
144. See Froomkin, Catalog,supranote 140; Mueller, ICANN and internetgovernance,
supra note 53, at 519; Posting of Carl Oppedahl, carl@oppedahl.com, to commentudrp@icann.org Comments [Riegarding UD[R]P (Oct. 13, 1999) ("The process was skewed
from its beginning to favor the interests of the trademark lobby and gave no meaningful voice
to the domain name owners of the Internet."), availableat http//www.icann.org/commentsmail/comment-udrplcurrentlmsg0Ol05.html (on file with the William and Mary Law
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however, much of this criticism was alleviated by the final stages
of the UDRP review process in which ICANN narrowed WIPO's
dispute settlement recommendations.
c. Narrowingthe Scope of Eligible Disputes While
Maintaininga Hybrid Dispute Settlement Model
Using the WIPO final report and a draft policy and rules
authored by a consortium of registrars as a template, ICANN's
Board instructed its staff to make three modifications to those
documents. First, it identified three factual situation~s which suggested that a domain name registrant would not be regarded as
having acted in bad faith;145 second, it specified the need for parity
of "appeal" rights for complainants and respondents;146 and third,
it requested a definition of and measures to minimize "reverse
domain name hijacking."147 Each of these revisions bolstered the
rights of domain-name owners and narrowed the range of conduct
giving rise to relief under the Policy.
In a revised draft of the Policy and Rules, the ICANN staff
implemented the Board's three recommendations in the following
ways. First, it drafted a new paragraph of the Policy embodying
the three circumstances where a domain-name registrant would
be treated as having legitimate interests in its domain name.'
Review).
145. ICANN,ResolutionsApproved by the Board,SantiagoMeeting, Res. 99.83.4 (Aug. 26,
1999), availableat http'//www.icann.org/santiago/santiago-resolutions.htm.
146. Id. Res. 99.83.5.
147. The three "factors"to be considered in determining bad faith registration ofa domain
name were:
(a) Whether the domain name holder is making a legitimate noncommercial or
fair use of the mark, without intent to misleadingly divert consumers for
commercial gain or to tarnish the mark
(b) Whether the domain name holder (including individuals, businesses, and
other organizations) is commonly known by the domain name, even if the
holder has acquired no trademark or service mark rights; and
(c) whether, in seeking payment for transfer of the domain name, the domain
name holder has limited its request for payment to its out-of-pocket costs.
Id. Res. 99.83.3.
148. ICANN, Uniform DomainName DisputeResolutionPolicy, DraftPolicyPreparedby
ICANNStaffand Counsel andPostedforPublicReview and Comment, I 4(c) (Sept. 29,1999)
[hereinafterDraftPolicyl,availableathttp'/www.icann.orgudrp/udrp-policy-29sept99.htm
(on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
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Second, in an attempt to ensure that both parties would have
equal "appeal" rights, the staff modified the Policy to require
complainants to submit to the jurisdiction of national courts in one
of two locations.149 Concomitantly, it revised the Policy to stay
automatically for ten business days a panel's order to cancel or
transfer a registration if the respondent filed a complaint in such
a court. 0 Finally, the staff included a definition of "reverse domain
name hijacking," and it sought to minimize its occurrence by
ensuring more effective notice to respondents of a complaint filed
against them, by clarifying that complaining trademark owners
bear the burden of proof, and by authorizing panels to make a
finding that a complaint was brought in bad faith. 5 '
After a second round of public comments nominally limited to the
few "implementation issues left open in the draft documents,"5 2 the
149. ICANN, Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, Draft Rules
PreparedbylCANNStaffand Counsel andPostedforPublicReview and Comment (Sept. 29,
1999) (defining "mutual jurisdiction"), available at http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-rules29sept99.htm (on file with the William and Mary Law Review). The two jurisdictions were
either. (1) the nation in which the Registrar had its principal office, provided that the
domain-name holder had submitted in its Registration Agreement to jurisdiction in that
nation, or (2) in all other cases, "at the location of the domain name holder's address as
shown for the registration of the domain name in Registrar's Whois database at the time of
the complaint." Over time, this jurisdictional alternative would favor jurisdiction at the
location of the registrar, since registrants purchasing domain names through ICANNaccredited registrars would all be required to submit to jurisdiction in that location. See
ICANN, Second Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy, 4.9, (Oct. 24, 1999) [hereinafter Second Staff Report] (noting that
jurisdictionwhere respondentwas locatedwould only apply to "some legacy registrants" who
had not registered domain names through accredited registrars), available at
http:l/www.icann.org/udrp/udrp-second-staff-report-24oct99.htm (onfile with the William and
Mary Law Review).
150. DraftPolicy, supra note 148, 1 4(k).
151. ICANN, Staff Report on Implementation Documents for the Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy, 4 (Sept. 29, 1999) [hereinafter Staff Report], available at http:/lwww.
icann.org/udrp/staff-report-29sept99.htm (on file with the William and Mary Law Review).
For the first panel decision to make a finding of reverse domain name hijacking, see K2r
ProdukteAG v. Jeremie Trigano,WIPO Case No. D2000-0622 (Aug. 23, 2000), availableat
http'//arbiter.wipo.inttdomainsdecisionsthtmlJ/2000/d2000-0622.html.
152. Staff Report, supranote 151, at 4. Although the ICANN Staff sought to limit public
comments to issues concerning the length and content of pleadings and decisions and the
mechanics for selecting dispute settlement providers and panelists, public comments were
directed to all aspects of its proposal. See Second Staff Report, supra note 149, 3.1
(cataloging titles of e-mail comments). This was hardly surprising given the Staffs attempt
to foreclose public comment on the modifications that it had proposed.
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ICANN Staff published a Second Staff Report containing a more
fully articulated defense of the draft policy and rules it had
proposed. 5 3 This report, while acknowledging that both trademark
owners and domain-name registrants had submitted meritorious
proposals for modifying the proposed UDRP, concluded that the
Policy was "balanced, workable, and fair" in its current form."5 It
stated that any future modifications should be referred to the
DNSO for further review "with the155benefit of experience with the

real-world operation of the policy."

The Second Staff Report also strongly reaffirmed ICANN's intent
that UDRP dispute settlement be exceedingly narrow in scope and
limited to "cases involving 'abusive registrations' made with badfaith intent to profit commercially from others' trademarks (e.g.,
cybersquatting and cyberpiracy)."5 6 The Report stressed that "the
fact that the policy's administrative dispute-resolution procedure
does not extend to cases where a registered domain name is subject
to a legitimate dispute (and may ultimately be found to violate the
challenger's trademark) is a feature of the policy, not a flaw.""'
In the text of the Policy itself, this desire to limit the UDRP's
scope found its expression in paragraph 4, which set forth the
elements of a trademark owner's cause of action. Paragraph 4(a)
required all complainants to prove essentially the same three
elements recommended in WIPO's final report. 5 ' Paragraphs 4(b)

153. See Second Staff Report, supranote 149.
154. Id. 1.6.
155. Id.
156. Id. 4.1(c).
157. Id.
158. See supratext accompanying note 115 (setting elements of cause of action proposed
by WIPO). Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy states:
You are required to submit to a mandatory administrative proceeding in the
event that a third party (a "complainant") asserts to the applicable Provider, in
compliance with the Rules of Procedure, that
(i) your domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights; and
(ii) you have no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain
name; and
(ii) your domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
In the administrative proceeding, the complainant must prove that each of
these three elements are present.
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and 4(c) then enumerated specific examples of, on the one hand,15a9
respondent's bad faith registration and use of a domain name,
and on the other, the rights or legitimate interests that a respondent might have in that domain name. 160 This structure also
reinforced a ministerial role for UDRP panels, first by limiting
their authority to open-and-shut cases of domain name abuses,
and second by indicating that more complex disputes involving
Policy, supranote 17, 1 4(a).
159. Paragraph 4(b) of the Policy provides:
For the purposes of Paragraph 4(aXiii), the following circumstances, in
particular but without limitation, if found by the Panel to be present, shall be
evidence of the registration and use of a domain name in bad faith:
(i)circumstances indicating that you have registered or you have acquired
the domainname primarilyforthe purpose of selling, renting, or otherwise
transferring the domain name registration to the complainant who is the
owner of the trademark or service mark or to a competitor of that
complainant, for valuable consideration in excess ofyour documented outof-pocket costs directly related to the domain name; or
(ii) you have registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of
the trademark or service markfrom reflecting the mark in a corresponding
domain name, provided that you have engaged in a pattern of such
conduct; or
(iii) you have registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of
disrupting the business of a competitor, or
(iv) by using the domain name, you have intentionally attempted to
attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to your web site or other online location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's
mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of your web
site or location or of a product or service on your web site or location.
Id I 4(b).
160. Paragraph 4(c) of the Policy provides:
Any of the following circumstances, in particular but without limitation, if
found by the Panel to be proved based on its evaluation of all evidence
presented, shall demonstrate your rights or legitimate interests to the domain
name for purposes of Paragraph 4(a)(ii):
(i) before any notice to you of the dispute, your use of, or demonstrable
preparations to use, the domain name or a name corresponding to the
domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services;
or

(ii) you (as an individual, business, or other organization) have been
commonly known by the domain name, even if you have acquired no
trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) you are making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use ofthe domain
name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Id. 1 4(c).
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discretionary judgments were suitable only for national court
adjudication.
Yet in response to proposals by trademark owners that the Policy
as drafted was too narrow (and to address opposing proposals by
noncommercial interests that the Policy was too broad), the Second
Staff Report blurred this narrow, ministerial vision of the UDRP
with more expansive judicial functions. Pressed by both interest
groups, the report stated that the specific examples provided in
Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) were "not intended to be exhaustive" and
that additional evidence and arguments could be considered by
UDRP panels as a basis for ruling in favor of trademark owners or
domain-name registrants." Although the staffs comment and its
corresponding language in the UDRP may have been intended to
mollify criticisms of its proposal from both sets of interest groups,
its effect was to grant panels substantial adjudicatory authority to
reconcile the competing interests at stake in trademark domainname disputes.
Finally, the Second Staff Report reaffirmed the arbitral roots of
UDRP dispute settlement by providing for post-dispute review in
national courts of so-called "mutual jurisdiction."1 62 These courts
would be located either where the registrar was located or at the
location of the domain-name holder as shown in the registrar's
Whois data. When filing a UDRP complaint, a trademark owner
would choose one of these two counties and submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the courts in that country for purposes of reviewing
a UDRP panel decision. A respondent who filed a complaint with a
court in such a country within ten business days of the panel's
decision would receive an automatic stay of the panel's order
1 63
transferring or canceling the contested domain name.
The report also specified the method for the parties to select
dispute settlement providers and panels. The provider for each
dispute would be selected by the complainant, who would also have
161. Second Staff Report, supranote 149, § 4.5(b). The commentary in the staff report is
reflected in the "in particular but without limitation" language in paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c)
of the Policy. For a discussion ofthe effects of these two clauses on decision making by UDRP
panels, see infra Part II.C.

162. Second Staff Report, supra note 149, at 10-11.
163. Id.
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the initial option to choose whether the case would be heard by a
one-person or a three-member panel. In either case, the complainant would pay all of the panels fees.1"4 Only if the respondent
chose to have the case heard by a three-member panel in cases
where the complainant had chosen a one-member panel would the
parties split the cost of the proceedings. And only in three-member
panel cases would the parties have input into the selection of the
decision makers; in all other cases the dispute settlement provider
would choose the sole panelist to hear the complaint. 65
4. The UDRP in Practice
Just over one month after the Second Staff Report was published,
ICANN selected WIPO as the UDRP's first dispute settlement
provider. It accredited two other providers, the National Arbitration
Forum and eResolution, approximately one month later.166 On
December 9, 1999, a trademark owner filed the first UDRP complaint and the one-member panel chosen to hear the case issued its
decision on January 14,2000.67
In practice as well as in construction, the UDRP has proven to be
a remarkable development in the history of international dispute
settlement. Even had trademark owners filed only a handful of
complaints with panels and even had those complaints concerned
only core domain-name abuses, the system would be worthy of
serious scrutiny. But precisely the opposite trend has occurred.
In the first twenty-one months of the UDRP's existence, panels
operating under the auspices of ICANN-approved dispute settlement providers have been inundated with cases. As of September
2001, filed complaints numbered over 4300.16 UDRP panels have
164. See Policy, supranote 17, g.
165. See id. 11 4(d), 4(f), 3(b)(iv), 5(bXiv)-(v); see also Second Staff Report,supranote 149,

§ 4.15.
166. ICANN approved a fourth dispute settlement provider, the CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution, on May 22, 2000. See Timeline, supra note 126, at 2.
167. See id.; World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No. D990001 (Jan. 14,2000).
168. ICANN, Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under UDRP (Oct. 2, 2001), at
httpJ/www.icann.org/udrpfproceedings-stat.htm. The number of complaints filed under the
United States' recently enactedACPAis also quite high. See DarrylVan Duch, Cybersquatter
LitigationBoom: Statute prompts 700 federal suits over Web domain names, NATVLL.J. (Feb.
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issued over 3500 published decisions, with more than threequarters of these decisions ordering domain names transferred to
the complaining trademark owners.' 69 Although domain name
registrants have achieved a few sporadic (but important) victories
during the last few months,17 ° beginning in the earliest days of the
UDRP panels interpreted the Policy and Rules expansively in ways
that generally favored intellectual property owners over domain
name registrants.' 7 ' These rulings occurred notwithstanding the
clear intent of the UDRP drafters to limit the panels' authority to
core cases of domain-name abuse, and at a time when both ICANN
and WIPO were considering their own expansion of the UDRP to
new gTLDs and existing country code domain names (ccTLDs) as
well as to names and identifiers not covered by the present Policy.1 2
Therefore, just as the creation of the UDRP did not adhere to a
process of deliberative construction followed by prior international
26, 2001).
169. See Statistical Summary of Proceedings Under UDRP, supra note 168. The
percentages vary significantly for different dispute settlement providers, a fact that may
have important implications for reform. See Michael Geist,Fair.com?:AnExamination
ofthe
Allegations ofSystemic Unfairness in the ICANN UDRP, at 6 (providing statistical summary
through July 7, 2001), availableat http://aixl.uottawa.ca/-geist/geistudrp.pdf (last visited
Sept. 8, 2001); Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANi's Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy [hereinafter Mueller, Rough Justice] (providing statistical summary
through Nov. 2000), availableat http://dcc.syr.edufroughjustice.pdf(lastvisited Jan. 9,2001).
170. See, e.g., Bruce Springsteenv. JeffBurgar & Bruce Springsteen Club, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1532 (Jan. 25, 2001) (protection of personal names); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-1104, at 9 (Nov. 23,2000) (.sucks domain
names); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Parisi, WIPO Case No. D2000-1015, at 4 (Jan. 26, 2001)

(same).
171. See Bruce M. McDonald, Intellectual Property Rights and Electronic Commerce, 1
INTERNL. & Bus. 483,492 (May 2000) ("Early decisions indicate that [the UDRP is] being
interpreted expansively in favor of trademark owners."); Mueller, Rough Justice,supranote
169.
172. See FinalReport, Second WIPO Domain Name Process,supra note 27, 20 (noting
that twenty-two ccTLDs have adopted the UDRP); id. 33 (discussing use of UDRP by new
gtlds); World Intellectual Property Organization, Second Internet Domain Name Process,
Request for Comments 1: Request for Comments on Terms of Reference, Procedures and
Timetable for the Second WIPO Internet Domain Name Process (July 10, 2000) (requesting
public comments for developing recommendations on certain intellectual property domain
name issues not included within UDRP), available at http-//wipo2.wipo.int/process2/
rfclrfcYindex.html; WIPO Conference on Intellectual Property Questions Relating to
the ccTLDs (Feb 20, 2001) (noting WIPO conference discussing importance of applying
dispute settlement rules to ccTLDs), available at http'l/ecommerce.wipo.intmeetings/
2001/cctlds/.
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lawmakers, so too many UDRP panels have jettisoned the incrementalist decision-making methodology that other international
dispute settlement bodies have adopted.
II. CHECKING FUNCTIONS IN THE UDRP
The previous section demonstrated the ways in which the UDRP
is composed of elements found in judicial, arbitral, and ministerial
decision-making systems. In this section, we analyze the consequences of this hybrid structure. We begin with a discussion of
the values of hybridization, identifying the advantages that flow
from amalgamating the features of different decision-making
paradigms. But hybridization has risks as well as benefits. Those
risks relate to the mechanisms used to control the power granted to
individual decision makers.
Within any single judicial, arbitral, or ministerial decisionmaking system, a variety of checking mechanisms constrain the
power of decision makers. As a working typology, we divide these
mechanisms into three distinct categories, which we refer to as
creational, external, and internal checking functions. 173 These
checking mechanisms serve several important objectives. They
bolster the legitimacy of decision-making outcomes and the
accountability of decision makers,' 7 ' they confine decision making
173. Creational checkingfunctions arise when adecision-makingbody is established. They
are designed to impose checks ex ante by anticipating the different kinds of excesses that
decision makers may engage in and by adopting procedures to prevent them. External
checking functions, in contrast, operate ex post in response to perceived errors or excesses
of authority by decision makers in a specific case. Either the participants in a dispute or
interested third parties may seek to initiate these external checking functions, selecting one
or more mechanisms from the range of control devices put into place when the decisionmaking body was first established. Internal checking functions are internally generated
forces within each system that operate upon judicial, arbitral, or ministerial decision makers
to correct errors or check abuses of authority.
Although this working typology is useful in highlighting the different ways in which
decision makers can be controlled, the classifications are not always distinct. For a related
discussion of internal and external controls in international and arbitral decision-making
systems, see W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

AND ARBITRATION 1-7 (1992).

174. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for InternationalEnvironmental Law?, 93 AM. J. IN'L L. 596, 600 (defining

legitimacy as "a quality that leads people (or states) to accept authority-independent of
coercion, self-interest, or rational persuasion-because of a general sense that the authority
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within the bounds of a system's institutional capacity, 75 they
correct errors, and they ensure
consistent outcomes in factually and
176
legally comparable cases.

When elements from different decision-making systems are
combined, however, the checking mechanisms that operate in any
one system cannot automatically be imported into the new hybrid
system. In the case of the UDRP, checking devices found in one or
another of the adjudicatory, arbitral, and ministerial models are
insufficient in themselves to constrain UDRP panel decision
making; oftentimes, they are simply inappropriate. Moreover, ambiguities and contradictions as to the source and content of the
UDRP's checking functions send conflicting messages to panels and
create incentives for them to act in ways the UDRP's drafters did
not intend. We contend that the failure to grapple with the hybrid
conceptual identity of the UDRP system and, more importantly, to
develop autonomous checking functions that reflect the distinctive
is justified" and citing numerous other definitions from domestic and international law,
political theory, and philosophy); see also William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in
InternationalArbitration,93 AM.J. INT'LL. 805, 817 & n.94 (1999) (noting that most national
laws permit challenges to arbitral awards in which arbitrators "exceed[ed their authority"
or "overreach[ed] their mandates").
175. In the judicial context, examples include the ECHR deciding cases involving massive
violations of human rights, see Menno T. Kamminga, Is the European Conventionon Human
RightsSufficientlyEquippedtoCope with Grossand Systematic Violations?,12NETH.H.R.Q.
153 (1994), or the ECJ or the WTO's Appellate Body making "political judgments" that they
are ill-equipped to make, see George A Bermann, Taking SubsidiaritySeriously:Federalism
in the EuropeanCommunity and the UnitedStates, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331,391 (1994); Ravi
Kanth, WTO GeneralCouncil ChairWarns of Perilto Dispute Settlement System, 17 INTL
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1157 (July 27,2000). In the arbitration context, examples include arbitral
panels deciding cases involving domestic public laws rather than private contractual
agreements. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 488 cmt. a (1987) ("The law of most states regards certain kinds of issues as not subject to
arbitration, typically agreements not of a commercial character or not between merchants,
and public law issues .... "). In the ministerial context, the issue can arise when an agency
exercises its authority over novel subject matters without first acquiring the necessary
technical expertise to address them. See James Gleick, PatentlyAbsurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 2000 (Magazine), at 47 (questioning U.S. Patent Office's competence to handle ecommerce and software patents).
176. See Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE. L. J. 1035 (1977) (discussing the merits of redundant
litigation to correct errors); cf. Heifer, Forum Shopping, supra note 1, at 293 (noting that
successive review of same petition byimultiple human rights tribunals serves error correcting
functions).

20011

DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS

191

nature of the UDRP, is the most significant casualty ofjettisoning
a deliberative pace of lawmaking.
A. The Values ofHybridization in Non-National Systems
In describing the UDRP's decision-making structure as a nonnational hybrid, we focus on the features typically found in distinct
arbitral, ministerial and adjudicative models. As we explain in
detail in Part III, we cautiously support the use of hybrid mechanisms that consciously draw upon the characteristics of these
different antecedents to fashion a new institutional device suited for
transborder problems. 7
As a preliminary matter, however, one might ask why such
hybridization is useful in a non-national setting? To be sure, the
conflict between the non-national nature of the domain-name
system and the national nature of the trademark system alone
explains the need to blend non-national and national influences.
But why also pursue a hybrid of adjudicatory, arbitral, and
ministerial models?
In part, the non-national nature of the domain-name system, like
the contexts to which the UDRP might be extended, demands such
hybridization in seeking an optimal form of dispute settlement.
Non-national-like dispute settlement has occurred heretofore only
in the arbitral context. 17 8 Arbitration might then appear a good
starting point from which to develop a model for non-national
dispute settlement. Indeed, the streamlined proceedings typically
identified as an advantage of arbitration would also appear to
further one of the objectives underlying all proposals to address the
trademark-domain name conflict.
The arbitral model, however, would not be appropriate for nonnational dispute settlement if adopted without modification. The
177. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that the hybrid nature of the UDRP is not
confined to a blending offeatures from adjudicative, arbitral, andministerial prototypes. The
UDRP system is a hybrid also of national, international, and anational structures and
influences. In Part III, we will return in more detail to the conjoining ofthese features. The
UDRP might also be viewed as a hybridization ofprivate and public regulation. See Henry
H. Perritt, Jr.,DefiningtheHybridinHybridRegulation,2001 U. ChL Legal. F. (forthcoming
2001) (on file with authors).

178. See supranotes 6 and 14.
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success of arbitration-its speed, its decision making tailored more
closely to parties' intent than to default principles of law, and its
finality ensured by less intrusive external review by courts-is
premised upon two important characteristics not present here.
First, the parties in arbitration have consented to these reduced
forms of external checks, and second, the decision of the arbitrator
affects only the parties and has limited if any value in articulating
broader norms or rules. Neither the parties (by virtue of their
consent) nor society (because the arbitration affects only the
disputants) can therefore object to the truncated external checking
mechanisms that are found in the arbitral model.
By contrast, parties to non-national UDRP proceedings are
strangers and have not, other than formally, consented to the
arbitral procedures thereunder, and the process by which the UDRP
was created cannot serve as a genuine proxy for their consent. And
if UDRP decision making is to effect the creation of norms, as we
(and the proponents of the UDRP) intend and as the publication of
decisions makes inevitable, then some of the control features found
in a traditional adjudicatory model must be incorporated.
This does not mean that we should simply adopt an adjudicatory
template, however. Courts remain predominantly national in
nature, and court proceedings remain slow and expensive. So the
wholesale adoption of the adjudicatory model is not attractive as a
solution to a non-national problem. Instead, only selective incorporation of some of the checking features of that model is advisable.
Adoption of adjudicatory features, of course, will slow down the
decision-making process, and thus, one might wish to reinject
speed. Here, the ministerial model has a role to play. Ministerial
decision making has the advantage of speed but it is restricted to
cases where the application of the relevant rules is routinized.
Much of the non-national decision making that occurs in the
UDRP is not so routine. Consequently, although we might wish to
incorporate aspects of the ministerial model, we cannot rely wholly
on it as an antecedent because the functions it delegates to decision
makers assume a far less discretionary form of decision making
than we contemplate here. It would appear then that the nonnational model could benefit from some-but not all-aspects of this
pre-existing model.
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B. Checking Functions in InternationalArbitrationand in the
UDRP
As explained in Part I, much of the UDRP was built in part upon
an arbitral model of decision making. The resolution of disputes
between private parties pursuant to what are nominally contractual
obligations; the use of lawyers, academics, and retired judges as
decision makers; the creation of multiple, independent dispute
settlement centers; and the role of the parties in choosing the panel
all reflect arbitral antecedents. With respect to the mechanisms
used to control excesses of authority and correct errors, however,
there are critical distinctions between the checking functions of
international arbitration and those found in the UDRP. We address
those differences below.
1. Checking Functionsin InternationalArbitration
In international arbitration, the most important constraints on
decision makers are ex ante creational checks rather than ex post
external or internal checks.' 79 Consider first creational checking
mechanisms, which arise from negotiations between the contracting
parties superimposed upon a backdrop of arbitration-related
national laws and treaties. Under the paramount arbitral principle
of party autonomy, the parties have virtually unfettered discretion
to choose the structure and rules under which their disputes will be
decided. 8 0 Three of their ex ante choices, however, are the most
significant for purposes of checking the power of arbitral panels: (1)
deciding between ad hoc and institutional arbitration, (2) agreeing
upon the place where the arbitration will be conducted, and (3)
selecting the composition of the panel.
The virtue of institutional arbitration is that it allows the
contracting parties to select a suite of predrafted, time-tested
179. For working descriptions of these types of checking mechanisms, see supranote 173.
180. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 278 (party autonomy is the "guiding principle

in determining the procedure to be followed"); see also Hans Smit, The Future of
InternationalCommercialArbitration:A Single TransnationalInstitution?, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 9, 14 (1986) (noting that "virtually all of the advantages to be gained from

institutional arbitration can be gained by making appropriate contractual provisions at the
time of making the arbitration agreement").
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procedural rules superintended by an established center of
international arbitration.'18 Included among these rules are a host
of mechanisms for supervising the arbitral process, ranging from
assisting in the selection of the panel, to entertaining challenges to
the impartiality or qualifications of individual panelists, to
reviewing the content of draft awards. 82 However, because each
institution exercises these supervisory functions in different ways,
the parties' choice of a particular institution determines the scope
of the checking functions applicable to the arbitrators.
The composition of the panel of arbitrators is also a significant
creational control mechanism. In international commercial arbitration, use of a three-member panel is the accepted norm, and
often a default rule if the parties fail to specify a different selection
method. 8 Use of a tripartite panel typically allows each party to
choose one arbitrator (so-called "party arbitrators"), providing
confidence that at least one member of the panel will share that
party's views of the case and, more broadly, the same language,
legal culture and philosophical approach. 's4 Three-member panels
also promote confidence in the arbitral process and thus generate
fewer challenges to the panel's final decision."8
Choosing the location ofthe arbitration also implicates creational
checking functions. International arbitration is not wholly detached
from the physical place in which the arbitration occurs. Location
determines the national law governing disputes over the conduct
of proceedings and the enforcement of awards, thereby allowing
nations to monitor and control arbitrations conducted within their
181. In ad hoc arbitration, by contrast, the parties create individualized substantive and
procedural rules for arbitrating their dispute.
182. Smit, supranote 6, at 634-43; Smit, supra note 180, at 14.
183. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 193, 378; see UNCITRAL Model Law on
International CommercialArbitration, art. 11(3)(1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL ModelLaw]
(specifying tripartite arbitration as default rule for panel composition), available at
http:/lwww.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitrationtml-arb.htnL

184. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity inPrivateJudging,38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485,506 & nn. 85-86
(1997).
185. REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 1, at 193-94 (indicating three-member panels are
most effective for international commercial arbitration because parties are more likely to
have confidence in their decisions); Rau, supra note 184, at 527 (noting the "widely-shared
conviction that the ability to participate in the selection of arbitrators is critical to fairness

in dispute resolution").
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borders.186 However, because different national laws exhibit
different degrees of solicitude toward arbitration, the choice of a
particular venue necessarily implicates the scope of the checking
functions that national courts will exercise over arbitral proceedings."8 7 For example, parties choosing a host state whose
national arbitration law is modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law
or the New York Convention have implicitly agreed ex ante to limit
the scope of judicial review to issues of basic procedural fairness
and violations of the forum's public policies, rather than to
correcting errors of law.'88
Turning from creational to external checking functions, the
parties' opportunity to control arbitral decision makers becomes
significantly more attenuated. Indeed, an essential feature of the
system of private ordering that arbitration makes possible is the
deference national legislatures, national courts, and even arbitration centers show to the arbitral process and to the finality of
decisions and awards.'89 As a general rule, successful challenges
become increasingly more difficult as the arbitration proceeds." °
186. See generally William W. Park, The Lex Loci Arbitri and InternationalCommercial
Arbitration,32 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 21 (1983). Disputes over issues such as the validity and
scope of an agreement to arbitrate, the need for provisional relief, or the use of judicial
measures in aid of arbitration are often resolved by national courts. See Smit, supra note 6,
at 631-39.
187. See Park, supra note 174, at 809-10, 815.
188. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 183, art. 34 (setting forth limited grounds
upon which international arbitral awards may be set aside); Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S.
38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. Ratified by more than 120 nations, the New York
Convention mandates enforcement of foreign arbitral awards subject to a limited set of
defenses that include invalid arbitration agreements, lack of due process, excess of authority,
irregular composition ofthe tribunal, or a violation of the public policy ofthe enforcing state.
See id art. V. Review of an arbitrator's legal errors is not permitted. Most but not all
national arbitration laws track these limited review standards. See Park, supra note 174, at
815-17.
189. Indeed, so pervasive is the deference granted to arbitral decisions that one
commentator has stated that "an agreement to arbitrate is, in effect, an agreement to comply
with the arbitrator's decision whether or not the arbitrator applies the law." Stephen J.
Ware, DefaultRulesfrom MandatoryRules: PrivatizingLaw ThroughArbitration,83 MINN.
L. REV. 703, 712 (1999).
190. Prior to the constitution of the arbitral panel, challenges to the agreement to
arbitrate or to the impartiality of particular arbitrators are subject to established review
procedures and receive a fair measure of solicitude by the outsiders asked to consider them.
Challenges later in the process are less well-received, and postaward challenges, although
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Knowing the broad deference given to the international arbitral
process in general, and panel decisions in particular, the parties
are free to bargain for more extensive challenge and review
procedures. Most do not make such choices, however, because ofthe
additional uncertainty, delays, and costs such procedures would
add. Nevertheless, it is the knowledge that the parties could have
bargained to include these elements in their dispute settlement
arrangements ex ante that legitimizes the system of deference given
to an arbitrator's conclusions ex post.
How do the constraints on challenging arbitral decisions affect
the incentives of arbitrators to limit their own authority? Arbitral
panels are traditionally concerned not with articulating governing
legal norms but with resolving private disputes within the
constraints imposed by the parties' contract. Fealty to the parties'
intent, therefore, is the benchmark against which arbitral accountability is measured. 9 ' The degree to which this benchmark
has been internalized is more difficult to assess. For, if external
checking functions are deliberately structured to be narrow,
arbitrators may experience only weak incentives to behave in ways
that are faithful to the parties' intent. 92
quite common, are treated with the least solicitude. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 67-69 (1994) (discussing procedures for
parties to challenge arbitrators appointed to panel); Sir Michael Kerr, Concord and Conflict
in InternationalArbitration,13 ARBITRATION INTIL 121, 134-41 (1997) (discussing a variety
of"interventions by national courts"); Rau, supra note 184, at 491 (discussing UNCITRAL
Model Law which "create[s] a mechanism for pre-hearingjudicial challenges to arbitrators
based on required disclosures"). The New York Convention's exceptionally narrow grounds
for contesting the enforcement of arbitral awards is perhaps the most obvious manifestation
of this practice. Tellingly absent from the Convention is any provision allowing a losing party
to challenge an award on the basis of legal errors committed by the arbitrator, even where
those errors are quite flagrant. See BORN, supra, at 506 (noting that U.S. courts have
repeatedly interpreted the New York Convention "as foreclosing virtually all judicial review
of the merits of arbitral awards"); REISMAN, supranote 173, at 109-20 (analyzing the control
scheme of the New York Convention).
191. As Professor Rau has written:
[A]rbitration should be understood through the lenses of contract rather than
of adjudication: With respect to the neutrality of the arbitrators, just as with
respect to other questions-for example, the extent of their'jurisdiction" or the
finality of their award-the only serious inquiry ought to be one into the
understanding and underlying assumptions of the contracting parties.
Rau, supra note 184, at 487; see also REISMAN, supranote 173, at 5-6; Park, supra note 174,
at 814-15.
192. REISMAN, supra note 173, at 6 (noting absence in international arbitration, as
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Even if formalized mechanisms of external control are scant in
any individual case, however, certain features of the arbitral system
tend over time to internalize core notions of accountability to
parties. The simple fact that arbitration is consensual serves to
internalize accountability norms. Arbitrators know that the parties
enjoy significant latitude in deciding where and how to resolve their
disputes. 193 Thus, even if the prospects of a particular panel award
being overturned by a national court are slim, the cumulative effect
of exceeding authority across a number of cases is likely to press
arbitrators to internalize certain limiting principles. This effect is
particularly pronounced where the arbitrators regularly resolve
disputes in a specific industry or for a particular center, or hope to
entice parties to appoint them to the financially remunerative task
of serving on future panels. 1
Consider the effect of these internalized checking functions on
the content of arbitral awards. Nearly all international arbitration
systems require that arbitrators give reasons for their decisions. 95
These reasons are not reviewed, however, with anywhere near the
scrutiny of domestic and international judicial appeals, and even
compared to domestic arbitration, of the "hierarchical control system equipped with an
effective compulsoryjurisdiction to review allegations of excessive jurisdiction and to decide
impartially the alleged nullity of the award").
193. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supranote 9, at 7.
194. See G. Richard Shell, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel Effects of Commercial
Arbitration,35 UCLAL. REV. 623, 634 (1988). Shell states:
Arbitrators, unlike judges, often have an incentive to make disputants equally
happy or unhappy because they are paid by the parties rather than by the state.
Since risk averse parties are more likely to agree on an arbitrator who has a
reputation for moderate decisions ... arbitrators who want to encourage repeat
business will seek a reputation for moderation rather than extremism in their
decision making.
Id; see also Rau, supra note 184, at 521 (discussing arbitrators' "self-interest in trying to
secure and expand prospects of future arbitral appointments").
195. See, e.g, Arbitration Rules ofthe United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, UNCITRAL art. 32(2), G. Res. 31/98, Dec. 15,1976 (noting that "the arbitral tribunal
shall state the reasons upon which the award is based, unless the parties have agreed that
no reasons are to be given"); Rules ofArbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
1 Jan. 1998, R.25(2) ("The Award shall state the reasons upon which it is based."), available
athttpl/www.iccwbo.orglcourtlenglish/arbitrationlrules.asp; London Court of International
Arbitration, Arbitration Rules, Recommended Clauses & Costs, art. 26.1 ("The Arbitral
Tribunal shall make its award in writing and, unless all parties agree in writing otherwise,
shall state the reasons upon which its award is based."), available at www.lciaarbitration.comlrulecostlenglish.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001).
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the deliberate disregard of controlling legal precepts is often an
insufficient basis upon which to vacate an award. To the extent that
external control mechanisms do exist, they are directed primarily
to curbing excesses of authority rather than to correcting legal
errors. In any single dispute, therefore, an arbitrator's incentive to
engage in rigorous legal analysis often will be outweighed by her
incentive to reach a conclusion that is faithful to the arbitration
agreement and is acceptable, or at least tolerable, to both contesting
parties.1 '
Nor are arbitrators likely to be especially concerned with the
effects of their reasoning on third parties. First, arbitral decisions
are free from the constraining effects of precedent, a necessity
given that parties regularly require decisions to remain unpublished or crucial passages excised to preserve confidentiality.
Where decisions are published, they often contain desultory
reasoning or fail to maintain decisional harmony with prior published cases addressing analogous legal issues.1 97 These decisional
ambiguities and conflicts often remain unresolved due to the
paucity of institutionalized appellate processes to clarify or
reconcile them.19 Indeed, without a system of internal and external
196. See Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and InternationalContracts:A
Challengefor InternationalCommercialArbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 657, 716-21
(1999) (criticizing arbitral awards as insufficiently reasoned and often based on "contextual
justice" rather than careful legal analysis); Rau, supra note 184, at 523, 534 (indicating
arbitration, unlike adjudication, creates "a tendency to look for intermediate solutions ...
responsive to the uniqueness of each dispute" that often takes the form of "compromise
awards"); see also REISMAN, supranote 173, at 95 (identifying structural incentives for threeperson arbitrations to produce compromise awards).
This approach to decision making is especially prevalent where awards must be issued
within a short period of time, whether because of contractual or institutionally imposed
deadlines or workload constraints. Cf Ted L. Stein, Remarks, Decisionsof the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. Soc'y INTL L. PRoc. 221, 228-29 (1984) (stating that
tribunal's heavy caseload tends to suppress extended legal reasoning).
197. See Maniruzzaman, supra note 196, at 721 ("In arbitral practice it seems to be a
striking feature that in many cases arbitrators leave out the analysis or any discussion while
applying any principle of law."); see also Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Bingham, Reasons and
Reasons for Reasons: Differences Between a Court Judgment and an ArbitrationAward, 4
INT'LARB. 141, 154 (1988) ("An arbitrator is not called upon to make detailed analysis ofthe
legal principles canvassed before him or to review in any detail the legal authorities cited.").
198. One exception to this is the ICSID annulment procedure. See REISMAN, supranote
173, at 46-106. Although the ICC does contain a court, it does not review arbitration
decisions on matters of substance. See REDFERN & HUNTER, supranote 1, at 51.
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checks to support the production of carefully reasoned awards,
commentators have questioned whether the international arbitration system
is capable of developing a distinct body of rules and
9
norms.

19

2. Misplaced and InadequateArbitral Checking Functions in
the UDRP
When viewed in the aggregate, the most important constraints on
arbitral decision makers are ex ante creational checks rather than
ex post external or internal checks. The parties' ultimate control
over an arbitrator's power flows from their virtually unfettered
right to choose the substantive and procedural rules according to
which the arbitral panel will decide their dispute. For this reason,
negotiating the terms of the agreement to arbitrate is perhaps the
most effective means ofpreserving accountability, preventing errors
and controlling excesses of arbitral power.2"
a. CreationalChecking Functions
Consider the implications of this balance of arbitral checking
functions for the UDRP. By imposing uniform, mandatory dispute
settlement rules upon all domain-name registrants, ICANN
eliminated the ability of registrants to opt out of UDRP dispute
settlement proceedings or to tailor the system to their needs.'O
199. See Maniruzzaman, supranote 196, at 717-32 (discussing impediments to formation
of lex mercatoria);see also KlAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX
MERCATORIA xiii (1999) (suggesting reforms of international arbitration practice designed to
make the lex mercatoria "a self-contained legal system" rather than "a method of
decisionmaking"). For competing views, see LEX MERATORrA AND ARBITRATION: A
DISCUSSION OF THE NEw LAW MERCHANT (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998).
200. For this reason, inter alia, the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, which sanctions
arbitration of contractual disputes, is stated to be inapplicable to contracts of employment
of any "class ofworkers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The
Supreme Court, however, has emphasized the federal policy favoring arbitration when in
interpreting the scope ofthe arbitration statute. See Circuit City Stores. Inc. v. Adams, 532
U.S. 105 (2001) (upholdingpre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment contracts); see also
Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends ofAlden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1113,1163 & n.246 (2001) (citing Circuit City and referring to the Court's "iron enforcement
of the Federal Arbitration Act).
201. Thus, while much ofthe criticism of the ICANN process has focused on questions of
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When an individual registers a domain name with any registrar of
names in the three unrestricted generic top level domains anywhere
in the world, she confronts a non-negotiable contract of adhesion.
She cannot specify the subject matter of the disputes upon which
the panel is empowered to rule or the procedures that it will follow,
and she has (consistent with the inapt analogy to arbitral models)
only limited control (via her selection of registrar, and hence the
courts of mutual jurisdiction from which to seek redress) over the
mechanisms by which panel excesses or errors may be challenged
or reviewed. °2
In effect, all of the key substantive and procedural terms of the
UDRP "arbitration" agreement are prenegotiated by ICANN, which
merely heightens the importance of the content of the UDRP's
two foundational documents and the legitimacy of the process by
which they were drafted. If these foundational documents fairly
balance the substantive interests of trademark owners and
domain-name registrants and if they contain equivalent procedural
rights for both parties, then using ICANN as a proxy for
individualized negotiation of a dispute settlement agreement may
well be an acceptable and efficient alternative."3 If, by contrast,
"voice," the questions of"exit" are also important. See Dan L. Burk, VirtualExit in the Global
InformationEconomy, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 943 (1998).
202. See Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace,supra note 26, at 98-99. A domain name
registrant's control over the mechanisms of dispute settlement is limited from the
perspective of the three creational checking functions identified above. First, she cannot
specify in advance which of the ICANN-accredited dispute settlement providers will hearher
case. LJDRP Rules, supranote 17, Rule 3(a). This omission is significant given the diversity
of approaches among providers to handling challenges to a panel member's independence or
impartiality, a subject we address below.
Second, although she can define the courts of mutual jurisdiction by her residence and
place ofregistration, she is unable to negotiate the background rules of national law against
which the panel's performance will be measured. This is so because there is no clear "seat'
of arbitration in cyberspace and determining that seat will be crucial to determining the law
to be applied by the court of mutual jurisdiction.
Third, although a registrant may participate in the panel selection process by electing to
have her dispute heard by a three-member panel, such participation comes at the expense
of splitting the cost ofthe proceedings with the complainant unless the traddmark owner has
already chosen a three-member panel to hear its complaint. The complainant's incentive to
select a three-person panel is also limited by the increased costs associated with this method
of proceeding under the UDRP. See infra note 236 (citing cost data).
203. In the case of tortious acts between strangers (such as cybersquatting or trademark
infringement), it has been argued that the absence of a "preexisting voluntary relationship
between the parties" precludes use of arbitration as a method of dispute settlement. William
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these foundational documents are substantively or procedurally
skewed, or if the process by which they were created is open to
challenge on legitimacy and accountability grounds, then the
arbitral "bargain" struckby ICANN is itself called into question and
a decisive check on the authority of UDRP panels has been cast into
204
doubt.
b. External Checking Functions
These concerns over the UDRP's creational checking functions
are further exacerbated by the fact that external checks are even
more attenuated in the UDRP context than they are for international arbitration, both with respect to institutional controls and
controls by national courts. Consider first the external checks
imposed by the four dispute settlement providers and ICANN itself.
Under many systems of institutional arbitration (including the
aborted WIPO ACP procedure), arbitral centers retain the authority
to enforce each panelist's obligation to be both independent and
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,Adjudication as a PrivateGood, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 237
(1979). In fact, arbitration is possible whenever the parties can be "contractually-linked
through intermediaries." Ware, supranote 189, at 752; see also Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (permitting arbitration of age discrimination claims because
of arbitration clause in securities registration application form). In the context of
cybersquatting, therefore, some form of proxy system is essential to replace direct
negotiations over the terms of the agreement to arbitrate.
The "bargain' in the UDRP system is completed when trademark owners agree to certain
ground rules as a condition of filing a UDRP complaint. See, e.g., UDRP Rules, supra note
17, Rule 3(b)(xiii) & (xiv) (complainant must agree to submit to jurisdiction of a court in at
least one specified "mutual jurisdiction" with respect to "challenges to a decision canceling
or transferring the domain name" and mustwaive all claims against, inter alia, registrar and
ICANN arising out of the registration of the domain name or any dispute relating to it). This
bargain, however, appears largely to benefit a third party, ICANN, rather than provide
benefits to the other party to the agreement, namely, the domain-name registrant. Indeed,
submission of the trademark owner to one "mutual jurisdiction" for purposes only of
adjudicating the appropriateness of an order canceling the domain-name registration is a
rather small "contractual" return for the domain-name registrant. (It is not clear, for
example, that the trademark owner is to be treated as having submitted to the jurisdiction
ofthese courts for related purposes, such as to determine whether a cause of action may arise
out of a finding of reverse domain-name hijacking.)
204. Ofcourse, the existence ofde novo review by national courts mitigates any structural
imbalances in the non-national system. As we explain immediately below, however, the
prospects for meaningful national court review of UDRP panel decisions are uncertain at
best.
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impartial, first by requiring panelists to disclose any circumstances
giving rise to doubts over those two attributes, and second by
entertaining challenges from the parties to a particular panelist.
The system of neutrality enforcement contemplated under the
UDRP is substantially more attenuated. Although the UDRP Rules
do impose a duty on all panelists to be impartial and independent,
the means by which that duty is enforced differ according to dispute
settlement provider and thus vary from case to case.2 °s One
provider gives no specific provision for party challenges;0 6 another
allows challenges only within a fixed period of time after the initial
appointment of a panelist;20 7 whereas a third (and perhaps a fourth)
permits challenges at any time during the proceedings if doubts
about a particular panelist arise."' In addition, the grounds upon
which challenges will be recognized vary widely. 0 9 The fact that
ICANN permits dispute settlement providers to adopt different
standards of review of a panelist's independence and impartiality
suggests that providers may compete with one another over the
substantive and procedural bases for panelist challenges. Whether
such competition is likely to lead to more or less stringent panelist
review is uncertain, however, and turns in part on the decision205. Cf supra note 173 (discussing blending of creational and external checking
functions).
206. See WIPO,SupplementalRulesfor UniformDomainNameDisputeResolutionPolicy,
Rule 8 Annex C (Dec. 1, 1999) (containing no provision for party challenges to panelist's
independent or impartiality, but stating that WIPO Arbitration Center itself checks"whether
there are any facts or circumstances, past or present, or that could arise in the foreseeable
future, that might call in to question that person's independence in the eyes of one or both
of the parties"), availableat http-J/arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/rules/supplemental.html.
207. See National Arbitration Forum, DisputeResolution for DomainNames, Supp. Rule
10(d) (Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Dispute Resolution for Domain Names], available at
http'/www.arbforum.com/domains/domain-rulesO2OlOl.asp.
208. See eResolution, eResolution Supp. Rule, Supp. Rule 10(a), availableat http'J/www.
eresolution.ca/services/dnd/pr/supprules.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). The CPR Institute
for Dispute Resolution's rules concerning challenges state only that "[cihallenges to the
impartiality, integrity or independence of a Panelist shall be determined by an officer of
CPR." CPR Inst. for Dispute Resolution, CPR'sSupplementalRulesandFeesSchedule, Supp.
Rule 9, available at httpJ/www.cpradr.org/ICANNRulesAndFees.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2001).
209. CompareDispute Resolution for Domain Names, supra note 207, Supp. Rule 10(b)
(setting forth specific grounds for disqualification, including direct financial interest and
prior representation of party), with eResolution, supra note 208, Supp. Rule 10(a) (allowing
panelist recusal "if there are circumstances which raise serious doubts about his or her
impartiality or independence").
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making incentives created by the UDRP's panel selection rules, an
issue we address in the next subsection.2 10
The absence of meaningful external controls by national courts
over UDRP proceedings is even more striking. As an initial matter,
however, the claim that external checking functions are more
limited for the UDRP than for international arbitration seems
contrary to the plain terms of the Policy. After all, the drafters expressly designed the UDRP as a soft-law system that supplements
but does not supplant national court adjudication of domain name
disputes.2 ' If de novo review by a national court is possible, then it
would seem that the UDRP's external checking functions are far
strongerthan the extremely limited national court checking mechanisms at work in arbitration.1 Several features of the UDRP
significantly undermine this argument, however, particularly with
respect to external checking functions affecting domain name
registrants. These features suggest that the UDRP may be soft law
in theory, but much harder law in practice.
Consider first the filing of a complaint by a respondent in a court
of so-called "mutual jurisdiction" to challenge a UDRP panel
decision ordering her domain name to be canceled or transferred
(described somewhat loosely as an "appeal" in the preparatory
documents).1 The extremely short ten-day window within which
210. See infra Part H.B.2.c. ICANN's power to approve and monitor dispute settlement
providers will likely serve as a check on any provider that habitually permits biased or
partial panelists to decide UDRP cases. Cases of less than systemic bias may be difficult to
monitor, however, particularly given that the parties will have limited information and
incentives to bring such challenges to ICANN's attention.
211. See Policy, supranote 17, 1 4(k) (parties to UDRP dispute are not precluded "from
submitting the dispute to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution before
such mandatory administrative proceeding is commenced or after such proceeding is
concluded"); see also Referee Enterprises, Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis.
Jan. 24, 2001) (federal court issued injunction in case directly at odds with prior UDRP
decision), availableat httpA/www.Loundy.com/CASES/Referee-Ent_vPlanetRef.html.
212. This was the rationale adopted in a recent district court decision that refused to apply
the deferential review standards of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act to UDRP panel
decisions. Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va. 2001) (concluding
that either trademark owner or domain name registrant may "seek a de novo review of a
dispute that has been the subject of the [UDRP'sl administrative procedure").
213. See Second Staff Report, supra note 149, § 4.7. Such a proceeding differs from the
conventional understanding of an appeal. To be sure, the level of review undertaken by
courts of mutual jurisdiction (de novo review) comports with the standard of scrutiny
typically applied by appellate courts to questions of law with which they are presented. Other
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respondents must file such a proceeding is likely to exert a
significant deterrent effect on national court review. Initiating litigation is often a time-consuming and complex process, particularly
for individuals and businesses with limited financial resources
who may be forced to find an attorney to litigate in a foreign
jurisdiction.2 1 4 Of course, nothing precludes a respondent from filing
national court proceedings after the ten-day window has expired.
The registrant's incentives to do so once a domain name has been
canceled or transferred will be substantially diminished, however,
particularly when the removal of the domain name disrupts her
established or planned business operations. From a cost-benefit
perspective, it may be preferable to transfer operations to a
different domain name or even to abandon a start-up enterprise
altogether. Empirical evidence on this point is anecdotal, but the
most comprehensive database of national court challenges to UDRP
rulings lists only twenty-five cases in federal district court and one
foreign case out of the more than 3500 UDRP panel decisions to
2 15
date.
aspects of the process, however, set it apart from traditional appeals and affect its role as an
effective checking mechanism. In particular, appellate courts typically are reluctant (or
unable) to disturb factual findings of lower courts absent egregious error. Cf FED. R. CIV. P.
50 (applying the "clearly erroneous" standard to review of factual findings of a judge sitting
as a fact finder). This would suggest perhaps, once more, that proceedings in courts ofinutual
jurisdiction would serve as a greater external check than normally served by the appellate
system. However, reliance on a developed factual record by the appellate court also serves
to expedite (and render less costly) the conduct of an appeal. The high cost of proceeding
before a national court, one of the reasons for the development of the UDRP, is cemented in
place by the lack of a portable factual record. The de novo factual inquiry, therefore, may
paradoxically exacerbate (or perpetuate) the cost concern of national court proceedings
discussed above, creating a disincentive to "appeal" and hence further weaken the external
check served by "appeals" to national courts.
214. Although the UDRP requires a stay of a panel order where an action is filed by the
domain name registrant in a court of mutual jurisdiction, there is nothing that prevents a
domain name owner from proceeding in another court (perhaps closer to home) that might
be willing to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. See LDRP Rules, supranote 17, Rule 4(k).
While this would not necessarily have the automatic stay effect of proceedings in a court of
mutual jurisdiction, it is unclear how a domain name registrar would deal with conflicting
national court determinations and/or orders. Cf id., Rule 3(b) (noting that changes will be
made to domain name registration if an order is received from a court of "competent
jurisdiction"). It is for this reason, among many others, as we discuss in Part m, that a
jurisprudence of national-non-national relations must be developed.
215. Patrick L. Jones, UDRPAppeals in Court [hereinafter UDRPAppeals in Court], at
http://www.udrplaw.net/UDRPappeals.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). See also Cerf, supra
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Second, it is unclear whether respondents who do muster the
resources to appeal panel decisions in fact possess a cause of action
against a trademark owner under national laws seeking retention
of the domain name. Michael Froomkinin particular has raised this
as a weakness of the UDRP system. 16 If this criticism is wellfounded, even where a dispute between the parties would have been
decided in the respondent's favor had it been litigated under a
particular national trademark or cybersquattinglaw, domain name
registrants may not be able to reverse a panel decision where a
transfer is already a fait accompli.
Whether the criticism is well-founded, however, is not so clear (at
least under U.S. law). A small number of cases have been filed by
aggrieved domain name registrants raising a smorgasbord of causes
of action. 17 And the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act
(ACPA),218 enacted in the United States in late 1999, permits
domain-name registrants whose domain name has been canceled or
transferred pursuant to the UDRP (or a similar policy) to file a civil
action in U.S. federal court against the prevailing party in order to
establish that the registration and use of the domain name was
lawful under the Lanham Act. 19 If the domain-name registrant is
successful, the court may "grant injunctive relief to the domain
note 26, at C2 ("Even though the UDRP is non-binding ...
it appears that [the challenge to
panelists' decisions] has happened in only a few dozen out of over 2,000 decisions to date.").
But see infra note 217 (referencing specific appeals).
216. Froomkin, WIPO Commentary, supranote 85,
124-27.
217. See Virtuality L.L.C. v. Bata Ltd., No. H-00-3054 (D. Md. Apr. 2, 2001) (dismissing
registrants state law claims but retaining jurisdiction of federal claims), available at
http'J/www.mdd.uscourts.gov/Opinions/PDF/2001/April/bata.pdf; Famology.com, Inc. v. Perot
Systems Corp., No. 00-2363 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2001) (dismissing registrants conversion
claim against trademark owner but refusing to dismiss tortious interference with contract
and abuses of process claims), availableat http'J/www.udrplaw.netIUDRPappeals.htm. For
a different complaint filed in a U.S. district court seeking to reverse a panel ruling, see
Barcelona.com,Inc. v. ExcelentisimoAyuntamientodeBarcelona,No. 00-CV-141L (filed Aug.
17, 2000) (alleging causes of action for fraud and unfair competition, tortious interference
with prospective economic advantage and a declaratory judgment of no trademark
infringement), availableat http't/www.domainbattles.com/lawsuit3.htm.
218. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (Supp. V 1999)).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)D)(v) (1994). The statute also provided a cause of action for
owners oftrademarks-both registered and unregistered-against cybersquatters. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d). In contrast to section 1114(2)(D)(v), the provision, this part of the statute has been
used heavily by trademark owners. See, e.g., Sporty's Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Market,
Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 495 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1262 (2000).
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name registrant, including the reactivation of the domain name or
transfer of the domain name to the domain name registrant."220 To
our knowledge, no other national law provides such a cause of
action.
Third, respondents who frame their claims not as an appeal of
the merits of a UDRP ruling but rather as a challenge to excesses
of panel power are equally unlikely to prevail. In traditional
international arbitral proceedings, nation-states have enacted
detailed statutory regimes to allow losing parties to challenge
awards, albeit on very limited grounds. But it is doubtful that
hybrid UDRP decisions qualify as arbitral awards under these
statutes, particularly given the de novo national court review
contemplated by the Policy.2 21 Courts in the United States, at least,
have indicated that they would not be bound by panel findings,
which suggests a clear intent not to treat panel decisions as arbitral
awards.2 22 For this reason, it is doubtful that national courts
possess any grant of power to review UDRP panel abuses as such.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v). Although at least one complaint has been filed in a U.S.
district court seeking to challenge a panel ruling under this provision, there have been no
reported decisions interpreting it. Barcelona.com, (http//www.domainbattles.com/
lawsuit3.htm.).
Itis unclear whether section 1114(2)(D)(v) was thought necessary to remedyjurisdictional,
substantive, or remedial failings. A declaratory judgment action for nonviolation of the
Lanham Act surely existed-subject to the thresholds required for such actions
generally-even without section 1114(2)(D)(v). But the relief provided in the statute suggests
that this might be a useful means of checking UDRP excesses. This provision raises avariety
of issues in addition to its intended application. For example, to work fully, the domain name
registrant may have to join the domain-name registrar as a defendant in the action.
221. Many national arbitration statutes are based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, supra
note 183, whose applicability to UDRP proceedings is highly questionable. Most importantly,
the model law permits the parties to have recourse to a national court to "set aside" an
arbitral award only on exceedingly narrow grounds, such as incapacity of a party, invalidity
of the arbitration agreement; lack of proper notice of the arbitral proceedings; failure to
follow the agreed panel appointments process; awards dealing with disputes or matters
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration; disputes not capable of settlement by
arbitration under national law; or awards in conflict with the public policy of the State. See
id. art. 34. These narrow grounds are directly at odds with a system in which the parties may
seek de novo review of the award by a national court.
222. See Parisi v. Netlearning, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752 (E.D. Va 2001) (rejecting
claim of trademark owner that UDRP decisions were arbitral awards entitled to the
deferential review and enforcement standards of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10
(2000); see also Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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As to this third weakness of national court proceedings as an
external check on UDRP decision making, one might respond that
the lack of a check on panel excesses is somewhat untroubling given
courts' power of de novo review on the merits. Nevertheless, even
if national proceedings on the merits develop in ways that obviate
the problems discussed above, 2 limited judicial review of panel
excesses would serve an independent checking role of significant
value. Such "quasi-procedural" reviews224 contribute to checking in
ways that even the ostensibly stronger de novo merits assessment
cannot achieve. The articulation of procedural and structural
standards across the board (e.g., regarding the impartiality of
arbitrators) may be of greater long-term consequence than an
unbiased court simply reaching a different conclusion on the merits.
The latter review ensures a proper result in a single case, but does
nothing to develop appropriate systemic checks on excess at the
level of UDRP panel decision making. Indeed, the legitimacy of
the UDRP system depends on the exposure of such conduct as
unacceptable, even where the outcome of the case on the merits
would be unaffected. 5 De novo merits review by national courts
will fail to highlight these excesses, whether courts reach the
same or a different result, thus preventing the internalization of
systemically appropriate standards by UDRP panelists.22 This is
especially so where, for reasons discussed above, other aspects of
the system discourage domain-name respondents from seeking
national court review in individual cases.227
223. See supra text accompanying notes 213-22.
224. See supra note 188 (discussing UNCITRAL model law).
225. Attention to these dual concerns of individual justice and systemic monitoring is
achieved in national court systems by doctrines of"harmless error."
226. This assumes, of course, that national courts will even consider a prior UDRP panel
decision as relevant to their own analysis of the dispute between the parties. See Referee
Enterprises, Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24, 2001) (failing even to
refer to priorUDRP decision betweenthe same parties), available at httpJ/www.Loundy.com/

CASES/RefereeEnt-vPlanetRef.html.
227. In addition, depending upon the scope of issues for which merits review by courts of
mutual jurisdiction is available, a procedural checking mechanism may be used by courts
strategically to indicate to panels the parameters of acceptable decision making on
substantive issues. National appellate courts frequently use similar national mechanisms
ofjudicial review to provide lower courts with guidance on the margins of the substantive law
even where appellate or review jurisdiction over the merits does not exist. See, e.g., In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (using mandamus procedure to
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Uncertainty over the location of national court review and the
substantive law to be applied raises a fourth doubt regarding
national courts' ability to provide adequate external checks on
UDRP panel abuses. Initially, one would expect that, as a result of
the -mutual jurisdiction provision in the UDRP, courts in jurisdictions where registrars are based might develop an expertise and
interest in reviewing UDRP panel decisions. For example, the
Eastern District of Virginia (by virtue of being the home to NSI, the
original exclusive registrar for domain names in the leading generic
top level domains) has thus far dealt with a significant number of
trademark-domain-name disputes.228 But the mutual jurisdiction
provision is unlikely over time to centralize such expertise. Even
assuming that trademark owners will select the domicile of the
registrar as the court of mutual jurisdiction rather than the
domicile of the domain-name registrant, the geographic location
of registrars is slowly diversifying under ICANN's competitive
registration policy. As the backlog of disputes regarding NSIregistered domain names is cleared, a similar disaggregation of
national judicial decision making can be expected. Moreover,
respondents are not restricted to so-called "appeals" and may bring
proceedings in any court of competent jurisdiction.229
At least in the short term, these diverse national courts are likely
to differ widely over the extent of review they grant to UDRP
rulings, 23" and over conflict-of-laws methodologies they apply to
review class action certification where direct appeal unavailable). Indeed, the use (or abuse)
of such appellate procedures for these purposes may force legislators to recognize the need
for more expanded direct review. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f) (creating broader appeal
possibilities in context of class certification addressed by mandamus inRhone.Poulenc);see
also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
CertificationandInterlocutoryReview by the U.S. CourtsofAppeals UnderRule23(), 41WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1531 (2000) (discussing genesis of Rule 23(f)).
228. E.g., Banco Inverlat, S.A. v. www.inverlat.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 521 (E.D. Va. 2000);
Caesars World Inc., v. Caesars-Palace.com, 112 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Va. 2000).
229. Policy, supra note 17, 3(b). Such courts may include, in some nations, not only
national courts but local courts as well. See David McGuire, CaliforniaPassesSweepingAntiCybersquattingLaw,NEWSBYTES, Aug. 23, 2000,2000 WL 21181749 (discussing California's
new state cause of action against cybersquatting in domain names that are identical or
confusingly similar to the "real names of other people, living or dead").
230. See Weber-Stephen Prods. Co. v. Armitage Hardware & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1766 (N.D. Ill. 2000); BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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determine the applicable substantive rules. Taken together, the
potential for multiple national review venues and the lack of
discernible review standards thus may diminish further the
capacity of national courts to serve as external checks. As a
theoretical matter, multiple venues might generate competition
among legal systems and thus stimulate active national court
review." 1 This free market approach to the development of
legal rights certainly undergirds the current domain-name registration system. 2 However, it may not cut as strongly in favor
of efficient, appropriate lawmaking in the context of external
checking mechanisms. 21 3 Dispersing the checking function through
decentralized review may simply dilute that function, sending the
wrong message to UDRP panelists.
Contrast this state of affairs with international arbitration, in
which review of an award may occur in multiple jurisdictions, but
the nature of that review-challenges under the national laws of
the seat of arbitration, and challenges elsewhere under the
strictures of the New York Convention-is fixed and known in
advance to both the parties and the decision makers prior to the
proceedings. Under this set of external constraints, the award
review, however limited, either at the arbitral situs or during
enforcement proceedings, is likely to-in most cases-identify fairly
quickly those arbitrators who regularly exceed the powers
arbitration agreements grant them or make other egregious errors.
The knowledge of such review is also likely to exert its own
231. See infranotes 365-66 (discussing why a multiplicity of venues might serve a useful
check on UDRP panels and enhance the legitimacy of the lawmaking and adjudicative
process).
232. Cf Burk, supra note 201 (discussing jurisdictional competition over legal norms
regulating cyberspace); DAN L. BulRK, The Market for Digital Piracy, in BoRDERS IN
CYBERSPACE 205 (Brian Kahni & Charles Nesson eds., 1997) (discussing danger of "race to
the bottom" in jurisdictional competition over rules of copyright protection).
233. One of us has written elsewhere of the value of "weak" international lawmaking,
facilitated by the wide dispersal ofdecision makers. See Dinwoodie,A New CopyrightOrder,
supra note 8, at 570-71 (discussing value of international copyright lawmaking being
conducted by varied national courts). However, there is an important difference between
weakening national courts that create international law through adjudication (which lends
legitimacy to such lawmaking) and weakening national courts that serve as checks on the
excesses of potentially too powerful non-national lawmakers (which reduces the legitimacy
of the lawmaking endeavor).
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constraining effect on arbitrators, deterring them from making
challengeable errors in the first instance.
Finally, the attenuation of national courts' external checking
function is manifested by the automatic nature of UDRP enforcement. Unlike international arbitrations subject to the New
York Convention, there is no requirement that prevailing UDRP
complainants institute separate national court proceedings to
enforce their awards-a crucial check on arbitral power. Instead,
enforcement of UDRP awards in favor of trademark owners are
automatic unless the respondent takes steps to appeal. This shift
of the burden of enforcement removes any opportunity for a
"second look" at the arbitral award," 4 thereby destabilizing one
of the features that makes the strong presumption favoring
enforcement of arbitral awards acceptable in the first place.
c. Internal Checking Functions
For the foregoing reasons, national courts are unlikely to exercise
significant de facto external checks on abuses of authoritybyU"DRP
panels, notwithstanding the de jure power that they are given
under the terms of the Policy. This leaves internal checking
functions as the principal method by which arbitral-type excesses
are to be checked. Yet UDRP panels have only weak incentives to
limit their own authority.
As noted above, the panelists and institutions operating in
international arbitration cases compete for business of both
complaining and responding parties. They thus have an incentive
to stay within the boundaries of the arbitral agreement and to issue
awards that encourage repeat business from both parties. 5 In the
UDRP, by contrast, competition incentives are skewed in favor of
complainant intellectual property owners. It is complainants, not
respondents, who choose the dispute settlement provider and who
pay panel fees in all single-panelist cases. In principle, respondents
may convert a single-member panel to a three-person panel after
234. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638

(1985) (emphasizing review of arbitral awards at the enforcement stage to ensure compliance
with forum's public policy).
235. See Shell, supra note 194, at 634.
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receiving the complaint. In practice, the large number of cases in
which respondents fail to appear and the added cost of choosing a
three-person panel for those who do"8 significantly diminish the
impact of respondents'
choice on the incentives of providers and
37
decision makers.
Confirming fears expressed by some participants during the
ICANN review-and-comment process, evidence suggests that
dispute settlement providers are acting on the "irresistible incentive
to ... develop a reputation for deciding cases in favor of complainants.""' Providers now publish statistics on their win/loss
records and other information about their decisions, information
which serves as indirect advertising to trademark owners intent on
choosing the most complainant-friendly provider. 9 There is also
236. Fees for a single-member panel run between $750 and $1000 (U.S. dollars) for a
single domain name. Fees for a three-member panel run between $2200 and $2500 (U.S.
dollars) for a single domain name. For a comparison of fee schedules and other cost data
among the first three UDRP dispute settlement providers, see Berkman Ctr. For Internet
& Soc., Harv. Law Sch., Choosing a Provider,at http:J/eon.law.harvard.edu/udrp/process
.html (last visited Oct. 3,2001). Respondents who elect a three-member panel must split the
cost ofthe panel's fees with the complainant.
237. Of the first 273 decisions issued by UDRP panels, only nineteen were decided by
three-memberpanels. See M. Scott Donahey, The ICANN CybersquattingfDecisions# 3:April
7, 2000 through May 5, 2000 [hereinafter Cybersquatting Decisions 3], available at
http'j/eon.law.harvard.eduudrpdecisions/2000-3.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001); M. Scott
Donahey, The ICANN CybersquattingDecisions # 2: March 2, 2000 throughApril 6, 2000
[hereinafter Cybersquatting Decisions 21, available at http-/eon.law.harvard.edu/udrp/
decisions/2000-2.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001); M. Scott Donahey, The ICANN
Cybersquatting Decisions # 1: January 14, 2000 through March 9, 2000 [hereinafter
CybersquattingDecisions 1], available at http'j/eon.law.harvard.eduudrptdecisions/20001.html (last visited Oct. 3,2001). This pattern has largely continued through July 2001. See
Geist, supranote 169, at 17 (reporting that of the first 3094 cases, 292 or 9.5% were decided
by three-person panels).
238. Comments of David Post to ICANN Staff& Council Regarding UDRP, Oct. 11, 1999,
at3, at http'J/www.icannwatch.org/archivestessays/939754407.shtml; see alsoJohn Berryhill,
The UDRP Provides Disputable Resolution Incentives, at 2 (Apr. 4, 2000) ("[Amny proregistrant provision that managed to sneak its way into the UDRP can be effectively negated
by the overall incentive structure built into the way that the UDRP is administered."), at
http//www.icannwatch.orgarchiveludrp-and-incentives.htm.
239. See CPR Inst. forDispute Resolution,DisputeResolutionforlnternetDomainNames:
CasesandPublishedDecisions,at http'J/www.cpradr.org/ICANN-Cases.htm (listing results
of UDRP cases decided by CPR Institute) (last visited Oct. 3, 2001); eResolution, Decisions:
DomainNameAdministrativeDecisinsathttp.J/www.eresoutin.calservicesdnddecisins.
htm (listing results of UDPR cases decided by eResolution) (last modified Sept. 21, 2001);
National Arbitration Forum, Domain Name DisputeResolution: Decisions, at http://www.
arbforum.com/domains (listing results of UDRP cases decided by National Arbitration
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anecdotal evidence that providers have adopted more overt methods
to attract complainants by boasting of the tough stance their
panelists have taken in UDPR disputes.240 These features have
already created a public perception that some dispute settlement
providers are more complainant friendly than others, a fact that the
case statistics support (although the cause-and-effect dynamic is
still unclear). 1 If this perception becomes entrenched, it will
affect the selection process of an ever larger pool of complaining
trademark owners, further skewing provider incentives and undermining ICANN's vision of the UDRP as a. substantively uniform
system administered by disaggregated decision makers competing
only over nonsubstantive matters.
In addition, consider the identity of the individuals who serve
as UDRP panelists. Most -are practicing intellectual property
attorneys, while a somewhat lower number are retired judges and
legal academics.242 It is at least an open question whether decision
makers from the private sector can sufficiently distance themselves
from the milieu in which they practice to self-limit their own powers
and develop balanced norms for the trademark-domain name
interface. This is particularly true if panelists are permitted to
trade on their UDRP expertise by representing trademark owners
in future domain-name disputes.24
Forum) (last visited Oct. 3, 2001); WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Ctr., Case Results:
gTLDs, at httpA/www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/statistics/results.html (last visited Oct. 3,
2001) (statistical breakdown of cases decided by WIPe Arbitration Center).
240. Berryhill, supra note 238, at 3 (citing examples of dispute resolution providers
"boast[ing]thatthey "go after cybersquatters" aidhave "evicted" them from domain names).
241. See Geist, supra note 169, at 6 (providing statistical evidence documenting
differential win/loss records among dispute settlement providers); Mueller, Rough Justice,
supranote 169 (same); see also Tamara Loomis,DisputesGet Swift Resolution UnderUDRP,
N.Y.L.J., July 27, 2000, at 5 ("Trademark lawyers seem overwhelmingly to prefer WIPO,
whose panelists are comprised mainly of intellectual property lawyers and professors.").
242. Loomis, supra note 241, at 5. For WIPO's complete "list of neutrals" and their
qualifications, see http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/paneYpanelists.html (last modified Sept.
11, 2001).
243. See Tata Sons evicts pornographiccyber squatter(Aug. 28, 2000) (discussing recent
UDRP victory and stating that WIPe panelist affiliated with private intellectual property
law firm in India "has been advising [the company] in all Trade Mark related matters and
the filing of complaints with WIPO Arbitration Center in domain name cases"), at
http:/www.tata.com/tatasons/releases/20000828.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001); see also
Berryhill, supra note 238, at 1 (positing that counsel representing trademark owners will
choose dispute settlement providers staffed by "practicing trademark attorneys," some of
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Taken together, these skewed internal checking functions are
likely to place significant pressure on UDRP decision makers to rule
in favor of complaining trademark owners. If, however, the disputes
subject to the UDRP were both unambiguous and narrow, then the
Policy itself might exert an adequate constraining force to prevent
panelists from acting on these pressures. As we explain below,
however, the UDRP provides panelists with discretionary decisionmaking authority, making it unlikely that the text of the Policy will
exert such a constraining effect.
C. Checking Functions in MinisterialDecision-MakingSystems
and in the UDRP
The documents that comprise the UDRP's drafting history,
including both the WIPO Report and the gTLD-MoU, stressed the
ministerial or nondiscretionary administrative character of their
respective proposed decision-making models. The ministerial attributes of the UDRP coalesce around several features: the Policy's
focus on cybersquatting and other widely deplored domain name
abuses, the short time periods for rendering decisions, the ability to
prosecute or defend claims without the assistance of attorneys, and
lastly, limiting the remedial powers of panels to transferring or
canceling domain names. These nondiscretionary attributes make
it important to compare the checking functions that operate in
ministerial decision-making systems with those at work in the
UDRP.
1. CheckingFunctionsin MinisterialDecision-MakingSystems
We begin with a definitional clarification. By ministerial or
nondiscretionary administrative decision making, we are referring
to systems in which the authority granted to decision makers
is tightly if not entirely constraining. Within such systems, a
whom may be "pre-disposed" to find in their client's favor).
In international commercial arbitration, panelists in one dispute often act as counsel in
future disputes not involving the same parties. See DEZALAY& GARTH, supranote 9, at 18-29.
In that context, however, control over the selection of panelists and arbitration centers is
more fairly divided. See supra,Part II.B.L
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predetermined rule or set of rules compels a particular result in
response to a given set of facts. 2 " Such rule-based decision making
is the antithesis of discretionary decision making, which occurs
'whenever the effective limits on [a decision maker's] power leave
him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
inaction."4 We recognize, of course, that there is no bright line
separating discretionary from nondiscretionary decision making,
although there are strong and weak forms of discretion.'
Nevertheless, we believe that the distinction is a useful one for our
purposes, both because it was a concept the UDRP's progenitors
adopted and because it highlights the ways in which the UDRP
differs from systems (be they administrative or judicial) in which
decision makers do enjoy significant discretion.
In the case of domestic ministerial or nondiscretionary administrative bodies, creational checking functional are often imposed by
elected representatives or their delegates who are accountable to
the voting public, or at a least more directly accountable than the
individuals who act as decision makers. 7 The authority of these
decision makers, in turn, is constrained first by the statute delegating legislative authority to the administrative agency' and
later by transparency and participation procedures that precede
administrative rulemaking.2 49
With these creational checks established, affected parties can
assert a variety of external checking mechanisms. External checks
may be as simple as a exercising a right to appeal, either to an
administrative appellate authority or to a national court, both of
244. RONALD DWORKIN, TAXING RIGTS SERIOUsLY 24 (1977) ("Rules are applicable in an
all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid,
in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it
contributes nothing to the decision.").
245. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIoNARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1969).
246. See id. at 52-96; DWORIaN, supra note 244, at 31-39.

247. Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of
Supranationalism:The Example ofthe EuropeanCommunity, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628,645-48
(1999) (reviewingliterature on administrative accountability). Creational checkingfunctions

might also be imposed by "the people" in the exercise of popular sovereignty. See U.S. CONST.
art. IIl.
248. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that
FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco products).
249. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-57 (2000).
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which are empowered to review claims of error using a standard of
review that grants a predetermined degree of deference to the
initial decision maker. In the case of national courts, the appealing
party may seek to compel the administrative decision maker to
perform a nondiscretionary act or to overturn a decision in which
the agency abused its discretion.' However, where challenges are
leveled at decision-making bodies against whom no appeal lies,
checking functions may be legislative or constitutional in nature,
such as when legislators revise a statute to limit or expand the
authority of an administrative agency.
The internal constraint on abuses of ministerial decision-making
power is the self-imposed value of rotely applying preset legal
rules to a particular set of facts. By mechanically and neutrally
implementing the nondiscretionary power granted to them, administrators insulate themselves from claims of error or abuse. 251 A
simple decision awarding or declining to award a claimed benefit or
privilege is often all that is required. Explanations need not be
given at all, or if provided, need not be detailed or discursive. 2
2. Misplaced and InadequateMinisterialCheckingFunctions
in the UDRP
What checking mechanisms could operate to control the
ministerial functions of UDRP panels? One mechanism would be to
provide a system of internal appeals, an option WIPO recommended but ICANN rejected. De novo "appeals" to national courts
theoretically could also provide some external checks, but the
substantial obstacles to review discussed above may deter appeals
by respondents in most cases. Yet some form of meaningful external
250. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, Jl, 2 ADM NSTfRATwELAWANDDPRAcncE § 8.20, at
466 (2d ed. 1997) (noting historical and modem uses of writ of mandamus to compel
government officials to perform non-discretionary obligations).
251. See Keith Hawkins, The Use of Legal Discretion:Perspectivesfrom Law and Social
Science in THE USES OF DISCRETION 11, 37 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (discussing ways in

which decision makers use nondiscretionary rules "as defences" and as 'justification for
decisions after the fact"); see also id. at 39 ("In administrative agencies ... bureaucratic rules
guide officials in ... providing protection from criticism in difficult cases.").
252. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 637 & n.8 (1995)
(identifying situations in which "legal decisionmakers facing specific controversies simply
announce results without giving reasons to support them").
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review procedure is essential to maintain accountability and "to
ensure that the rules produced in the administrative sphere fall
do not violate the rights
within the original legislative mandate and
253
interests.
private
other
of individuals or
One further context in which panels are authorized to act in ways
that might appear ministerial in nature is where a respondent fails
to answer the complaint. Commentators have noted the large
number of UDRP decisions in which respondents fail to appear or
to defend against trademark owners' complaints.2 ' These defaults
do not disempower panels from processing such cases, many of
which involve clear and uncontroversial abuses of domain names.255
At the level of individual justice, we are largely untroubled by
the grant of default judgments. It requires little cost or effort to
participate in TDRP panel proceedings, and the range of circumstances in which panel determination of cases against defaulting
parties will produce bad substantive law is probably narrow. In
particular, while several panels have treated a respondent's default
alone as a virtual admission of the complainant's claims, 256 this is

unlikely to alter the development of UDRP jurisprudence if the
253. Lindseth, supra note 247, at 646.
254. Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc., Harv. Law Sch., Analysis ofKey UDRPIssues, at
A3 2 [hereinafterKey Issues], at http'//eon.law.harvard.edu/udrp/analysis.html (lastvisited
Oct. 3,2001) (TuIn most cases the respondent defaults by failing to submit a timely response,
leading to an even greater likelihood of a finding of bad faith, since the dispute is then
resolved solely on the complaint.").
255. To the contrary, panels are expressly authorized by the Policy and Rules to review
the allegations of the complaint and to order a cancellation or transfer of the domain name
ifjustified. UDRP Rules, supra note 17, Rule 14(a). The UDRP also gives panels broad
discretion to determine the significance of a party's default. Id. Rule 14(b) ("Ifa Party, in the
absence of exceptional circumstances, does not comply with any provision of; or requirement
under, these Rules or any request from the Panel, the Panel shall draw such inferences
therefrom as it considers appropriate.").
256. See Noodle Time, Inc. v. Max Marketing, No. AF-0100 (Mar. 9, 2000) (stating
that failure to respond "should be considered as an admission that such claims are
true"), available at http:/www.eresolution.ca/services/dnd/decisions/0100.htm Alcoholics
Anonymous World Services, Inc. v. Raymond, WIPO Case No. D2000-0007 (Mar. 6, 2000)
(citing Mondich and finding "Respondent's failure to respond to the Complaint allows the
inference that the evidence would not have been favorable to Respondent"), available at
http'/www.arbiter.wip.int/domainstdecisions/html/2000/d2000-0007.html (last visited May
4, 2001); Mondich v. Brown, WIPO Case No. DOO-0004 (Feb. 16, 2000) ("It is a general
principle of United States law that the failure of a party to submit evidence on facts in its
control may permit the court to draw an adverse inference regarding those facts."), available
at httpj//www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0004.html.

20011

DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS

legal conclusion is explicitly premised upon the uncritical acceptance of the alleged facts. Only where a contested legal issue would
benefit from adversarial debate, and instead, is argued from one
side alone, is skewed UDRP case law likely to result.
We do not mean to downplay such a possibility. However, our
concern about the number of default cases rests principally on a
more structural basis, and suggests that a continuing high rate
of default may be problematic for the UDRP unless carefully
monitored.2 5 7 International and non-national dispute settlement
bodies typically cannot rely on a large account of intrinsic
credibility or legitimacy. They are built onless obviously democratic
foundations, and their representational capacity is continually
questioned. 2" Therefore, it is even more important for such bodies
to operate in ways that enhance their legitimacy and do not deplete
their capital of credibility.
In the specific context of domain-name disputes, ensuring the
credibility and persuasiveness of default decisions is particularly
important given the doubts expressed about ICANN's authority.
It also helps to alleviate concerns that the process by which the
UDRP was adopted unduly favored intellectual property interests.
International institutions, such as the European Court of Human
Rights, the International Court of Justice, and the World Trade
Organization make great efforts (through financial assistance or
technical support) to reduce default jurisprudence. 9 The UDRP
panels are more like such tribunals than national courts in terms
of the need to preserve their legitimacy, and thus should consider
257. In the human rights context for example, supranational tribunals and review bodies
require individual complainants to substantiate the factual assertions they make against
defending governments in order to find a treaty violation. See Helfer& Slaughter, supra note
5, at 353-54.
258. See infra Section IIl.B.1.; see also Bodansky, supranote 31, at 599-600.
259. See Peter H. F. Bekker, InternationalLegal Aid in Practice:The ICJ Trust Fund, 87
AM. J. INT'LL. 659 (1993) (discussing mechanisms used by the U.N. to provide legal expertise
and funds to states seeking to settle disputes through the International Court of Justice);
Carl Otto Lenz & Gerhard Grill, The PreliminaryRulingProcedureandthe UnitedKingdom,
19 FORDHAMINT'LL.J. 844,858 (1996) (discussing legal aid provided to individuals litigating
before European human rights tribunals); Kim Van der Borght, The Review of the WTO
Understandingon DisputeSettlement: Some Reflections on the CurrentDebate, 14 AM. U.
DWL L. REV. 1223, 1230-32 (1999) (noting that developing countries have asked that
additional resources be made available to assist in the prosecution of claims before WTO
dispute settlement bodies).
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adopting mechanisms developed by such tribunals in deciding
default cases.
D. Checking Functionsin InternationalAdjudication and in the
UDRP
As we explained in Part I, several attributes of the UDRP
resemble the adjudicatory functions of domestic courts and
international tribunals. These include the requirement that all
panel decisions be reasoned and published in a widely accessible
manner on provider web sites. Published, reasoned decisions contemplate an interpretive role for panels and the creation of a
trademark-domain name jurisprudence-functions endorsed by the
text ofthe Policy, by participants in the WIPO consultative process,
and during ICANN's own deliberations.26
Yet, are UDRP panels competent to create such a jurisprudence
within the constraints the Policy imposes on them? In international
adjudication, numerous checking mechanisms limit the authority
of international courts, tribunals, and review bodies (which we
collectively refer to as tribunals) to interpret treaties and resolve
disputes between contesting parties. The next sections identify
those restrictions and then compare them to the checks that operate
on UDRP panels.
1. Checking Functions in InternationalAdjudication
International tribunals are creatures of treaties. When negotiating, ratifying and enforcing treaties, national governments use
a variety of tools to prevent and control excesses by the tribunals
they create. Most obviously, governments build creational checking
functions into a treaty's text to specify the form and functions
of adjudication. These textual constraints include clauses addressing the composition of the tribunal, the discretion it enjoys to
screen cases for review, its evidentiary and fact-finding powers,
260. See UDRP Rules, supranote 17, Rule 15(a) (authorizing panels to decide cases using

"any rules and principles of law that [they] deem{] applicable); supra Part I.B. (discussing
UDRP's formation).
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and whether its decisions are legally binding or not.26 ' Checking
features are also implicit in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which contains a hierarchy of generally applicable treaty
interpretation methods.262 Structural checks of a political nature
can be imposed by adding procedures for treaty parties to delay or
overrule individual tribunal rulings, 263 or by specifying in advance
the procedures for amending a treaty in response to a particular
decision.26
International adjudication is also home to a diverse series of
external checking functions. While some treaties allow litigating
parties to appeal an initial decision by a tribunal, many do not.
In the latter instance, or when the decision is issued by the treaty's
highest decision-making authority, affected parties (which often
include nonlitigating treaty signatories) may exercise both formal
and informal political checking mechanisms in response to perceived errors or excesses by decision makers.
Most formally, affected treaty parties may seek to amend their
agreement to thwart the impact of a particular decision. But
amendment procedures are cumbersome and time-consuming. A
defending state may therefore choose a more narrowly tailored
mechanism, such as initiating treaty procedures that allow it to
block or delay a particular decision from taking effect." 5
261. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 300-07 (discussing state parties' control over
structure of supranational tribunals).
262. Vienna Convention, supra note 48, arts. 31,32 (specifyinginterpretive methodologies
for all treaties).
263. The WTO achieved a similar result by requiring rulings of panels or the Appellate
Body to be adopted by the DSB absent a consensus to do otherwise. See infra note 265 and
accompanying text; see also Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Blocks EU'sRequest for Panelat WTO on
Havana Club Rum Dispute, 17 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA) 1209, 1209 (2000) (noting use of
procedure permitting party to temporarily block formation of a WTO dispute settlement
panel).
264. In the WTO, panel and Appellate Body rulings do not constitute definitive
interpretations of the WTO agreements. See Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and
InternationalTrade Law (PartOne ofa Trilogy), 14 An U. INTLL. REV. 845 (1999). For such
authoritative constructions, states must look outside ofthe dispute settlement process to the
WTO Ministerial Conference and General Council, which may adopt such interpretations
only ifthree-fourths ofthe WTO membership agrees. See WTO Agreement, supranote 2, art.
IX(2).
265. *This blocking mechanism is subject to differing constraints in different treaty
regimes. In the old GATT trade regime, for example, the losing party could unilaterally block
a panel decision from taking effect. Under the WTO dispute settlement system, by contrast,
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Where a tribunal's decision is both final and binding, more
attenuated external checking functions come into play. The losing
party may seek to delay implementation of a particular ruling or
even flout it altogether, in each case justifying its conduct by
reference to the decision makers' alleged errors or abuses of
authority.266 If decisions are nonbinding then losing parties may
simply ignore them, but because even nonbinding decisions have a
strong "compliance pull," a losing party may still publicly express
its disagreement with the reasoning or conclusions of the
tribunal.267 Whether made in response to binding or nonbinding
decisions, such public criticisms send a message to decision makers
that they have acted in ways perceived as improper by important
players in the decision-making process. It is a message that
international tribunals have heeded in the past," thereby
internalizing the very values that external checking functions serve.

decisions become binding unless all states agree to block them by a consensus vote. See David
Palmeter, National Sovereignty and the World Trade Organization, 2 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 77, 80-81 (1999); see also REISMAN, supra note 173, at 15 (discussing potential uses of
UN Security Council to nullify decisions ofthe ICJ). For a recent example ofdelaying tactics
with respect to global intellectual property norms, see Ravi Kanth, WTO ArbitratorGives
Canada Until Oct. 7 to Comply With DrugStockpiling Decision, 17 Intl Trade Rep. (BNA)
1313, 1314 (2000) (WTO arbitrator rejected Canada's request for fifteen-month period to
implement TRIPs panel's pharmaceutical patent ruling and imposed six-month period
instead); Award of the Arbitrator, United States-Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act, WTO
Doc. No. WT/DS160/12 (Jan. 15, 2001) (rejecting U.S. claims for a fifteen-month delay),
availableat http/www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-eldispu e/160_12_e.pdf.
266. The United States' criticisms of the ICJ in response to the Court's acceptance of
jurisdiction in the ParamilitaryActivities in Nicaragua Case is perhaps the most famous
example. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILUP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 326-29 (3d ed.
1999). For a discussion of realistic rates of compliance and delaying tactics in European
human rights cases, see Mark W. Janis, The Efficacy of StrasbourgLaw, 15 CONN. J. INT'L
L. 39 (2000).
267. THOMAS M. FRANCIK THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990)
("Legitimacy is a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull
toward compliance on those addressed normativelybecause those addressed believe that the
rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted
principles of right process."). For an analysis of the compliance pull exerted by nonbinding
decisions of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at
344-45.
268. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 315-17 (discussing methodologies used by
ECJand ECHR in response to charges ofludicial activism by national governments); see also
Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims, supra note 20, at 408-09 (discussing how ECHR
advanced its authority incrementally to overcome resistance from state parties).
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What other internal checking mechanisms constrain judicial
decision making? An extensive literature seeks to explain the art
of common and civil law judging in general and ofreasoned decision
making in particular.269 Much of this literature identifies ways
in which judges have internalized norms that constrain their
actions. Indeed, the notion that decisions should be reasoned in
itself exerts a constraining force on judicial decision making.
Reason giving roots out latent errors, promotes intellectual rigor,
and constrains the scope of discretion in a specific case within a
preexisting framework of generalized principles.7 More broadly,
the giving of reasons "bolsters a court's legitimacy by justifying its
conclusions in terms of a particular polity's legal traditions and
underlying social, economic, and political values." 2
The existence of international judicial scrutiny is a comparatively
novel development and thus internal constraints are still evolving.
The core tension arises from balancing a tribunal's power of
independent review against the need for deference to politically
269. Distinctions are often drawn between common law and civil law judging.
Conventional understanding of civil systems emphasizes, for example, the more mechanical
nature of judging. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION (2d ed. 1985);
KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KITz, 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAw (Tony Weir
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d rev. ed. 1998). Both systems, however, value reason giving,
even if the reasons stated may rest in the case of common law systems on inductive
consistency with prior decisions, and in civil law systems on deductive application of first
principles. See Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common and the Civil Law -A Scot's View, 63
HARV. L. REV. 468, 471 (1950). For insightful discussions of the methods and functions of
reasoning in civil law systems, see Mitchel de S.-O.-IE. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)Portraits:
JudicialDiscoursein the FrenchLegal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325, 1342-43 (1995); Michael
Wells, French and American JudicialOpinions, 19 YALE J. INTIL L. 81, 92 (1994).
270. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 365-72
(1978); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Between Monster and Machine: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 51 S.C. L. REv. 183, 184 (1999) (analyzing and reviewing literature on
"jurisprudential threats that judges themselves perceive as circumscribing their work").
271. See Bingham, supra note 197, at 141-43 (identifying benefits produced by the
obligation to produce reasoned judgments, including imposing constraints on judicial
discretion); Rau, supranote 184, at 530 ("'Rleasoned opinions can be seen as one means of
imposing transparency on the decision-making process and in particular, of imposing a
certain self-discipline on the decisionmakers themselves."); Schauer, supranote 252, at 641
(describing reasoned decision making as "includ[ing a] decision within a principle of greater
generality than the decision itself).
272. Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 322. The operation of internal judicial
constraints is particularly acute where judges are engaged in decision making at what is
perceived to be the margins of their legitimacy or institutional capacity.
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accountable domestic governmental bodies. On the one hand,
international jurists have claimed an exclusive interpretative
competence that arises concomitantly with adjudicating disputes
between contesting parties. To be sure, it is necessary and
appropriate for jurists engaging in this function to analyze the
rights and obligations a treaty imposes." 3 The results of such
an independent analysis are, however, far from preordained.
International tribunals employ a multiplicity ofinterpretative tools
to expand existing rights, fill gaps left open by treaty drafters, and
claim implied powers nowhere enumerated in a treaty's text.-74

To counterbalance these broad interpretive powers, however,
international tribunals have adopted critical internal checking
mechanisms. These include procedural screening devices to avoid
deciding certain cases on their merits, incrementalist decisionmaking strategies, and identification of subjects ill-suited for
international adjudication.2 75 When using these devices to selfimpose constraints on their authority, international jurists often
acknowledge the virtues of deferring to domestic actors, of
273. The candor with which different international tribunals have claimed this
interpretative function varies. The ECHR, for example, has explained that it possesses a
"European supervision" over national governments that "empower[s it] to give the final
ruling" on questions of treaty interpretation. Barfod v. Denmark, 149 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 12 (1989); see also Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36 (1979).
The ECJ has claimed the same preeminent interpretive power. Lindseth, supranote 247, at
663-64 (citing case law and commentary indicating that the ECJ has "established itself as
the ultimate judge of the extent of Community competences"). By contrast, other dispute
settlement bodies have proceeded more cautiously. E.g., Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United
Mexican States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)198/2 1 8-9 (2000) (panel noted its
power to interpret NAFTA investor dispute settlement provisions under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties but did not elaborate on that power).
274. The ECJ's early and aggressive use of a teleological method of interpretation to
expand its own competencies and those of European Community institutions is by far the
most famous example of this trend. See, e.g., Lindseth, supra note 247, at 638, 663-64
(discussing ECJ's method of treaty and legislative interpretation); J.H.H. Weiler, The
TransformationofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2416 (1991) (noting same). For a discussion
of a similar expansion of judicial power by the ICJ, see REISMAN, supranote 173, at 19-45.
275. National courts also possess an arsenal of escape mechanisms (e.g., in the United
States, the political question doctrine) that permit them to avoid politically contentious
issues and thus not risk their legitimacy. Cf Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). However, the calculation whether to invest or preserve some of a court's finite
supply of legitimacy in entering a divisive topic may differ in the case of international
tribunals where legitimacy may be more tenuous (and more readily depleted) than in the
national context.
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respecting the intentions of a treaty's drafters, and of considering
the broader political climate in which their decisions will be
received. 76
Inthe abstract, these two approaches-interpretative supremacy
and internal restraint-at best are in tension and, at worst flatly
contradictory. However, the obligation to give reasons for decisions,
together with the candor with which most jurists approach interpretive problems, has generated an extensive body of doctrinal
rules to reconcile the competing pressures. And these rules exert
yet another constraining force: jurists treat their own precedents 2as
77
persuasive authority although no treaty requires them to do so.
In this way, putative excesses of interpretive authority quickly
become entrenched in a tribunal's case law, highlighting for affected
parties an opportunity to exercise one or more external checking
functions to remedy them.
2. Misplaced and InadequateAdjudicatory Checking Functions
in the UDRP
Accepting that the UDRP's drafters sought to empower panels
to create some sort of trademark-domain name jurisprudence
does nothing to answer the question of what substantive norms
such a jurisprudence should strive to develop. Much of the UDRP's
genesis reflects a desire to limit the scope of dispute settlement to
cybersquatting and similar behavior condemned by all Internet
stakeholders. 8 However, the questions remain: how to ensure this
276. Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO DisputeProcedures,StandardofReview,
and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193, 211-13 (1996) (identifying
importance of these issues for WTO dispute settlement bodies); Helfer, Adjudicating
Copyright Claims,supranote 20, at 399-401 (discussing ECHR's methodologies ofdeference
to national actors); see also Waste Mgmt., Inc., ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB(AF)/98/2 51
8-9 (Keith Highet, dissenting) (stressing need for "as complete an understanding as possible
...of the legal issues involved! in NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute because the "precedential
significance ofthis Award forfuture proceedings under [NAFTA] cannotbe underestimated").
277. See REISMAN, supranote 173, at 31; Raj Bhala, The PrecedentSetters:De Facto Stare
Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a Trilogy), 9 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 1, 3-4
(1999); Helfer & Slaughter, supranote 5, at 319. This phenomenon of treating past decisions
as persuasive authority extends to the judgments of sibling tribunals as well. See Jonathan
I. Charney, The Impact on the InternationalLegal System of the Growth of International
Courtsand Tribunals,31 N.Y.U. J.INTL L. & POL. 697, 699-700 (1999).
278. This aspirationfounditsmostcompelUingexpressioninICANl'sSecondStaffReport,
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vision is translated into practice, and how to provide mechanisms
for rectifying any deviations from that vision should they occur? As
we explain below, the checking mechanisms ICANN adopted were
inadequate to address the risks and problems engendered by
granting panels adjudicative decision-making powers.
a. CreationalChecking Functions
One obvious way to confine panels' adjudicatory power is to
include clear rules and limiting principles in the UDRP's founding
documents." 9 Yet, the final version of the UDRP reflects only an
equivocal endorsement of this basic creational checking mechanism.
Some provisions of the Policy do indeed manifest the drafters'
desire to the limit the scope of dispute settlement and the
interpretive authority of panels. However, others suggest a starkly
different vision of the UDRP, one that contemplates expansive,
discretionary adjudication by panels deciding cases at the
trademark-domain name frontier.
The most acute expression of this tension appears in the first
three subsections of paragraph 4 of the Policy, which set forth the
elements that a complainant must prove to justify a transfer or
cancellation of a domain name. Paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c) list the
circumstances demonstrating, on the one hand, a respondent's
"registration and use" of a domain name in bad faith, and on the
other, her "rights or legitimate interests" in the domain name
sufficient to defeat a complaint. If the UDRP were designed as a
system of constrained judicial decision making, these enumerated
circumstances would be dispositive of all claims and all defenses.
Under such a system panels would admittedly still have interpretative discretion to decide in each dispute whether the facts
presented fell within the parameters of the enumerated rules and
to resolve ambiguities contained within the rules themselves." °
which rejected attempts by both trademark and domain name owners to alter the UDRP to
reflect their respective interests. See Second StaffReport, supranote 149, at 8-9.
279. See Carl E. Schneider, Discretion and Rules: A Lawyer's View, in THE USES OF
DISCRETION, supra note 251, at 87 ("Perhaps the most obvious way of limiting a decisionmaker's discretion is to provide him with rules written at some level of detail that attempt
to tell him what decision to reach where a particular set of facts exists.").
280. One obvious example would be the number ofand types ofdomain-name registrations
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However, the exclusive nature of the categories would exert considerable constraining force, preventing panels from expanding the
Policy very far beyond the heartland of cases circumscribed by the
text.
The UDRP's drafters, however, did not limit panelists' discretion
to these enumerated grounds. Instead, they labeled these exemplars
as "circumstances" which existed only "in particular but without
limitation" to other situations of bad faith, on the one hand, or
rights and legitimate expectations, on the other." 1 Such an obvious
and open-ended invitation to lawmaking sends a clear message to
panels that they can exercise independent authority in determining
which sorts ofunenumerated circumstances justify a ruling in favor
of complainants or respondents. 2 Without constraints on these
open-ended clauses, panels are left with little to guide the exercise
of their discretionary lawmaking powers. Not surprisingly, this
omission has produced a schism between panels that strictly
construe the UDRP and those that interpret the Policy more
expansively to curb a broader range of conduct by domain-name
registrants.2-3
b. External Checking Functions
An alternative checking model would have granted panels
interpretive powers in the text of the UDRP, but constrained those
powers and corrected any errors they engendered through external
necessary to constitute a "pattern" of registering designed domain names to prevent
trademark owners from reflecting their marks in such domain names. See Policy, supranote

17, 1 4(bXii).
281. Key Issues, supra note 254, 3 ("Since the UDRP specifies that bad faith is not
limited to the specific circumstances enumerated in 4(b), panels have taken the liberty of
finding bad faith beyond the 4(b) factors."). For a recent and controversial example, see Reg
Vardy Plc v. Wilkinson, WIPO Case No. D2001-0593 (July 3,2001) (respondent, who was not
a competitor of the mark owner, registered domain name in bad faith notwithstanding fact
that Policy I 4(bXiii) premises finding of bad faith upon registration primarily for the
purpose of disrupting the business of a competitor; panel relied on "all the circumstances"
and registrant's "objective of causing harm and nuisance to the Complainant"), availableat
http'l/www.time4talkco.uk/finalwipo/Decision.htm.
282. Even with this indefinite grant of decision-making authority, however, ICANN could
have used other textual methods to at least partially effectuate its goal of limiting the
UDRP's scope. We discuss one such method in Part IH.B.6.a. infra.
283. See CybersquattingDecisions 3, supranote 237, at 2.
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checking functions. As drafted, the UDRP contains two external
checking mechanisms, one political and the other legal. Neither,
however, are adequate to curb abuses of adjudicatory power by
panelists.
Political checking mechanisms exist by virtue of ICANN's
authority to revise the Policy and Rules. ICANN's established
procedures make it possible to amend the UDRP on a regular basis
in response to input from affected parties. Indeed, the authors of
the Second Staff Report expressly recommended that the DNSO
revisit dispute settlement issues after the UDRP began operations
to consider the recommendations of trademark and domain-name
owners. Such a robust political revision process could diminish the
significance of panel errors and excesses of authority by quickly
correcting them to conform to the consensus view of interested
stakeholders.
There are numerous impediments to the effectiveness of the
political checks we have just sketched, however. First, if the process
by which ICANN's initial iteration of the UDRP was subject to
legitimacy challenges, similar charges (howeverjustified) are likely
to plague any revision of that process. Moreover, if intellectual
property interests have captured ICANN's rulemaking process, as
some commentators have contended, then the results of any
revision process may be regarded as equally tainted. In addition,
the pitch of the legitimacy and capture debate is likely to be set
even higher than in the dispute over the creation of the UDRP,
given that the review will occur in the same timeframe as consideration whether to extend the UDRP to far more controversial
intellectual property issues. 8
Second, the extremely rapid growth of UDRP case law is likely to
make ad hoc review of the UDRP process a poor proxy for review in
individual cases, or more formalized periodic review procedures. In
the first twenty-one months ofoperation alone, UDRP panels issued
284. WIPO, Interim Report ofthe Second WIPO InternetDomain Name Process,(Apr. 12,
2001) [hereinafter Interim Report HI] (identifying conflicts between domain name
registrations and myriad intellectual property issues, including personal names, trade
names, geographical indications and indications of source, nonproprietary names for
pharmaceuticals, and names ofinternational intergovernmental organizations), availableat
http'//wipo2.wipo.int/process2trfcrfc3/.
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over 3500 decisions, raising myriad complex issues for reviewers to
consider. In addition, the sheer number of decisions issued suggests
that episodic appraisals may be inadequate to prevent erroneous
interpretations of the Policy from becoming entrenched.
Third, attention to UDRP review and reforms is likely to be
obscured, at least in the short term, by the other domain name
regulatory issues on ICANN's agenda. For example, the question of
UDRP reform has received far less scrutiny than the creation of
new gTLDs, an essential component of ICANN's mandate from the
United States government.' This suggests that political checking
mechanisms are likely to be both slower and more cumbersome
than the Second Staff Report had contemplated.
Fourth, the attention and resources that affected constituencies
can devote to monitoring the UDRP and urging reforms of the
system are likely to be limited. This is so not only because of the
competition between UDRP reform issues and other regulatory
issues on ICANN's agenda but also because of the multiple fora in
which lawmaking is likely to occur. In July 2000, WIPO commenced
its second domain-name consultative process to consider the more
contentious intellectual property issues excluded from its first
consultative process. 286 This second WIPO process produced
recommendations to ICANN for additional mechanisms (some
of which are similar to the UDRP) to protect certain other names
and identifiers, such as international nonproprietary names of

285. See ICANN, New TLD Program,at http://www.icann.org/tlds (last modified Sept. 9,
2001) (identifying seven new gTLDs approved by ICANN); ICANNApproves Seven Top-Level
Domains,supranote 123 (reviewingproposals for new gTLDs, including extensions of UDRP
and enhanced protections for intellectual property owners).
286. WIPO, WIPO2RFC-1:RequestforComments'On Terms ofReference, Proceduresand
Timetablefor the Second WIPO Internet DomainName Process(July 10, 2000) (noting that
member states had asked WIPO to study and issue recommendations concerning domain
name registrants' "bad faith, abusive, misleading or unfair use of: Personal names;
International Nonproprietary Names (INNs) for Pharmaceutical Substances; Names of
international intergovernmental organizations; Geographical indications, geographical
terms, or indications of source; and Tradenames"), available at http'J/wipo2.wipo.int/
process2(rfclrfcl/index.html; Caroline Drees, U.N. Agency Broadens Fight Against
Cybersquatters, Reuters (July 10, 2000) (quoting WIPO Assistant Director General as
characterizing second WIPO consultative process as addressing "very complicated" legal
issues which are less harmonized than national trademark laws), availableat http//www.
acm.orgtechnews/articles/2000-210T12w.html.
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pharmaceutical substances and the names of international intergovernmental organizations.8 7
Fifth and finally, the active use of the UDRP and its expansive
interpretation by some panels are likely to create an "endowment
effect" that will make it difficult for ICANN's political bodies to
resist a ratcheting-up of intellectual property protection or to
investigate panel errors and abuses."8 Several forces are likely to
obscure the need for a review of the UDRP that tests trends in
panel case law for their fidelity to the present Policy. These include
a push by trademark owners to extend the UDRP to new gTLDs, a
drive by famous trademark owners to incorporate enhanced dispute
settlement protections for their marks, and pressure by nontrademark interests currently excluded from the UDRP to
incorporate their intellectual property rights into the Policy. In the
debates these issues generate, the existing UDRP will serve as a
minimum baseline against which all revisions proposals will be
measured. 9 The debate over forward-looking developments is
likely to obscure the more retrospective question of panels
287. See FinalReport, Second WIPO InternetDomain Name Process,supra note 27, 1

117, 163. It bears noting, however, that the interim and final reports of the Second WIPO
Domain Name Process candidly acknowledge the muchmore significant risks associatedwith
lawmaking at the perimeter of the international intellectual property system:
The efficiency 'with which policy can be implemented through the deployment
of the technical infrastructure, however, also inspires caution. New law has, in
the past, been created in democracies by representative legislatures. It is one
thing to give expression to existing law in an effective manner through the
deployment of a powerful technical infrastructure. It is quite another thing to
use the technical infrastructure not merely for the implementation, but also for
the formulation, of new laws.
InterimReport11, supranote 284, 1 26; see alsoFinalReport, Second WIPOInternetDomain
Name Process, supra note 27, 1 65-67 (expressing similar sentiments and recalling
distinctions in political theory between creating law and applying law).
The
recommendations (both of action and inaction) contained in the final report of the Second
WIPO Internet Domain Name Process were heavily influenced by whether the protections
sought by different parties reflected a consensus embodied in existing international
intellectual property law. See, e.g., id. 1 92, 155, 201, 245.
288. See Daniel Kalmeman et al., The EndowmentEffect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991).
289. See, e.g. ,ElectronicCommerce Work Programme,supranote 15, 1 44 (statingthatthe
UDRP has "arguably become a de facto international standard"); WIPO, Wipo To ProbeNew
IssuesRelating To Domain Name Abuse, Press Release PR/2000/235 (July 10, 2000) (stating
that the UDRP "is
now widely regarded as an efficient, quick and cost-effective way to resolve
domain name disputes"), availableat http://www.wipo.int/eng/pressrel/2000/p235.htm.

20011

DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS

229

overstepping their adjudicatory authority.2 0 Additionally, if ICANN
expands the UDRP without undertaking a meaningful and balanced
review, its actions may validate those panels that have adopted an
expansionist methodology.
Whatever the results of ICANN's political review of the UDRP,
such a process is likely to provide little comfort to the parties
in individual cases who believe that a panel has acted erroneously
or exceeded its mandate. What legal recourse do such aggrieved
parties have under the present Policy? As noted above, the drafters
did not include any system of internal appeals, either to ICANN, to
the registrars, or to the dispute settlement providers. As a result,
even where two opposing lines of decisions become entrenched in
the case law, there is no established mechanism in place to review
them. Appeals to national courts, although possible, suffer from all
of the difficulties we identified above in our discussion of external
arbitral checking functions.
In addition, the fact that UDRP panels apply a non-national
body of rules that may diverge from national trademark and
cybersquatting statutes suggests that those courts issuing rulings
in cases previously considered by UDRP panels will apply their own
national laws rather than "correct" the panel's interpretation of the
Policy or its application to a particular set of facts.2 9 ' Moreover,
290. Alternatively, ICANN's review process may focus only on the current system's most
egregious problems, such as the skewed incentives created by permitting complainants to
choose the dispute settlement provider. See Mueller, Rough Justice,supranote 169. Byway
of full disclosure, we note that one of us has recently been appointed as the independent
academic expert on the Task Force named to review the UDRP. ICANN Watch, Names
Council Selects UDRP Task ForceMembers (Aug. 27, 2001), at http'//www.icannwatch.org/
article.phpsid=317 (listing Graeme Dinwoodie as part of task force as "independent
academic expert").
291. Indeed, in one recent case, a U.S. district court adopted a ruling directly at odds with
a prior UDRP panel decision between the same parties without even citing that decision,
let alone discussing why or how the panel had erred. Cf Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref,
Inc., No. 00-C-1391 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 24,2001), availableat http'J/www.loundy.com/CASES/
RefereeEnt_v_PlanetRef.html, with Referee Enters., Inc. v. Planet Ref, Inc., No.
FA0004000094707 (Nat'l Arb. Forum June 26, 2000), available at http'1lwww.arbforum.
comldomains/decisions/94707.htm. In another case, a U.S. district court issued a preliminary
injunction that effectively affirmed a prior UDRP panel decision, again without citing to the
prior dispute. Cf Registral.com, LLC v. Fisher Controls Int'l, Inc., No. H-01-1423 (S.D. Tex.
June 28, 2001), availableat http'f/www.s0rk.com/docs/fisherl.pdf, with Fisher Controls Intl,
Inc. v. Registral.com LLC, No. FA0102000096749 (Nat'lArb. Forum Apr. 20,2001), available
at http://www.arbforum.com/domains/decisions/96749.htm.

230

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:141

because panels also have discretion to decide cases using whatever
legal rules they deem applicable, 2 they are free to ignore any
indirect corrective force these national court decisions exert and
to continue deciding cases using their preferred construction of
the Policy. That many UDRP decisions will involve parties and
registrars from different countries is likely to enhance this effect.
Panel decisions that diverge widely from the text of the UDRP,
from each other, or from national laws, risk undermining the
UDRP's legitimacy.29 Conflicting panel decisions, particularly interprovider conflicts, are likely to exacerbate disparities in the
panel selection process, making the complainant's right to choose
the provider an even more significant feature than it is at present.
By contrast, any significant divergence between the UDRP and
national trademark laws will increase the incentives for losing
parties to appeal a panel's ruling. If lengthy and expensive national
court appeals become habitual, they will undermine the UDRP's
goal of providing a fast, inexpensive, and streamlined way to resolve
cybersquatting cases without adding much to the checking
functions the system sorely needs.
c. Internal Checking Functions
ICANN's conflicting signals to UDRP panels concerning their
adjudicatory powers also affects their adoption of internal checking
mechanisms. On a basic level, the requirement that all decisions be
published and reasoned exerts a constraining effect on gross errors
and excesses of authority. Panelists know that the decisions they
author will be available to all potentially affected parties, including
not only the litigants, but future litigants, other panelists, and
292. UDRP Rules, supranote 17, Rule 15(a).
293. One ofthe most frequent concerns raised by UDRP observers is whether panels are
adopting coherent and consistent interpretations of the Policy. See CybersquattingDecisions
3, supra note 237 (providing a statistical analysis of decisions between commencement of
UDRP and May 5, 2000, showing that only 25.5% of cases cited prior panel decisions and
stating that "[t]his does not bode well for the rule of law, encourages users to forum shop for
panelists, and provides little guidance to prospective users as to how a particular issue is
likely to be decided"); John Partridge, Loblaw losesanotherNetname battle,TORONTO GLOBE
&MAIL, June 21, 2000, at B7 (noting "a disturbing lack of consistency in decisions under the
new dispute resolution system).
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ICANN. They thus have a significant interest in ensuring that
their rulings meet at least minimal levels of competence and
persuasiveness, particularly if they hope to receive future UDRP
assignments.2 9 4
, Beyond this bare minimum level of competence, however, there
are few structural incentives for panels to produce carefully
reasoned decisions. 29 Well-reasoned decisions require at least a
modicum of deliberation, a quality that the time and cost-sensitive
UDRP does not favor. Consider the following: Panels normally must
issue a decision within less than forty-five days after a complaint is
filed. Panelists are private adjudicators with other responsibilities
outside of the UDRP competing for their time. Also, the modest
compensation panelists receive for their services pales in comparison to the fees they can receive as practicing attorneys or
deciding other arbitral matters. 29 6 Each ofthese pressures are likely
to limit the attention that panelists can devote to drafting reasoned
opinions.
Deliberation, particularly deliberation seeking to reconcile a
dispute settlement system's competing systemic values, is facilitated by the use of multiple decision makers.29 7 Thus, holding other
294. Cf Louise Ferguson, GeographicDomainson Shaky Ground,THE STANDARD, Aug.
11, 2000 (reporting statement of WIPO Assistant Director General that"the performance of
the arbitrators is constantly under review"), available at http'J/www.thestandard.com/
article/0,1902,17627,00.html.
295. A number of commentators (and a few panel decisions) have criticized the quality of
the legal reasoning of panel decisions. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 241, at 5; Emerson H.
Tiller,ICANN's UniformDomainNameDisputeResolutionPolicy:An Overview and Critique,
1 INTERNET L. & Bus. 589 (June 2000); see also Winterson v. Hogarth, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0235, 6.12 (May 22, 2000) (noting that panel decision in CedarTrade Assocs. v.
qualified as a trade
Ricks "unfortunately gives no guidance as to why common law rights ...
mark"), availableat http'//arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decsions/htl/2000/d2000-0235.html;
J.P. Morgan v. Resource Mktg., WIPO Case No. D2000-0035 (Mar. 23, 2000) (refusing to
follow four prior panel decisions which had accepted rebuttals from complainants "[blecause
the distinguished panelists in these cases did not discuss this issue [and this panel does] not
have the benefit of their reasoning"), availableat http:J/arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisionst
html/20001d2000-0035.html.
296. See Berryhill, supranote 238, at 3 ("A $200 an hour attorney has very few hours to
waste in reading the complaint and the response, making a decision, and reducing that
decision to writing."); Steven Bonisteel, TourBoatFirmsCollidein ICANN DomainDispute,
NEwsBYTEs (Ontario), May 26, 2000,2000WL21177837 ("[Tihe lower fees [for UDRP panels]
may be discouraging some arbitrators from giving their full attention to the matter and
providing a full slate of reasons.").
297. Cf Heifer & Slaughter, supranote 5, at 325 (explaining the persuasiveness of ECJ
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variables constant, three-member panels should produce better
reasoned UDRP decisions than one-member panels. Three-member
panels enjoyincreased opportunities for exchanging views, catching
errors, identifying relevant issues not raised by the parties, and
fleshing out ambiguities or competing approaches. It is not surprising, therefore, that a sizable number of three-member panel
rulings contain dissenting or concurring opinions,298 a fact that
suggests single-member panels may be obfuscating or eliding
controversial issues embedded in their decisions. Yet, as we identified earlier, the increased cost of three-member panels and the
disincentives for both complainants and respondents to choose them
are likely to severely limit the number of three-member panel
decisions.
The lack of any appeal process within the UDRP makes the need
for a deliberative approach to decision making particularly acute.
Although some observers have criticized ICANN's failure to include
such an appellate mechanism to resolve interpretive differences
among panel rulings,99 dispute settlement systems can create
coherent jurisprudence without an appeals body or a doctrine of
binding precedent. The adjudication of public international law
disputes has always operated without the aid of a supreme judicial
control body, and the recent proliferation of courts and tribunals
has not thrust international law into chaos.300
decisions to national European courts by noting "the intrinsic value of widespread and
diverse input in a deliberative process: Two minds are better than one, and fifteen minds,
particularly minds from different perspectives and cultures, are better than two").
298. Of the forty-five three-member panel opinions between January 14 and July 3,2000,
nine (20%) contained individual concurring or dissenting opinions. CybersquattingDecisions
1 through 3, supra note 237; See M. Scott Donahey, The ICANN CybersquattingDecisions
# 5: June 14,2000 throughJuly 3, 2000 [hereinafter CybersquattingDecisions 5], available
at http://eon.law.harvard.edu/udrp/decisions/2000-5.html (last visited Oct. 3,2001); M. Scott
Donahey, The ICANN CybersquattingDecisions # 4: May 5, 2000 through June 13, 2000
[hereinafter CybersquattingDecisions 41, available at http://eon.law.harvard.eduludrp
decisions/2000-4.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001).
299. Cabel, supra note 34, at 6.
300. Charney, supranote 1, at 104-05 (noting that "the variety ofinternational tribunals
functioning today do not appear to pose a threat to the coherence of an international legal
system"); id. at 108 (arguing that persuasive authority of ICJ's decisions for other
international tribunals is bolstered by "the fullness and deliberative character" of its
decision-making style); see also Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO DisputeResolution,
40 HARV. INTL L.J. 333, 353 (1999) (indicating "a rule of stare decisis is not necessary to the
development of a body of jurisprudence by a court or dispute resolution tribunal").
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Several conditions are necessary, however, for the UDRP to
function effectively as a disaggregated and nonhierarchical dispute
settlement system. First, like the jurists who serve on international
tribunals and domestic courts, UDRP panelists must internalize a
set of guiding objectives and principles to assist them in resolving
difficult cases. How, for example, should they interpret the lawmaking powers granted to them by ICANN in paragraph 4 of the
Policy? Should the UDRP panelists construe these powers as a
narrow grant of authority consistent with the drafters' goal of
limiting the UDRP to open-and-shut cases, or should they use their
discretionary authority to adopt teleological interpretive methods
and fill gaps left open by the drafters?
Answers to these questions require a theory of the relationship
between adjudicators and the lawmakers who created the dispute
settlement system. Gap-filling may be appropriate for systems in
which the drafters have expressly authorized such a function, or
where political lawmaking bodies are at an impasse. 0 1 Gap-filling
is far more problematic, however, when it encroaches upon areas
intentionally excluded from a dispute settlement system or where
the political rulemaking process is robust and promises to fill gaps
on its own. An expansive construction of adjudicatory powers also
is highly questionable during the early days of a new dispute
settlement regime in which jurists' authority to hear even
uncontroversial disputes is fragile and subject to intense scrutiny
by affected parties." 2
Measured against this internal checking-function metric, the
UDRP's performanceis questionable. Several panels have extended
the UDRP to cases involving legitimate disputes over domain name
ownership or to bad faith registration without corresponding bad
faith use, categories of cases that the drafters expressly excluded
from the Policy. 3 More striking still is a line of cases permitting
301. Helfer& Slaughter, supranote5, at382-83 (discussinggap-fillingbyECHR); Michael

P. Van Alstine, Dynamic TreatyInterpretation,146 U. PA.L. REv. 687 (1998) (discussinggapfilling in courts applying the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and similar treaties).
302. See Dinwoodie, New Copyright Order, supranote 8, at 503-18 (discussingthe dangers
of activist WTO panel interpretations in TRIPs cases); Heifer, Adjudicating Copyright

Claims, supra note 20, at 423-31 (discussing dangers of gap-filling by TRIPs panels).
303. Cf J. Crew Intl, Inc. v. crew.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0054, 1 3 (Apr. 20,2000)
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surname and geographic name owners to bring successful complaints against domain name registrants (either by ignoring the
elements required to prove a claim or by very expansive interpretation of the notion of common law trademark rights).,0 4 Not
only did these rulings ignore the drafters' desire to limit the UDRP
to trademark controversies, they also were issued at a time when

(UDRP prohibits "speculative registration of names that happen to be the trademarks of
others without a demonstrable plan for bona fide use"), availableat http'//arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0054.html, with World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v.
Bosman, WIPO Case No. D99-0001, 3 (Jan. 14, 2000) ("It is clear from the legislative
history that ICANN intended that the complainant must establish not only bad faith
registration, but also bad faith use."), availableat http://arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisionst
html/1999/d1999-0001.html; see also Telstra Corp. v. Nuclear Marshmallows, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0003, 1 7.11 (Feb. 18, 2000) (endorsing concept of "passive holding" as sufficient to
satisfy TDRP's requirement of bad faith use), availableat http'//arbiter.wipo.intdomainsl
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0003.html.
304. See, e.g., Excelentisimo Ayuntamiento de Barcelona v. Barcelonacom Inc., WIPO
Case No. D2000-0505 (Aug. 4,2000) (geographic name), availableat http'//arbiter.wipo.intl
domains/decisions/htmlt2000d2000-O505.html; Robertsv. Boyd, WIPO Case No. D2000-0210
(May 29, 2000) (personal name), available at http:i/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-0210.html; Winterson v. Hogarth, WIPO Case No. D2000-0235 (May 22,
2000) (personal name), available at http:J/arbiter.wipo.intdomainsdecisions/html/2000/
d2000-0235.html. But see Kur-und Verkehrsverein St. Moritz v. StMoritz.com, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0617 (Aug. 17,2000) (refusing to transfer trademarked geographic name of Swiss
city to official organization representing that city where respondent provided information
services about such city), available at http'/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html
2000/d2000-0617.html; Sumner v. Urvan, WIPO Case No. D2000-0596 (July 24, 2000)
(refusing to transfer domain name containing stage name of famous musician because
musician's actual name was different and also generic), availableat http'//arbiter.wipo.intl
domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0596.html; Springsteen v. Burgar, WIPO Case No.
D2000-1532 (Jan. 25, 2001) (refusing to transfer domain name), available at http'/
arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/ d1532-0003.html.
Itis possible, though difficult, to obtain trademark rights in personal names. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 105(2)(e)(4) (1994) (providing for denial of trademark registration on ground that a claimed
mark is primarily merely a surname). UDRP panels have transferred domain names
containing celebrity names on the grounds that such names constitute common law
trademark rights. See, e.g., Winterson, WIPO Case No. D2000-0235; ef Interim Report II,
supranote 284, 175 (stating that UDRP jurisprudence "indicates that it can and should be
applied to protectpersonal names against bad faith domain name registrations, provided that
the criteria ofthe Policy are carefully and properly applied and that in cases where personal
names "have not been registered as a trademark or service mark, a particular focus must be
devoted to ascertaining that the name in question, under relevant law, has acquired the
requisite common law trademark rights"); U.S. Patent &Trademark Office, Abusive Domain
NameRegistrationInvolvingPersonalNames,athttp//www.uspto.govweblofficesdcom/olial
domainnamerep.html, (last modified Jan. 18, 2001) (concluding that the ACPA should not
be extended to protect personal names).
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WIPO was studying whether to recommend an expansion of the
Policy to encompass these precise intellectual property rights."' 5
A second component of an effective nonhierarchical dispute
settlement system is that its disaggregated decision makers must
engage in an extensive and informed dialogue with each other
regarding the norms they seek to articulate. Such a dialogue
requires each decision maker to carefully search past relevant
decisions, to review those decisions, and to harmonize, reconcile,
and distinguish any divergent interpretations of the unitary text
that all decision makers are construing. In this way, it will be
possible to minimize many, although clearly not all, of the potential
conflicts that a nonhierarchical system of adjudication can en6
30

gender.

Whether UDRP panels will engage in the kind of sustained
dialogue necessary to avoid jurisprudential incoherence is uncertain. Panels are not bound by prior UDRP decisions and need not
refer to them at all in their rulings. They may, of course, treat prior
decisions as persuasive under their Rule 15(a) authority to consult
whatever rules of law they deem applicable to a particular
dispute.17 They are not required to do so, however, and a recent
statistical survey reveals that prior panel rulings are cited in only
slightly more than one-quarter of all cases. 08 There may be cogent
305. Final Report, supranote 78, 1[ 167-68 (declining to extend dispute settlement to

"trade names, geographic indications or personality rights"); see also Second StaffReport,
supra note 149, 1 4.1(c) ("Except in cases involving 'abusive registrations' made with badfaith intent to profit commercially from others' trademarks ... the adopted policy leaves the
resolution of disputes to the courts.") (emphasis added).
306. See Charney, supra note 1, at 114 (advocating increases dialogue between ICJ and
other internationaltribunals); Helfer, Forum Shopping,supranote 1, at 326-31,335-40,34953 (documenting cases ofhorizontal dialogue among UN and regional human rights tribunals
and advocating more sustained dialogue to promote jurisprudential coherence); Helfer &
Slaughter, supra note 5, at 323-26 (noting dialogue among supranational tribunals as one
factor that covaries with their effectiveness).
307. See 3636275 Canada v. eResolution.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0110, § 7 (Apr. 10,
2000) ("Although entitled to consider principles of law deemed applicable, the Panel finds it
unnecessary to do so in any depth. The jurisprudence which is being rapidly developed by a
wide variety of Panelists world-wide under the ICANN Policy provides a fruitful source of
precedent."), available at http-//arbiter.wipo.int/domainstdecisions/html/2000/d2000-110.
html.
308. For the period of January 14 to July 3, 2000, 160 out of 568 decisions, or 28%,
cited to prior panel decisions. Cybersquatting Decisions 1 through 3, supra note 237;
CybersquattingDecisions 4 and 5, supra note 298. This trend has risen slightly over time.
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reasons for this trend: Given the discretion panels enjoy to choose
the controlling law, it is far from clear what persuasive force, if any,
a UDRP ruling nominally decided under the law of one nation has
for UDRP issues arising under another nation's laws.3 °9
The UDRP's hybrid decision-making structure poses a more
fundamental challenge to developing a consistent domain name
jurisprudence. The arbitral model upon which much of the UDRP
was founded places limited weight on past awards as sources of
authority. It also focuses more on resolving disputes between the
parties than on articulating governing legal norms or creating a
jurisprudence to guide future conduct by nonparties. Given these
antecedents, it is not surprising that stark divergences have
developed between panels analyzing the same legal issues.3 1 0 With

limited internal incentives for panelists to reconcile divergences, no
appeals process, and attenuated political checks, it is questionable
CybersquattingDecisions5, supranote 298 (noting that 33% of 156 decided cases cited prior
panel decisions in the period of June 14 to July 3, 2000); see also Sundor Brands v.
Trenchcoat Prods., Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0633, 1 6 (Aug. 21, 2000) (refusing to
distinguish prior panel decisions on the ground that "the instant Panel is not aware of the
evidence presented in the cases cited by Respondent and that such decisions arenot binding
in thismatter")(emphasis added), availableat http'/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/
2000/d2000-0633.html; Pivotal Corp. v. Discovery Street Trading Co., WIPO Case No. D20000648, 3 (Aug. 14, 2000) ("The Panel is perfectly aware that it is not bound by any other
decisions."), available at http'/arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0648.
html.
Moreover, these figures mask the fact that panels have yet to develop a methodology for
assessing prior case law. Many of the panels that do cite to prior UDRP cases do so in a
cursory fashion without discussing the prior decision's reasoning or identifying whether a
split of authority exists on the particular point at issue. See, e.g., SundorBrands, WIPO Case
No. D2000-0633. Only a few have engaged in more extended analysis such as distinguishing
past precedents or reconciling conflicting strands of case law. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan v.
Resource Mktg., WIPO Case No. D2000-0035, 3 (Mar. 23, 2000) (noting inconsistent panel
approaches as to whether UDRP allows submission of rebuttals by complainants and
choosing approach thatwas more persuasively reasoned), availableat http://arbiter.wipo.int/
domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0035.htm; PivotalCorp., WIPO Case No. D2000-0648,
17 (discussing several decisions analyzing what constitutes a bona fide offering of services
by the respondent).
309. See Key Issues, supra note 254, at 9 (noting divergent approaches to 'the perils of
applying domestic [UDRP] decisions to international disputes").
310. See Neil J. Cohen, Forum:ICANNat the Crossroads,1 INTERNETL. & Bus. 581,581
(2000) (stating that "the decisions diverge widely on the most important UDRP issues" and
that the outcome in any particular dispute "is a crapshoot"); The TLD Lobby, Is Your Domain
Name in Jeopardy?,at httpJ/www.tldlobby.com (last visited Oct. 3,2001) (stating that UDRP
decisions have been "wildly inconsistent").
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whether the UDRP as presently constituted can achieve jurisprudential coherence.
III. EXTENDING THE NON-NATIONAL MODEL OF LAWMAKING AND
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

As we explained at the beginning of this Article, international
and domestic policymakers are heralding the UDRP as a new model
for resolving legal disputes that transcend national borders. Their
proposals to extend the UDRP, however, fail to address two key
questions. First, are the conditions necessary for the UDRP's
replication absent in other settings; and second, assuming that
replication is feasible, should the UDRP be propagated whether in
its current form or only with certain modifications of its structure?
In this Section, we seek answers to both of these questions. In
brief, we believe that the UDRP's non-national model can indeed be
applied elsewhere, even absent centralized technological monopolies
such as ICANN. Of course, merely because replication is possible
does not mean it is desirable. We conclude that the question of
whether policymakers should encourage the proliferation of nonnational approaches to lawmaking and dispute settlement cannot
be answered in the abstract."' It depends instead on the methods
used to legitimize non-national structures, which in turn hinges on
such foundational issues as (1) the pace of non-national lawmaking
and dispute settlement relative to their alternatives; (2) the design
of checking mechanisms different from those currently found in the
UDRP; (3) the degree to which non-national structures accommodate competing national values and interests; (4) the relationships between non-national structures and complementary or
competing national and international ones; and (5) the substantive
law that the system encompasses. We address these variables in
311. Although some (but by no means all) of the deficiencies of the UDRP are
consequences of breaking new ground free of existing national political structures and
traditional forms of international cooperation among governments, a,retum to either a
purely national model or a purely treaty-based one would jettison the advantages that nonnationallawmaking offers. We therefore rejectthe cosmetic "solutions" ofinstituting a series
of checking mechanisms based upon those found in a single national model or a single treaty
regime, or based upon a single decision-making model (whether adjudicatory, ministerial,
or arbitral).
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our discussion below, identifying the options available to public and
private policymakers seeking to emulate the UDRP's advantages
without retaining its problematic features.
A. Replicatingthe UDRP:Are TechnologicalMonopolies
Essential?
As an initial matter, one might question whether calls to
replicate the UDRP are misguided not on legitimacy grounds, but
because of technological deficiencies. According to this argument of
technological essentialism, centralized technological monopolies
were not merely a sufficient condition for creating the non-national
UDRP; rather, they were a necessary condition. For technological
essentialists, the successful operation of the UDRP rests on two
features embedded within the architecture of the domain-name
system itself. First, technology gave ICANN exclusive control of the
most commercially valuable domain-name space and permitted it
to condition access to that space on a registrant's "consent" to a host
of substantive rules. Second, technology provided the means to
enforce dispute settlement decisions simply and automatically,
without the delays or due process constraints that enforcement of
judgments normally entails. In the absence of these two features,
it might be argued, non-national structures will be inherently
unstable and may even be rendered nugatory by competing national
and international alternatives.
To be sure, technological essentialism helps to explain why the
first extension of the non-national model is occurring entirely
within the domain-name system. It is no accident that ICANN
made non-national dispute settlement a required component of the
seven new gTLDs under its exclusive control.312 Applying the
UDRP, either in its current form or in an enhanced format, to a
broader set of domain-name disputes requires relatively minor
modifications to the root server and to the web of contractual
relationships that ICANN and its accredited registrars superintend.
Technological essentialism may similarly explain why the Second
WIPO Domain Name Process will likely produce the next wave of
312. See ICANNApproves Seven Top-Level Domains, supra note 123.
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LDRP extensions. The legal and political issues the second WIPO
process raises are complex, often exceedingly so. If, however,
governments and affected stakeholders can reach a consensus on
how to reconcile these issues, implementing that bargain will be
straightforward. 13 Stated another way, the critical, practical
questions facing WIPO are questions of legitimacy, not questions of
technology.
Technological essentialism fails to account for other aspects of
the non-national story, however. First, consider the fact that
ICANN's control of domain-name space is far from complete.
ICANN has imperfect control over the practices and policies of
ccTLDs, and its recent interactions with ccTLD registries suggest
a relationship of hostility rather than one of mutual cooperation.3 14
In addition, ICANN is attempting to fend off competition from
New.net, a California firm that registers second level domain
names in "alternative" gTLDs outside the existing root server and
thus beyond ICANN's reach.81 Nevertheless, both New.net and an
increasing number ofccTLD registries have voluntarily adopted the
UDRP to review cybersquatting complaints by trademark owners
against registrants in these domain-name registries.316
These events undermine the claims of technological essentialism
in two ways. First, they suggest that the UDRP can succeed even in
313. See Interim Report H, supra note 284, [ 24 (stating that implementing the
recommendations of the second WIPO process through ICANN "has the obvious advantages
of automaticity in effect and total coverage. Since the technical infrastructure is deployed in
favor of the [chosen] policy, the policy can effectively he implemented throughout the whole
of that technical infrastructure, namely the DNS [domain name system]").
314. ICANN, Principles for Delegation and Administration of ccTLDs Presented by
GovernmentalAdvisory Committee (Feb. 23, 2000), at http'/ww.icann.orgcommittees/
gaclgac-cctldprinciples-23febOO.htm; Andrew Orlowski, Country code chiefs, registrarsmull
ICANN breakaway, THE REGISTER (Nov. 25, 2000), available at httpJ/www.theregister.
co.uk/content/6/14999.html.
315. James Ledbetter, CompetingDomainNameRegistriesCreatingTowerofCyberBabel,
THE STANDARD (July 5, 2001), available at http://www.thestandard.comlarticle/ 0,1902,
27694,00.htmL
316. See New.netModelDomainNameDisputeResolutionPolicy,athttp'/www.new.net/
policies-dispute.tp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001) (comparing text of New.net dispute settlement
policy to UDRP); FinalReport, Second WIPOInternet DomainName Process,supranote 27,
20 (notingthat twenty-two ccTLDs have adopted the UDRP). Similarly, keyword providers
have adopted dispute settlement mechanisms not unlike the UDRP to resolve disputes
between keyword holders and trademark owners, notwithstanding that keyword providers
are not obligated to apply the UJDRP or any equivalent system. See id. 43.
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areas of the domain-name system not under ICANN's monopoly
control (at least for purposes of imposing a mandatory dispute
settlement system upon registrants). Second, and perhaps more
importantly, the events reveal that where a non-national dispute
settlement system has advantages over traditional adjudication or
arbitration, those advantages may in themselves persuade other
public or private regulatory bodies to adopt the system, even in the
absence of a mandatory or centralized control structure. 17
This latter point explains why the UDRP's non-national model
can indeed flourish outside of the domain-name context. Consider
for example the notice and take-down obligations of private
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The European Community's
recent Information Society Directive instructs member states to
encourage the development of a notice and take-down system by
means of "voluntary agreement between all parties concerned." 18
Recent practice under the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) suggests one way such a system might operate. Under
the DCMA, ISPs in the United States function as the de facto
adjudicators of infringement disputes between copyright owners
and users who post copyrighted content to web sites. The disputes
they oversee are designed to precede litigation and do not preclude
the contesting parties from adjudicating their claims in court. The
first few years of practice under the statute, however, reveal that
the overwhelming
majority of disputes are resolved with no judicial
intervention.3 19
317. Cf Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming:Systematizing CorporateUse ofADR,
59 ALB. L. REV. 847,858 (1996) (discussing historical processes by which alternative dispute
resolution systems became institutionalized among American businesses).
It is equally plausible, however, that an existing dispute settlement system will be
emulated not because ofits advantages, but because network effects have made it a de facto
model that cannot be ignored. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
ImplicationsofNetwork EconomicEffects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998). For present purposes,
we are agnostic about the causes of proliferation. Our point is simply that non-national
dispute settlement systems can and do proliferate absent technological imperatives. We
address normative issues in the next subsection.
318. Information Society Directive, Directive 2000/31/EC ofthe EuropeanParliamentand
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12-14, and recitals 40-46, O.J.
L 178, 1, 6, 12-13.
319. See Steven J. Metalitz, Implementation of the DMCA: The Practical,Ninth Annual
Conference on International Intellectual Property Law and Policy, at 7 (Apr. 20, 2001) (on
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Admittedly, ISPs are nominally applying United States copyright
law to these disputes, not non-national or international law.
However, the rules applicable to notice and take down disputes may
well evolve away from purely national roots toward contractenshrined norms and practices not tied to any particular prescriptive authority. 20 This is especially likely if non-U.S. ISPs
proliferate or U.S. ISPs acquire customers from other countries.
Moreover, although technology permits ISPs to remove infringing
copyrighted content from their web sites, the sheer number of ISPs
means that it is a far more decentralized technology than that
which controls domain names. In short, there are both analogies to
and divergences from the UDRP that suggest the non-national
model can flourish outside of the domain-name system.
Where governments conclude that their national interests are
served by non-national dispute settlement models, those models are
likely to proliferate. 2 1 Proliferation might also occur where the
relevant private actors' interests are served by non-national models.
Indeed, the mix of public and private involvement may vary widely.
The substantive content of the UDRP emerged from a body of
uncertain public-private status. In the case of the DMCA, the notice
and take-down procedure is embodied in legislation, but the
system's content has evolved from private ISP practice. In Europe,
the EC Directive encouraged the negotiation of private agreements
fie with the William and Mary Law Review) (noting ISP action on thousands of notice and
takedown notifications and near total absence of disputes in court and concluding that "the
notice and taking down procedure codified [in the DMCAI has rapidly become the primary
means by which copyright owners and service providers cooperate to deal with instances of
online infringement").
320. Under one approach to such a system, an ISP's subscribers would submit to dispute
settlement of infringement claims by third-party copyright owners with respect to postings
of copyrighted materials on the ISP's computer servers. The question of whether the ISP
must remove such allegedly infiingingmaterials would be consigned, in the first instance (or
perhaps exclusively), to non-national dispute settlement providers authorized by the ISP
subscriber agreement to hear such claims based on some designated body of rules, be they
national or international copyright laws or some hybrid of the two. Further review by
national courts is possible but not essential to such a system.
321. A recent example is the draft Agreement on the Free Trade Area of the Americas,
FTAA.TNC/w/133/Rev.1 (July 3, 2001), availableat http:/Awww.ftaa-alca.org/alca e.asp. The
draft treaty obligates the states that ratify it to participate in ICANN's Governmental
Advisory Committee and to require "domestic Network Information Centers (NICs) [to]
participate in the ... UDRP to address the problem of cyber-piracy of trademarks." Id. at
8.14.
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but did not establish a mechanism for their development. Thus,
public regulation of private parties may be required to jump start
the non-national system, as was needed also with credit-card
charge-back disputes in the United States."z If properly designed,
however, the system's advantages may well convince even unregulated private parties to emulate it, as occurred with the
voluntary adoption of charge backs in
Europe and with ccTLDs and
S23
New.net's emulations of the UDRP.
In sum, we agree with the claim of technological essentialists
that centralized technological controls of the sort ICANN enjoys will
greatly facilitate the propagation of non-national dispute settlement
systems. Nevertheless, such controls are not necessary conditions
for extending the non-national model, either where that model has
demonstrable advantages over alternatives or where government or
private interests are served by adopting a non-national approach.
The nature and extent of technological implementation (and,
indeed, public law involvement and oversight) will vary from one
context to another.
B. DesigningChecking Functionsfor Non-NationalSystems
Assuming, therefore, that the UDRP can be replicated in other
contexts, we turn to the normative issues raised by non-national
structures and the variables that should guide government officials
and private parties consideringwhether, and in what form, to adopt
them. These variables are developed from our analysis of the UDRP
as the structure at the leading edge of this paradigmatic shift, but
we intend that they extend more broadly. Only if greater attention
is paid to a new complement of checking functions will it be possible
for non-national lawmaking and dispute settlement structures
legitimately to replicate the UDRP.

322. See Perritt, supra note 7, at 945-50 (explaining why credit-card-charge-back dispute
settlement systems benefit consumers, merchants, and financial intermediaries and
predicting the spread of such systems internationally).
323. Id. at 949 ("The relatively wide availability of charge-backs in Europe despite the
absence of any government compulsion to offer them, is strong testimony to their
attractiveness as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.").
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Our analysis has a theoretical focus that we hope will serve as a
template for further and diverse scholarlyinquiry. For example, the
variables we identify with regard to checking functions could help
guide empirical studies of the UDRP. At present, UDRP opponents
and proponents cite individual panel decisions to support claims
that the system is broken or functioning as its drafters intended.
More than anecdotal evidence is available, however. Because nearly
all UDRP decisions and other dispute settlement data are
published, commentators can identify with some precision broader
trends upon which to ground their assessments of the system and
prescriptions for reform."s
Future empirical studies could focus onprocedural or substantive
issues. The extent of default jurisprudence would be a useful
subject for examination. Critics often cite the high success rate of
trademark owners as almost irrefutable evidence of the UDRP's
imbalance, but the success rate of trademark owners can be
measured in many ways. For example, the rate might differ if
default cases were excluded from the calculation. So too, as
appeals to national courts become more prevalent, information
about the percentage of panel decisions appealed, and affirmance
or reversal rates, could be used to assess the efficacy of national
courts as checking mechanisms for non-national decision makers."
Substantively, studies might, for example, gauge whether panels
are expanding the UDRP by identifying the percentage of cases that
premise a finding of bad faith on conduct that the UDRP's drafters
chose not to include within paragraph 4(a) of the Policy. The degree
to which national interests are penetrating into the system could be
tested by analyzing panels' choice of law methodologies and
deference to national trademark rights.
For present purposes, however, we focus on conceptual and
foundational concerns. Legitimacy and accountability, institutional

324. Milton Mueller's statistical assessment ofperformance trends across all four UDRP
dispute settlement providers is an early and influential example. See Mueller, Rough Justice,
supra note 169. Michael Geistes recent study of disparities among the different dispute
settlement providers also offers helpful empirical data. See Geist, supranote 169.
325. We note, however, that current information about appeals from UDRP panel rulings
is anecdotal and incomplete. See UDRPAppeals in Court,supra note 215.
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capacity, and the need for error correction mechanisms-these
concerns endure and guide our analysis.
1. The Importance of Legitimacy
As described above, the UDRP contains weaknesses that undermine its claims of legitimacy. Legitimacy, of course, is a value
worthy of pursuit in and of itself.326 In a context such as the UDRP,
however, where regulatory and adjudicatory authority largely
operate outside existing national political arrangements and
derives power in part from the custom and consensus of affected
constituencies, 27 legitimacy is essential to achieve even pragmatic,
self-interested goals such as viability and efficacy. Absent legitimacy, non-national alternatives likely will arise because of the ease
with which competing structures and institutions can emerge
without the decelerating constraint of international or national
political debate and procedure. The fate of the Internet Ad-Hoc
Committee's Memorandum of Understanding and the rise of
New.net speak to such facility. 8 '
Legitimacy also nurtures and invigorates other forces that may
help to sustain the non-national system and abate its inherent
vulnerability. Non-national law is largely soft law, at least in
theory. 29 But the law produced by a non-national system may be
hardened through, and incorporated into, traditional lawmaking
and adjudicatory processes. For example, it might be incorporated
into instruments such as treaties. The recently released proposal
for a Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement raises the
UDRP's status by making it the required means for resolving
certain cybersquatting disputes. 3 0 Similarly, national courts soon
will be forced to consider (inmany procedural contexts) what degree
of deference to give UDRP rules and UDRP panel decisions."'
326. See supra Part I.A.
327. See Liu, supra note 49, at 618-25 (discussing cyberspace source of authority).
328. See supra text accompanying notes 42-53 and 315-16 (discussing IAHC and New.net
as possible rival to ICANN).
329. See supra Part II.B.2. (discussing whether UDRP is hard law in practice).
330. See supranote 321.
331. Cf HeathmountA.E. Corp. v. Technodome.Com., No. CA-00-00714-A, at 18 (E.D. Va.
Dec. 29, 2000) (refusing to treat the UDRP as adequate alternative forum when reviewing

20011

DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS

245

Judicial deference, where appropriate, would both boost the UDRP
as the de facto system and harden its soft-law character. A slightly
different form of hardening might be achieved by most country code
domains adopting the UDRP, thereby consolidating the UDRP's
position.3 2 Yet all these developments are unlikely to occur unless
the system is perceived as legitimate.
2. Deliberative Constructionin a Non-NationalEra: The Case
for Speed
In fashioning control mechanisms for non-national systems, one
basic strategic choice must be confronted--deciding upon the pace
of legal change. As noted at the beginning of our inquiry, two
distinctive features of the UDRP's hybrid model were the absence
of deliberative construction in developing the rules of the dispute
settlement system, and a departure from incrementalism in adjudicating disputes.33 3 These aspects of the UDRP may of themselves
weaken the legitimacy of the system. However, they also present a
basic preliminary dichotomous choice, between slower and faster
models of lawmaking and decision making, that affects how best to
legitimize a hybrid system without jettisoning its advantages. 34
If a dizzying pace of progress is thought to be essential to secure
the benefitsof non-national dispute settlement, that pace could be
maintained provided that decisions are subject to greater and later
external checks. Alternatively, the process could be consciously
made more deliberative, bringing it more within broadly accepted
forum non conveniens motion and stating that the UDRP "is not an adequate substitute for
this court's consideration of the issues presented here"), availableat http:/dnlr.com/reporter/
technodome.
332. The FTAA requires national governments to mandate that private parties not part
of the non-national system join that system. This bolsters the UDRP in two similar but
slightly different ways. First, because treaties must be approved by elected representatives
and the ICANN delegation from the Department of Commetce was never so approved, the
former has greater democratic legitimacy. Second, the status of the UDRP is enhanced by
its widespread adoption by a larger number of registries.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 4-15.
334. See supraPart HII- Although we stress that change may occur at different rates of
acceleration for legislative and dispute settlement institutions within the same non-national
system, we recognize that "dispute settlement is not simply a mechanism for neutral
application of legislated rules but is itself a mechanism of legislation and of governance."
Trachtman, supra note 300, at 336.
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parameters of slower-moving lawmaking models. That is, softer
law (as might be achieved, for example, through minimizing the de
facto binding force of panel decisions) 3 5 can be made more quickly
without jeopardizing desired systemic values; harder law must
be developed more incrementally. While the former is a riskier
strategy, it has greater potential gains.
Consider the early flood of cases under the UDRP as an example.
Undoubtedly, this surge is in part the result of many disputes
having accumulated prior to the implementation of the Policy, as
well as a rush of early, easy cases that have come to establish the
basic parameters of appropriate conduct on-line."3 ' Both of these
types of cases should subside over time, at least within existing
gTLDs, 33 ' but we doubt that the number of cases brought before
the UDRP will slow significantly. Unlike most other international
structures, the UDRP is a vehicle for adjudication of certain routine
commercial disputes. These disputes are brought by self-interested
individuals in lieu of private, multijurisdictional litigation, using
procedures that are inexpensive and user-friendly. Moreover, they
3 38
are brought without the checking intervention of state actors.
These are precisely the characteristics that make the UDRP model
attractive for replication. 33 ' To remove them in the name of en-

335. See supra Part II.B.2.b. (discussing practical binding effect of decisions).
336. The Policy does not have any statute of limitations. Thus, disputes that significantly
predate the launching of the UDRP in December 1999 may be freely decided by panels.
337. A second wave of accumulated, easy cases may arise once new gTLDs are opened for
registration. The nature and number ofthese cases will depend on variables such as whether
trademark owners are given priority in registering their trademarks in the new domainname space and whether the gTLDs are open to all comers or restricted to certain classes of
registrants. See supraPart II.A.
338. See Judith H. Bello, Some Practical Observations About WTO Settlement of
Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 37VA.J. INT'LL. 357,358-60 (1997) (noting that limiting WTO
jurisdiction to disputes among states creates restraints on government decision makers'
likely prosecution of intellectual property claims).
339. Strong pressures to allow private parties access to the dispute resolution process exist
even in systems nominally restricted to nation states. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members
Make Unfriendly Noises on Friends of the CourtDispute Briefs, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1283, 1284 (2000) (noting increasing acceptance of and reliance upon submissions by nongovernmental organizations and interest groups by WTO Appellate Body and Panels). But
see Philip Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
NongovernmentalParties,17 U. PA. J. INVL EcoN. L. 295, 303 (1996) (criticizing proposals
to grant private parties standing to bring claims before the WTO).
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suring the fuller ventilation of competing perspectives that a slower
pace makes possible might make the model significantly less useful.
Moreover, because of the pace of change in the digital
environment, panels will inevitably be faced with sets of facts
involving cutting edge issues upon which non-national lawmakers
inevitably will not have focused their attention. There is immense
value in panels being able to address these issues in the interstices
between periods of non-national rulemaking to create a fund of
experiential knowledge upon which lawmakers may later draw.
Indeed, although UDRP panels' legitimacy may be endangered by
a hastening to address issues beyond the core of agreed cases, their
attractiveness may be equally undermined by their refusal to decide
cases in which gap-filling is required. 4 °
Yet the legitimacy of panels jettisoning a cautious, incremental
approach depends, in large part, on the pace and nature of the
lawmaking process that undergirds and interacts with panel
decision making. Change may occur at different rates of acceleration for legislative and adjudicative institutions within the same
non-national system, but the speed of each is dynamically interactive; the pace of one affects the pace of the other.
If non-national legislative reviews of dispute settlement outcomes
are both frequent and representative, then the dangers of panel
3 41
excesses and experimentation are, at least in the aggregate,
markedly diminished. If, by contrast, the legislative process is
obstructed, not only are the dangers of rapid panel expansions
magnified temporally, but their legitimacy is far more uncertain.
True, international tribunals continue to function during periods of
political impasse, but during such times they are also subject to
pressures not found during phases of more lubricated political
evolution. 4" Some tribunals have successfully managed these
340. Cf Paul Geller, Intellectual Propertyin the Global Marketplace: Impact of TRIPs
Dispute Settlements, 29 INTLLAw. 99, 112 (1995) (arguing that WTO panels should engage
in filling gaps in TRIPs Agreement).
341. These dangers do exist in individual disputes, but it is here that national institutions,
and in particular national courts, may serve in important constraining function. See infra
Part III.B.6.a.
342. Both the ECJ and the WTO have been presented with a docket of competenceexpanding cases duringperiods when internationallawmakingby national governments was
obstructed. See Lindseth, supra note 247, at 663-64 (discussingECJ); Kanth, supranote 175,
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pressures, swiftly extending their powers to achieve larger objectives when forward political motion had slowed to a crawl, and
retrenching when legislative processes regenerated. 43 However,
keeping a steady hand on the throttle of the accelerator requires a
degree ofinstitutional control and coherence that maybeimpossible
when a non-national dispute settlement system's hybridization
includes a disaggregated decision-making structure.
For these reasons, the preliminary choice between faster and
slower models of evolution pervades each of the checking functions
below through which we seek to legitimize hybrid non-national
models typified by the UDRP. That is, the devices we discuss below
nominally relate to a variety of discrete procedural issues, but
almost all implicate an effort to modulate the pace of non-national
lawmaking and non-national dispute settlement, thereby accommodating the legitimacy objective we identified earlier.
3. InstitutionalReform: RefurbishingNon-National
Lawmaking
Reform of ICANN's lawmaking structures would assist in refurbishing the legitimacy of that institution and, as a consequence,
of the panels that interpret and apply the "law" that ICANN
produces. Moreover, ifthe organization's lawmaking processes were
revised to enhance its democratic credentials, the different organs
of ICANN could additionally serve more significant checking
functions than they do at present.
We believe that some formal, organized rulemaking body,
whether public or private, is essential to impose checking functions
on panels, particularly if non-national legal norms will continue to
serve at least in part as rules of decision for on-line domain name
disputes. Existingtreaty-based institutions are insufficient vehicles
at 1157 (discussing WTO). It was also during such a period of expansion that the ECJ came
under pressure from national courts in Europe to impose human rights limitations on
Community powers. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 310-11 (discussing ECJ's

acquiescence to pressures by German Constitutional Court to develop a human rights
jurisprudence).

343. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 5, at 315-16 (documenting how the ECJ initially
extended its powers to achieve the goals ofintegration during periods of political stagnation
and then became more cautious as the EC's political processes became more active).
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for the forms of lawmaking and dispute settlement demanded by a
global and digital world.'" To be sure, such institutions tie the
resultant rules more directly to the people that are governed
through the national governments by whom such rules are
negotiated. Treaty lawmaking, however, is too slow, and does not
reflect the increasingly important interests that exist apart from
(although partly overlapping
with) the interests represented in
345
national political units.

Clearly, we do not envisage (and the peoples of the world are
not ready for) the creation of a world parliament to establish a
direct link between the non-nationally governed and their nonnational governors. 46 Such a body is neither practical nor
normatively compelling when (globalization notwithstanding) social
identities and priorities remain linked in many important ways
to nationality. 47 But this does not mean that looser political
structures of a non-national nature cannot be designed to
complement national mechanisms. Nor does it imply that such
structures cannot be nurtured to grow in line both with evolving
social norms of community and with practical considerations. This
growth, and the metrics for measuring its determinants, will
appropriately be judged by the primary actors at the present stage
of global political organization, namely the disaggregated national
governments who are themselves subjected to pressures from
individuals and private parties operating within and across nationstates.3 8
344. Treaty institutions, however, may set parameters on the extent of power exercised
by non-national structures. Additionally, treaty norms may also serve as the substantive
legal rules to be applied by non-national dispute settlement decision makers. See infra Part
I.B.7.
345. See Dinwoodie,A New Copyright Order,supranote 8, at 483-84 (need for dynamism);
id. at 550-52 (complexity of interests).
346. But see Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On The Creation of a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of PopularSovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191 (2000)
(advocating the extension of democratic procedures and institutions from the setting of the
nation-state to the global context).
347. Cf Roger Cohen, EU Unity After Danish Vote: 'Wide' Rather Than 'Deep'?, INT'L
HERALD TRIB., Oct. 2,2000, at 13 (discussing resurgence of national identities within Europe
in wake of Denmark's rejection of common EU currency).
348. See Anne-Marie SlaughterA LiberalTheory oflnternationalLaw,94AM. Soc'yINT'L
L. PROC. 240,240-42 (2000).
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Notwithstanding ICANN's status as the UDRP's progenitor, it
may not be well-placed to evolve in this fashion. The trenchant
democracy deficit and legitimacy critiques leveled against ICANN
mean that entrusting the organizationin its present form to oversee
and implement creational and external checking mechanisms may
only exacerbate the skewed elements of the present system. Much
ink has been spilled by scholars and public interest groups
advocating specific proposals for how to reform ICANN, including
changes to its voting and operational systems.149 For present
purposes, we will not rehearse the different proposals. 5 We simply
indicate our general support for reforms not only because they will
bolster the legitimacy of ICANN's control of the domain-name
system, but also because they enable us to enlist ICANN (or
whatever national rulemaking succeeds it) 5 ' in the performance
of a variety of crucial checking functions over panel decision
3

making.

52

4. HorizontalNon-National Relations: Competitive Federalism
The relationship between competing non-national fora may also
affect the content and pace of panel decision making and the
internalized values of decision makers. Diffusion of power may act
as a check on abuses of power. At present, ICANN is committed
to making available to complainants a wide range of dispute
settlement institutions. Accordingly, domain-name registrants are
required to submit to the jurisdiction of any and all dispute
settlement providers. However, the procedures in place also give the
349. See, e.g., Center for Democracy and Technology, Domain Name Management Policy
(2000), at http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/study/ (last visited August 31, 2001); At-Large
Membership Study Committee, Discussion Paper #1 (July 12, 2001), available at
http://www.atlargestudy.org/DiscussionDraftRev.5.4.htm; see also Mueller, Technology and
InstitutionalInnovation, supranote 41; Zittrain, supranote 51.
350. At minimum, these include reaffirming decisions taken at a time of democratic
impoverishment. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38 (discussing proposal).
351. Zittrain, supranote 51, at 1088-90 (discussing possible alternatives and successors

to ICANN).
352. These might include more intrusive legislative oversight of panel developments
through conducting annual (or more frequent) reviews of UDRP outcomes, investigating
allegations of actual or apparent biases relating to arbitral appointment procedures, and
considering proposals for structural reforms (such as a UDRP Appellate Body).
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complainant unfettered choice among those providers, and thus the
competition
that is engendered is simply a race to favor the mark
3
35

owner.

Restoring competition and balance is essential. Other commentators have proposed immediate reforms.' Additional proposals
might be considered if the number of dispute settlement providers
increased markedly. Requiring domain-name registrants to designate a limited number of providers to whom they agree to submit
disputes might establish countervailing pressures and thus more
closely mimic the competition seen in international commercial
arbitration. There, the incentive to be seen as a fair dispute
settlement institution (or panelist) is generated by advance,
predispute designation of the dispute settlement institution. While
this veil of ignorance cannot be replicated in the UDRP context, a
similar equilibrium might be produced by establishing two equal
forces that push against each other. This is one example of how a
hybrid non-national structure might have to achieve the same
result as existing paradigms using slightly different devices.
5. Vertical Non-National Relations:A UDRPAppellate Body?
Significant checking functions could also be entrusted to some
form of non-national appellate body, either within ICANN itself or
comprised ofjurists from the different dispute settlement providers.
Although the virtues of such a body are obvious,3 55 so are the vices,
which may in fact outweigh the virtues. Non-national lawmakers
will need to consider several variables in deciding whether to create
3 58
such a body.
353. See supra Part II.B.2.
354. See, e.g., Mueller, Rough Justice, supranote 169, at 12.

355. From a litigants perspective, a UDRP appellate body would provide an immediate
opportunity to correct panel errors without the expenses and delays endemic in national

court proceedings. From an institutional perspective, an appellate tribunal could provide a
more deliberative atmosphere in which to interpret the Policy, harmonize conflicting
decisions, and highlight problematic issues for subsequent review by ICANN's political
bodies.
356. They will also need to consider important questions about the jurisdiction of any
appellate tribunal that is created. See M. Scott Donahey, Adding Appeals Procedure to
DisputeResolution Might Satisfy ICANNCritics,6 ELEc. CoMM. &L. REP. 33 (Jan. 10, 2001)

(proposing UDRP appellate panel and discussing its structure and jurisdiction); Experts Call
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One variable will be determining whether an appellate tribunal
contributes to an optimal level of overall checking functions. Such
functions, although essential to any system of dispute settlement,
are not cost free. 57 International commercial arbitration has long
eschewed appellate mechanisms precisely because they undermine
the finality and certainty of awards.358 However, as we have argued,
the UDRP is not purely arbitral and so might require checking
mechanisms that arbitration does not.
A second and closely related variable is UDRP's substantive
scope. Broadening the policy and moving it closer to a full-fledged
adjudicatory model would increase the opportunities for conflicting
panel decisions, which an appellate tribunal could then reconcile.
By contrast, a more ministerial policy in which panel discretion is
tightly constrained ex ante is likely to require less harmonization.
The need for error correction in individual cases will remain, but
this may be adequately addressed by national courts if national
court review is facilitated in ways such as those discussed below.
Reformers must also consider the UDRP's relationship to
national courts and national laws. Adding an additional layer of
non-national review will diminish litigants' incentive to take a
second appeal to national courts, further distancing national judges
from trademark-domain name adjudication and from influencing
the formation of legal norms. Such distance might be appropriate
if ICANN were to move the UDRP toward a more autonomous
system of non-national rules, but it is far less suitable for a
national-non-national hybrid, particularly one whose choice-of-law
clause draws at least in part on domestic statutes and case law as
rules of decision.
Whether an appellate tribunal will provide a net benefit to the
UDRP system will depend on how each of these variables are
resolved. But on balance, we see the importance of maintaining and
For Right of Appeal in Domain Name Dispute Resolution, 14 WIPO REP. 402 (2000)
(discussing comments by experts participating in meeting convened by WIPO); cf. Helfer,
Forum Shopping, supranote 1, at 395-99 (discussing alternative ways of structuring a new
international human rights court to complement the existing system of multiple human
rights tribunals).
357. Cf Stephan, supra note 30, at 747-48 (arguing that harmonization of international
commercial law should strive for "an optimal level of legal risk that is greater than zero").
358. See supra Part II.B.1.
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even enhancing national law input as weighing against the creation
of such a body.
6. Relations Between Non-National and National Systems
Even though non-national institutional reform is where much
scholarship has focused," 9 there are limits to what structural
reform of ICANN could ofitself achieve. A more nuanced conception
of the multifarious relations between lawmakers and those that
they govern must also be developed. This conception begins with
creational checking functions. Those functions typically arise from
the need to maintain a nexus between the progenitors of the system
and those subject to the system, whether from the people who in
exercise of sovereignty form a national government in whose affairs
they are represented, or a legislature that assigns responsibility to
an agency whose activities it oversees.
For the domain-name system, it is often remarked that the
legitimacy of imposing checking mechanisms, whether as now
exercised by ICANN or by earlier bodies, rests in large part upon
the acquiescence of Internet users.3 6 This is a fragile basis upon
which to construct a claim of legitimacy. Just as the acquiescence
of U.S. nationals in U.S. efforts at regulating the Internet does not
of itself legitimate the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over Internet
activities affecting other countries, so too the acquiescence of
Internet stake-holders would not legitimate preemptive or exclusive
non-national jurisdiction where national interests are at stake. If
creational checking functions themselves are to be valid and
effective, it is crucial that national interests also be incorporated
into the analysis.
For this reason, we think it necessary to proceed simultaneously
along two parallel tracks. On the one hand, we urge ICANN to
shore up its non-national democracy deficit by introducing direct
representation and voting structures. If such reforms can be accomplished, they would strengthen the allegiances between private
359. See, e.g., Froomkin, Wrong Turn in Cyberspace,supranote 26; Mueller, Technology
and InstitutionalInnovations,supra note 41; Zittrain, supra note 53.
360. See supranote 84 and accompanying text (discussing representational legitimacy of
Internet governance).
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non-national governors and the Internet stakeholders they seek
to govern, without regard to nationality or national political
loyalties."6 ' However, the example of the European Union's efforts
to overcome its own democracy deficit shows that legitimizing
supranational or non-national lawmaking structures through direct
representation mechanisms is a slow and cumbersome process, one
that may never fully supplant national political structures as
proxies for the interests of the governed.362
Therefore, as an additional strategy, we support the inclusion of
national structures in the design or refurbishing of non-national
lawmaking and dispute settlement systems on both pragmatic
grounds and as a matter of principle. Pragmatically, facilitating
input by the primary beneficiaries of the intellectual property
system, namely the public, cannot be achieved without the input of
national political structures. 63 This is particularly true in the short
term if non-national lawmakingis to continue at a relatively rapid
clip while non-national democraticmechanismsevolve more slowly.
The inclusion of national structures is important for two reasons
of principle. First, as one of us has argued elsewhere, actions taken
in cyberspace have spillover effects off-line, where national governments have traditionally and uncontroversially exercised their

361. Liu, supranote 49, at 620-21 (discussing evolution of "direct Internet democracy");
see also Peter M. Gerhart, Why Lawmaking for Global IntellectualProperty is Unbalanced,
22 EuR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 309, 311 (2000) (recognizing "the undemocratic nature of
international institutions" and noting that "it is nations, not people or their direct
representatives, who make international law").
362. See Lindseth, supranote 247, at 672-80 (discussing how EC member states granted
greater lawmaking powers to directly elected European Parliament as a means ofovercoming
the EC's "democracy deficit," but questioning whether the creation of a European "demos"
is attainable) (citing Joseph Weiler, Does EuropeNeed a Constitution?Demos, Telos and the
German MaastrichtDecision, 1 EUiL L.J. 219 (1995)); see also Paul B. Stephan, The New
InternationalLaw-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global
Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1555, 1581 (1999) (noting the difficulty "[of] constitut[ing]
international organs as democratic republics").
363. Nor can we allow the UDRP's resemblance to an arbitral proceeding to obscure the
substance ofthe system. UDRP-generated opinions are creating a body ofdecisional law that
affects the public for whose benefit national trademark systems were created. The purposes
of trademark law not only "to secure to the owner of the mark the goodwill of his business"
but also "Wprotect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers." Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 774 (1992) (citing ParkNFly v. Dollar Park
and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (internal citations omitted)).
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authority within their own borders. 64 For this reason, nations do
have some legitimate claims to prescribe in cyberspace, and these
must be accommodated in any non-national system.
Second, the addition of national structures into the lawmaking
mix may diffuse public choice concerns. Some commentators have
argued that international lawmaking structures of various stripes
are especially susceptible to strategic pressures from certain
interests groups, who have the resources and incentives to distort
the lawmaking process in inefficient and substantively dubious
ways. 65 Indeed, the ICANN process has been heavily criticized in
this regard. To be sure, national structures can also be strongly
skewed by public choice pressures, 66 but we believe that a divided
non-national-national rulemaking competence (and the multiplicity
of perspectives it engenders) will at worst not exacerbate public
choice problems and may in fact check the ability of certain interest
groups to achieve the dominance they might otherwise enjoy in a
single lawmaking forum. With this dual perspective firmly in mind,
we next consider several devices by which the interests of all
persons affected by non-national structures can be represented.
a. Subsidiarityand Deference
The relationship with national courts (and, separately, with
national laws) will be key. Principles of non-national-national
federalism must be developed. Within the EU, although the
principle of subsidiarity-that is, the notion of deferring to national
institutions-has proved to have little justiciable content, it has
had an important political role in conferring legitimacy upon its
364. See Dinwoodie,A New Copyright Order, supranote 8, at 542 n.224, 562-63.
365. See Froomkin, Governance, supra note 85, at 623-25 (discussing public choice
pressures applicable to different methods used to achieve international harmonization and
standard setting); Stephan, supra note 30, at 743 (discussing political economy problems
affecting public and private international commercial lawmaking). It may be that the
widespread availability of digital communication and the development of bodies of critical
mass over a range of countries may, at some point, reduce public choice concerns that have
clouded international lawmaking in the past. See Citizens' Groups: The Non-Governmental
Order: Will NGOs Democratise,orMerely DisruptGlobal Governance?,ECONOmIST, Dec. 11,
1999, 1999 WL 29811934. Such a shift remains, at present, highly speculative.
366. See Gerhart, supranote 361, at 311 (Even national systems face a real risk that the
producer interests will be given disproportionate weight over consumer interests.").
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supranational activities. And this concept has not simply been
deployed as the marketing strategy of a power-hungry institution;
EU officials have incorporated subsidiarity in fashioning their
legislative proposals. 6 7
Deference to national actors (or to national laws)3 6 is appropriate
where the parties' expectations and the interests of national
jurisdictions coalesce to favor the application of national laws that
reflect those expectations and interests. For example, a registrant's
rights and legitimate interests in using a domain name are likely
to vary from nation to nation, just as do user interests in off-line
disputes with trademark owners. Superimposingrigid non-national
norms in such cases creates the illusion of harmonization where
the consensus needed for harmonization does not exist, and it
disrespects both free expression rights and the careful
balance
36 9
struck by most national intellectual property systems.
Deference is also appropriate on pragmatic grounds. A pattern
of unduly trademark-protective panel rulings will only create
incentives for respondents to appeal to national courts to strike
a more appropriate balance. 370 Additionally, rulings insufficiently
respectful of dominant national interests will merely fuel nationalistic efforts to raise the specter of loss of sovereignty to undermine
the legitimacy of the fledgling non-national institution.

367. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, The Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2,1997, Protocol on
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, O.J. (C340) 1 (1997),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998) (requiring that legislation contain what has come to be called
a "Subsidiarity Impact Statement").
368. Indeed, the application of a particular national law may be more important to parties
than the adjudication before a particular national fora. As Linda Silberman famously
commented, to believe otherwise is to suggest that knowing where one will be hung is more
important than knowing whether one will be condemned in the first place. Linda J.
Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978).
Recognition ofthe importance of applicable law, without forfeiting the procedural advantages
of the UDRP, would suggest that panels should be willing to apply national law where the
interests are so strong as to warrant such application.
369. It also conflicts with the balance between calls for uniformity and calls for national
autonomy reflected in current public international intellectual property law. See Dinwoodie,
A New Copyright Order,supra note 8, at 491-92.
370. Ifimpediments to appeals by respondents result in panel decisions enjoying a de facto
binding status, see supranotes 211-27 and accompanying text, the harm to national interests
is that much greater.
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In the context of domain-name dispute settlement, however,
subsidiarity can function in a variety of ways. First, a methodology
of deference could be incorporated into UDRP decision making
either by revising the system's choice-of-law rules-a subject we
address in greater detail below 3 7 -or by introducing a "subsidiarity
clause" into the dispute settlement Policy. Such a clause would
clarify that the UDRP was intended to be limited to cybersquatting
and other enumerated domain name abuses,3 7 2 thus inhibiting
expansive panel lawmaking.'" However, a subsidiarity clause will
not (and perhaps should not) absolutely preclude panel attention to
more controversial issues. Panel jurisdiction will continually be
pushed to the margins 7' and the flexibility to address lacunae and
novel issues is a perceived advantage of this mechanism over
existing international intellectual property structures, such as the
WTO.' 5 Nevertheless, subsidiarity language would signal to panels
that they need to take national interests into account.
A philosophy of subsidiarity will also have a second beneficial
effect-encouraging national legislatures and national courts to
engage in intellectual property domain-name lawmaking and
adjudication. A UDRP limited to cybersquatting and analogous
egregious conduct does not imply that there is no need for the
development of standards of conduct where the interests of the
contesting parties are more balanced. However, if the UDRP is so
limited, national actors will be pulled into the breach to create rules
for such balanced cases. Indeed, it is striking that the UDRP was
created when national jurisdictions were still in the throes of
legislatively andjudicially workingthrough the myriad intellectual
property puzzles that domain-name registrations raise. These
national law experiments should continue, but we question whether
371. See infra notes 386-98 and accompanying text.

372. A subsidiarity clause could operate even if ICANN expands the UDRP to include
some or all of the more contested intellectual property issues considered in the Second WIPO

Domain Name Process. See Interim ReportIT, supranote 284.
373. A subsidiarity clause is but one example of a variety oftextual devices by which nonnational lawmakers could seek to ensure a limited application of the UDRP. Other examples
include preambular clauses setting forth the objectives against which the specific provisions

ofthe Policy are to be construed, or an incorporation by reference to established interpretive
frameworks, such as the one set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
374. See supranotes 340-43 and accompanying text.

375. See Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order,supranote 8, at 493-94, 501-04.
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they will continue if UDRP panels exercise expansive lawmaking
powers." 6 An expansive UDRP with comprehensive non-national
rules reduces pressure on national decision makers to adopt their
own cybersquatting statutes or case law, thereby privileging by
default the non-national model, even if it is not the (or an) optimal
model. But if domestic lawmaking remains robust, it must be
accommodated somewhere in the non-national system.
One means of facilitating input from national systems would be
to further "soften" UDRP panel decisions by expressly encouraging
national court review that is more intrusive than one would
expect for a system with significant arbitral features. 77 A second
significant step would be to revise the time limits and other
procedural aspects of the UDRP that presently limit domain-name
registrants when seeking effective review in national courts.
Together, these steps would make it easier for respondents to
involve national courts, and thus, to enlist such courts in the
application of more extensive controls on panel lawmaking than
currently exist.3 78
National involvement may also be needed to take advantage of
the expertise of national institutions in applying national law.
Consider the issue of trademark ownership upon which a UDRP
complaint is premised. Not all countries offer extensive protection
to common law marks, but panels are expected to be able to address
such difficult questions as full-fledged and competent adjudicative
bodies.3 7 9 If panels were empowered to seek the assistance of
376. At present, the dominance of the UDRP is overwhelming the development of
alternative national solutions. See Electronic Commerce Work Programme,supra note 15,

44 (suggesting that the UDRP has "arguably become a de facto international standard").
377. The scant external checking functions of international arbitration are too limited to
work in a context such as the UDRP where the notion of party consent, upon which its
limited review is based, is a pure fiction. See Rau, supranote 184.
378. The involvement ofinstitutions ofdemocratic nation-states may also serve to enhance
the democratic legitimacy of the non-national system. More active national court
involvement would also serve an error-correction function by facilitating the review ofsimilar
facts in disparate fora. This is a more nuanced approach than simply establishing an ICANNbased appeals process.
379. In order to have standingto bring a complaint, a trademark ownermust demonstrate
"that the domain name in question is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or
service mark in which the complainant has rights." Policy, supra note 17, 4(a) (emphasis

added). In addition to the question of common law rights, itis unclear whether panels should
be willing to review national administrative determinations of the validity of registered
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national institutions in interpreting and applying national laws,3 80
those institutions might usefully assist panels in this quest, and
thus be incorporated into the non-national decision-making process.
The extent to which national laws serve as a vibrant contributor
to the non-national system might also be affected by the content of
those laws. For example, the enactment of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) in the United States will likely
affect the nature of U.S. judicial contribution to the UDRP.
Although the two bodies of law are substantively similar, their
procedural and remedial rules differ. 8 1 Whereas the UDRP has the
advantage of low cost, speed, and ease of enforcement, the broader
remedies under the ACPA might encourage trademark holders to
proceed directly to U.S. federal court. 82
By the same token, the substantive rules of the non-national
domain-name system might reduce some of the conflict between
trademarks and domain names. These include introducing new
generic top level domain names, restricting the open registration
system by withdrawing certain names from use as a domain name,
modifying the first come, first served system of domain-name
registration, or developing defined permissible uses of trademarks
as part of domain names. Additional possible reforms of the
trademark system are also important, particularly as regards the
scope of rights granted a trademark owner in cyberspace. These
rights. See Ty Inc. v. Parvin, WIPO Case No. D2000-0688, 1 6 (Nov. 9, 2000) (majority
opinion ofPanelists M. Scott Donahey, Jeffrey M. Samuels and G. Gervaise Davis, III) ("As
an international body, it is not for the Panel... to second guess the rulings of national
trademarkbodies, at least absent compellingevidence ofchanged circumstances."), available
at http://www.arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0688.html.
380. An additional area oftension under national trademark law is the question of"fame,"
a concept that may yet affect the contours of trademark owners' rights under the UDRP. It
would greatly assist panels, elevate the ministerial nature of some of their activities, and
further legitimate the non-national process if national authorities made determinations of
national fame. Indeed, this interpenetration could be further aided by the development of
new national institutions, such as national registries of well-known marks compiled by
national trademark offices.
381. See generally Barbara Solomon, Two New Tools to Combat Cyberpiracy-A
Comparison,90 TRADEMARK REP. 679 (2000) (comparing substantive and remedial aspects
of UDRP and ACPA).
382. For example, statutory damages are available under the ACPA. See 15 U.S.C. §
1117(d) ( Supp. V 1999). Similarly, plaintiffs in U.S. federal court may obtain broad
injunctive relief rather than the mere transfer or cancellation of existing domain-name
registrations.
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possible reforms illustrate that the successful operation of any nonnational model will depend not only upon a coherent structural and
conceptual identity but also upon the different substantive rules
governing non-national conduct. 3"
b. Choice of Law in Non-NationalSystems
Another critical means of accommodating national interests
into the development of a non-national system is via the choice-oflaw analysis that panels employ. Because nations, in many cases,
will have a strong claim to prescribe conduct even in cyberspace,
the legitimacy of the rules that are applied and developed nonnationally requires respect and consideration of those national
claims to prescribe. In the decision-making context, this is the
function of choice-of-law principles. Choice-of-law rules reflect what
William Baxter called the "external objectives"3 ' of a political unit,
383. The diversity of substantive national law in the particular area in question will also
affect efforts to replicatethe UDRP. This lesson is seen even in the domain name context,
where technological conditions were ripe for the development ofnon-national systems. These
conditions are not, however, limited to cybersquatting and, in fact, extend to situations giving
rise to a range ofdisputes in which the equities vary widely. Thus, there exists a broad-based
demand for non-national forms of dispute settlement. However, this demand has been
fulfilled only with respect to cybersquatting. This limited response to the more general
demand can be traced to the fact that relatively convergent values regarding cybersquatting
were formed largely independently of developed national legislation. To be sure, even in
disputes of a type ICANN clearly empowered panels to review, differing notions of free
expression may be implicated. Compare Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. Briese, No.
FA0102000096765 (Nat'lArb. Forum May 4,2001) (use ofmayoinfo.com to criticize the Mayo
Foundation does not violate UDRP), availalble at httpA/www.arb-forum.com/domains/
decisions/96765.htm, with La Caixa v. Namezero.com, WIPO Case No. D2001-0360, 1 6(c)
(May 3, 2001) (finding use ofcritical term similar to mark in domain- name registration to
be a violation of UDRP because respondent's distortion, while understood as critical byusers
of "countercultural Latin jargon," is unlikely to be understood as such by most Internet
users), available at http-/arbiter.wipo.intdomains/decisions/html/2001/d200l-0360.htmL
And with respect to conduct on cybersquatting's periphery (such as domain-name
warehousing), panelists' interpretations might be affected differently by use-based or
registration-based principles oftrademarklaw, a division which separates the United States
from the rest of the world. In other intellectual property contexts, such as fair use under
copyright law, one can foresee even sharper divergences. The replication of the non-national
model beyond the current context, therefore, will work only if substantial weight is given to
a philosophy of subsidiarity and deference where diverse national laws exist.
384. By external objectives, we refer to the objective "to make effective, in all situations
involving persons as to whom it has responsibility for legal ordering, that resolution of
contending private interests [that it] has made for local purposes." William F. Baxter, Choice
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namely, the policy values of how it seeks to effectuate its (internal)
substantive policy preferences where another political unit also has
a claim to exercise prescriptive authority over a particular dispute.
Choice-of-law rules in the UDRP are thus at the epicenter of nonnational relations, because they embody the values that the nonnational system will seek to apply where national political units
have a competing claim to prescribe conduct.8 5
One way that any political unit may pursue its external
objectives is, of course, simply to mandate the application of its own
law in all situations where it has a claim to prescribe. Nonetheless,
a political unit might more rationally conclude that the best route
to making its own internal policy values effective in the greatest
possible number of multistate situations is to take into account
more than proceedings before its own tribunals. Thus, the courts of
StateA may apply, or at least consider, the internal policies of State
B in the hope (and expectation) that the courts of State B will
consider the internal policy values of State A in cases where State
A would have a strong interest in seeing its internal values applied.
To restate these strategic options in the UDRP context, the
narrower unilateral perspective would involve the application of
autonomous non-national principles without reference to national
interests or laws.
Alternatively, ICANN might rationally conclude that its
substantive policy preferences on the relationship of domain names
to trademarks might best be furthered if it recognized that national
courts and legislators are in a position to enhance or undermine the
substantive policy choices contained in the UDRP. 8 6 Accordingly,
to ensure that national courts and legislatures support, rather than
undermine, those substantive policy choices, UDRP panels must be
willing to accommodate national interests and laws. Choice-of-law
rules can be regarded as the statement of the terms and conditions

of Law and the FederalSystem, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 17 (1963).
385. Choice-of-law rules can also be shapedbypublic international lawmakingandthereby
constrain the scope of choices available to national and non-national lawmakers. See infra
Part III.B.7.
386. Indeed, by virtue of their inherent legitimacy deficit, non-national institutions may
need to be particularly cognizant of the ability of other (national) institutions to interfere
with the effectuation of the non-national policies.
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of this bargain between the competing national and non-national
institutions.
Choice-of-law rules permitting panels to reflect the national
interests of relevant states in regulating domain-name space must
therefore be developed by ICANN or by UDRP panels. It may be
that in a non-national setting, the connecting factors would have to
be quite substantial to justify exclusive (or even extensive) reliance
on one particular national law over autonomous non-national
principles. However, the current Rule 15,8' by failing in any real
way to address choice of law, fails to ensure that national interests
will appropriately be recognized by panels, or to provide panels with
guidance on where such recognition should occur. It thus omits an
important means of establishing the legitimacy of the non-national
structure and indeed positively invites challenges to it. National
interests are not only, by virtue of their normatively persuasive
prescriptive claim, appropriately part of the non-national system;
they are, by virtue of their practical ability to affect its legitimacy,
an essential partner in its development.
Moreover, the lack of direction on choice of law, and hence the
absence of guidance on which laws will govern particular circumstances, implicates checking functions. The citizenry (whether
nationally or digitally affiliated, or both) is without guidance as to
the body (national or non-national) from which to seek corrective
redress. 88 The representational validity of the system is thus
diluted and the accountability mechanism is weakened.
What then should be the choice-of-law rule? What should be the
terms and conditions ofthe bargain that the non-national structure
offers national institutions? The answer is far from clear. The
choice-of-law dilemma is troubling courts and scholars in all aspects
of cyberspace, and settled approaches have not yet received widespread support--even in the less complicated environment ofnation
to nation relations. It may be that, as in those other contexts, the
question cannot be settled with absolute certainty. The illusion that
387. UDRPRules,supranote 17, Rule 15(a) (authorizingpanels to decide cases using"any
rules and principles of law that [they] deem[] applicable").
388. The ability to seek redress might properly be classified as an external checking
function falling underthe rubric of error correction. See supranote 173-76 and accompanying
text.

20011

DESIGNING NON-NATIONAL SYSTEMS

263

any choice-of-law questions could be resolved with such assurance
was disturbed by the realist conflicts scholars in the United States
throughout the twentieth century.389
However, some general parameters must be established,
especially if a non-national model is to supplant (or at least
legitimately supplant) national regulation in any respect. If nations
are legally or effectively to cede their direct authority to effectuate
their prescriptive goals, then that authority must be recognized
elsewhere in the system. As noted above, the choice-of-law system
has historically been the locus of that recognition. The value is no
different in the on-line context, even if the rule or methodology
adopted may be different in order to accommodate the differences
discussed above.
For a variety of reasons, in the domain-name setting in
particular, the balance of prescriptive claims to regulate might
appear to fall closer to the non-national than the national. Because
the domain-name system is an element of the Internet's architecture, domain names would appear inevitably non-national.
Registration can be made in top level domains without regard to
national status or location. Generic top level domain names are not
allocated by national governments. Indeed, even registrations in the
country-code domain names need not be administered by governmental entities.390
National interests are not without some legitimate prescriptive
claim, however. At the very least, in every UDRP dispute there is
some national interest, because any complainant at present is
resting its claim upon trademark rights recognized by a national
law. 91 The endorsement of such a claim, or the determination of the
389. See generally FRIEDRICH K JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE
(1993); Symeon C. Symeonides, GeneralReport, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONALLAWATTHEEND
OF THE 20TH CENTURY: PROGRESS OR REGRESS? (Symeon C. Symeonides ed., 2000).
390. The administration of country code top level domains is delegated by ICANN
(formerly by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) to authorities ("managers") in the
relevant country. For resolution of a recent controversy on the question, see Internet
Assigned Numbers Auth., LANA Report on Request For Delegation of the .ps Top-Level
Domain (Mar. 22,2000) (concluding that the .ps domain should be delegated to managers in
the Palestinian Authority and approving the managers for that purpose), available at
http-J/www.icann.org/generallps-report-22mar0.htm. For a fuller discussion of this point,
see Dinwoodie, supra note 8.
391. Exceptions to this rule are evolving, such as the creation ofsupranational trademark
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scope of protection that flows from nationally conferred rights,
implicates the interests of the nation by whom the rights have been
conferred. Stated more tendentiously, the non-national system is
defining the scope of national rights in the cyberspace contextand nation-states have not yet ceded control over such issues to
ICANN. 9 2 Trademark rights exist for the benefit of more than
non-national cyberspace actors. We suggest that at least three
considerations should be borne in mind as ICANN and/or panels
construct choice-of-law rules.
First, the determination of issues 9 3 in a non-national dispute by
the invariable application of a single national law would be

rights in economically integrated regions such as the EU. See Council Regulation 40/94 of'20
December 1993 on The Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) (creating unitary, EU wide
trademark rights established by a single registration with an EU-level trademark office).
392. Juliana Gruenwald & Roy J. O'Connor, ICANN Tethered, INTERACTIVE WEEK, Feb.
14,2001,2001 WL 7347529; Senate to ScrutinizeICANNMore Closely, THE STANDARD, Feb.
14,2001, availableat http'//www.thestandard.comarticle/0,1902,22210,00.html. In the more
specific context of famous trademarks, national and non-national competition continues.
Although belated adoption by ICANN of the "sunrise" proposal advanced in the First WIPO
Process would ensure protection for famous marks throughout cyberspace without direct
national involvement, in September 1999, WIPO member-states agreed to a nonbinding
resolution calling for the per se protection of famous marks against registration as part of
a domain name by someone other than the mark owner. See WIPO, Joint Resolution
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, General Report of the
Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO, 34th Annual Meeting, Doc. A/34/16
171-83
(Sept. 1999) [hereinafter Well-Known Marks JointResolution],availableat http://www.wipo.
orglnews/enrmdex.htmlwipo-frame--newsen/documents.htmL We believe that non-national
lawmakers should give this and similar soft-law initiatives considerable deference. See infra
Part III.B.7.
393. It may be that different laws, whether of one or more nations or non-national in
nature, should be chosen to decide different issues before a panel. This would be a typical
application of the doctrine of depegage, which is found in traditional conflicts analysis. See
Willis L.M. Reese, Depe~age:A Common Phenomenon in Choice ofLaw, 73 COLUm. L. REV.
58, 58 (1973) (describing doctrine as "the process of applying the rules of different states to
determine different issues"). For example, the determination of whether the complainant
possesses "trademark rights," an essential element of a claim under the UDRP, see Policy,
supra note 17, j 4(a)(i), would under present notions of international trademark law, be a
question of national law. Trademark registrations can be made only with national bodies,
with the recent exception of regional (but still territorial) rights such as those available
through the Community Trademark System in the EU. See Council Regulation 40/94 of 20
December 1993 on The Community Trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11), art. 25. Similarly, the
existence of common law or unregistered trademark rights based upon use, which several
countries such as the United States permit, will be determined by whether consumer
association has developed in the country where such common law protection is sought. See
Buti v. Impressa Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
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unhelpful."9 ' Use of a single national law would minimize the
potential of the non-national system to develop through an accommodation of different national values a jurisprudence that, like the
social activity it regulates, transcends national borders and reflects
varied national interests. It would ground the non-national system
in outdated national premises by seeking to localize that which is
not local. And it would surely heighten the concerns of other
nations whose laws were not applied, but who inevitably have a
prescriptive claim, that there had been a transfer of sovereignty to
another institution (a competing national law) in which it has no
participatory role.
Second, for the reasons of national interest discussed above, it
is imperative that panels do not reflexively decide cases solely
by reference to autonomous principles unmoored from national
values. As is implicit in our critique of localization above, we believe
that, in the long term, the non-national system might usefully
develop autonomous rules that apply in disputes transcending
national borders. Andcertainly some autonomous rules, particularly
in matters of procedure, are required for the system to function
efficiently.3 95 But the development of such autonomous principles
must be grounded, at least initially and at least in part, in the
underlying national interests and values. Given the critique of
existing ICANN structure, and the unlikelihood that a full-fledged
democratic non-national legislative body can (or should) arise inthe
near future,3 96 panel efforts to implement autonomous principles
without any reference to national interests rest on shaky ground.
Third, as a means of resolving these first two dilemmas, panels
should recognize that non-national social structures involve par394. By this we mean to reject efforts to localize an entire dispute within a single country
and apply that law to all issues in a case (even if the particular national law would vary from
case to case). We are even more resistant to the notion, advanced by some writers, of
reflexively applying a particular jurisdiction's rules (such as those of the United States) to
all UDRP disputes. See Angela Proffitt, Drop The Government, Keep The Law: New
International Body For Domain Name Assignment Can Learn From United States
TrademarkExperience, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 601 (1999) (suggesting application of U.S.
law to UDRP cybersquatting disputes).
395. It is typical, ofcourse, for decision makers inmultistate cases to apply their own rules
of procedure even if the substantive law to be applied is a foreign law. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 122 cmt. b (1971) (discussing substance/procedure

distinction).
396. See supra notes 321-23 and accompanying text (rejecting "world parliament").
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ticipants with a complex amalgam of affinities (and hence,
expectations). These affinities are part national, part regional, and
part non-national. This is particularly true of cyberspace actors. To
use a non-domain name example, a citizen of the United Kingdom,
who is a permanent resident of the United States, but temporarily
in Canada, accessing a web site based in Germany that permits
access throughout the world but only to members of his profession,
may expect such conduct to be regulated by a dizzying array of
norms from a wide array of national and non-national sources. The
rules applied to non-national conduct, and thus, the rules to
which the choice-of-law provision should lead, should reflect
these complexities. The legitimacy of law as an instrument of social
regulation rests upon some correspondence between it and the
social structures that it purports to regulate. 397 Thus the choice-oflaw rules should permit panels to draw from the variety of relevant
national laws as well as the non-national policies in constructing
applicable substantive rules.
c. Relative Influence of Different NationalLegal Systems
In any system where decisions from varied sources will be
considered as part of the law-formation process, the potential for
excessive influence of one subset of geographic rules or conceptual
settings must be borne in mind. In the context of relatively
homogenous constituents (such as the United States) this fear
might be discounted. In the international setting, there may be a
fear that the United States would dominate.3 98
A review of panel decisions to date, even those handed down
by non-U.S. arbitrators, reveals the significant influence of U.S.
legal principles.399 This is not always obvious on its face. Those
principles, first introduced from U.S. case law, are often "non397. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order,supranote 8, at 550-51.
398. Such fears were initially expressed by the EU over the privitization of the domainname system. See Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 1670-71 & n.105.
399. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. wallmartcanadasucks.com, WIPO Case No. D20001104, 6(BXii) (Nov. 23, 2000) (noting in case involving the challenge by a U.S. company,
holding trademarks in Canada and the United States, to the registration of a domain name
by a Canadian citizen with a Canadian-based registrar, that the "U.S. ACPA and trademark
infringement cases are natural sources of rules and principles of law to apply in resolving
this dispute" because of their similarity to the UDRP standards), available at
http://arbiter.wipo.inttdomains/decisions/html2000/d2000-1104.html.
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nationalized" by their later repetition as principles of autonomous
UDRP law without full acknowledgment of their etymology. For
example, the early expansion of the notion of "use" in panel
decisions interpreting the UDRP can be traced to similarly expansive Ninth Circuit case law interpreting the "use in commerce"
requirement of the Lanham Act.4 " Yet, although recognized in the
first UDRP panel decision employing the Ninth Circuit case law,
later panel decisions cite simply to the initial decision incorporating
the Ninth Circuit case law.40 1 A system of formal precedent might
only exacerbate this problem and undermine any benefits that a
genuinely non-national system would otherwise create.
Whether U.S. litigation and law would dominate would depend,
however, on several variables." 2 To be sure, much of the activity
on the Internet is U.S.-based or -initiated. And effective U.S.
03
control of the domain-name system is still a plausible assertion.
However, control over registration of names in the generic top level
domain has been dispersed widely to registrars throughout the
world. Also, the structural aspects that contribute to the abundance
of U.S. litigation (such as discovery rules, provisions for allocation
of attorneys' fees, availability of contingency fees, etc.) need not
be replicated non-nationally. Procedural reforms of the ICANN
system that furthered such departures from the U.S. litigation
model might help to assuage fears that input from national
400. See Panavision Intl L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
401. Compare World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO Case No.
D99-0001 (Jan. 14, 2000) (citing Panavision),availableat http/arbiter.wipo.int/domains/
decisions/html/1999/d1999-0001.html, with Array Printers AB v. Nordell, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0092 (Apr. 10, 2000) (applying Bosman's "use" concept to dispute involving two
Swedish parties without citing Panavision),available at http-//arbiter.wipo.int/domainsl
decisions/html/2000/d2000-0092.html. See also AT&T Corp. v. Alamuddin, WIPO Case No.
D2000-0249, 7 (May 18, 2000) (in the absence of any case law in Singapore, the domicile
of the respondent, panel stated that "[plrinciples of law set out in decisions of Courts in the
United States and the United Kingdom in similar cases could easily be of assistance to
Singaporean courts"), availableathttp-J/arbiter.wipo.intdomainddecisionshtml/2000/d2OOO0249.html; Key Issues, supranote 254 (noting this trend for other U.S. cases).
402. See Heathmount A.E. Corp. v. Technodome.Com., 106 F. Supp. 2d 860 (E.D. Va.
2000) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss ACPA suit between two Canadian nationals on
forum non conveniens grounds, inter alia because Canadian law did not provide plaintiffwith
adequate relief).
403. See Gruenwald & O'Connor, supra note 392; Senate to Scrutinize ICANN More
Closely, supra note 392. This possibility will continue so long as the United States does not
relinquish control over the root server that maps domain-name space. See Mueller, supra
note 170, at 498.
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laws and national systems might simply mean the implementation
of U.S. law. And incorporating subsidiary principles as discussed
above might encourage other nations to develop domain-namespecific legislation and litigation. This would diversify the national
law sources upon which UDRP panels could draw for support and
ultimately mitigate U.S. dominance.
7. RelationsBetween Non-National and InternationalSystems
Non-national lawmakers must also carefully consider the relationship between non-national systems and the rules and norms of
public international law. Public international law can interact with
non-national structures in at least three distinct ways: first, as a
constraint on the subject matter of issues committed to the
jurisdiction of non-national lawmakers; second, as a source of
substantive rules to be applied in disputes :between private
parties adjudicated in non-national fora; and third, as a source of
(depending on one's perspective) competition or inspiration for the
creation of new legal rules relating to intellectual property rights.
Each ofthese mechanisms ofinteraction requires separate extended
treatment, and therefore we highlight only a few preliminary points
below.
First, mandatory rules contained in relevant treaties such as
the Paris Convention and the TRIPs Agreement should, at least
initially, serve as boundaries on the authority of non-national
lawmakers and dispute settlement decision makers. As creatures
of public international law, these treaties create legal obligations
only for their nation-state signatories and cannot directly bind
private non-national entities such as ICANN. However, the longstanding pedigree and widely accepted nature of these treaty
obligations strongly suggest that they should be incorporated into
non-national lawmaking initiatives. Thus, where the treaties
impose obligations on national governments, they should constrain
non-national lawmakers as well.40 4
404. WIPO clearly believed that the UDRP's novel procedures permitting trademark
owners to recapture domain names registered and used in bad faith was compatible with
intellectual property treaty law. See FinalReport, supra note 78, J1 173-74 (noting that
WIPO's proposed definition of abusive registration "draws on solid foundations in
international and national law and in case law," and citing in particular unfair competition
provisions of the Paris Convention). It is unclear, however, whether WIPO's view fits with
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Translating these obligations into the particularities of the
non-national setting presents considerable conceptual challenges.
Under one possible approach, mandatory treaty rules could be
directly incorporated into new non-national "legislation" as rules of
decision to be applied by non-national jurists." 5 This preserves the
procedural virtues of a non-national dispute settlement setting
while coupling them with settled and unobjectionable substantive
norms. But such an approach could also diminish other nonnational values, such as the capacity of non-national decision
makers to adapt old norms or generate new ones tailored to rapidly
evolving demands of transborder digital technologies. An alternative approach (the one apparently adopted in the UDRP) would
create a new set of relatively autonomous non-national norms but
subject them to implicit review for treaty compatibility through
external checking mechanisms. Such mechanisms could include
review of non-national rulings by national courts applying treatyinspired national laws."
conventional understandings ofthe principal treaty regimes. The UDRP clearly furthers the
objectives of those regimes, but does so in a way that (perhaps rightly) brings into question
the core treaty principles ofterritorially circumscribed rights and national treatment. At the
very least, the application ofnon-national substantive rules instead ofpotentially conflicting
national laws weakens the grip of territoriality as the defining principle of international
intellectual property law. See Ty Inc. v. Parvin, WIPO Case No. D2000-0688, [ 6 (Nov. 9,
2000) ("[M']e are dealing not with the sovereign territory of the United States and its laws,
but with cyberspace, which is the 'territory' in which domain names exist"), available at
http/www.arbiter.wipo.intdomain/decisions/html/2000/d2000-0688.html; see also Dori
Kornfeld, Evaluatingthe UniformDomain Name DisputeResolution Policy, nn. 32-33 and
accompanying text, at httpJ/cyber.law.harvard.edulicann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/
udrp-review.html (last modified Oct. 31,2000) (noting case transferringbarcelona.com owned
by a U.S. business to Barcelona city government notwithstanding conflict between U.S. and
Spanish law over protection of geographic names).
405. Conversely, treaties can incorporate non-national norms or structures as part oftheir
own substantive rules. See supra note 321 (discussing FTAA).
406. Intellectual property treaties require national governments to incorporate treaty
obligations into their national intellectual property laws or otherwise to recognize them in
their domestic legal systems. Thus, to the extent that national laws and institutions operate
as a check on non-national authority, those laws and institutions will implicitly serve to
constrain non-national powers within treaty-compatible limits. Cf FinalReport,supra note
78, 150(ix) (stating as a basic principle for the UDRP that "a decision by a court of
competent jurisdiction, in a country that is party to the Paris Convention [or the TRIPs
Agreement], which is at variance with a determination resulting from the [UDRP] should,
subject to the application of normal principles for the enforcement of judgements, prevail
over the administrative determination"). For such a system to function effectively, however,
national courts will need to pay greater attention to the international dimensions of their
national laws. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order, supranote 8, at 550-52.
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Whichever approach is chosen, however, unanswered questions
will remain. Intellectual property treaties do not always provide
settled solutions for the most pressing issues plaguing digital
technologies disputes or do not speak to those issues in preclusive
detail. Where interstices exist, there are opportunities for new rules
and norms to evolve non-nationally. But such non-national
evolution must proceed in conjunction with and not in opposition to
lawmaking that occurs in more traditional settings. Consider, for
example, the work of WIPO's Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications,
which is developing soft-law recommendations for national governments concerning well known trademarks and when use of a mark
on the Internet amounts to use within the territory of a member
state. 40 7 These initiatives may one day be integrated into national
legislation or national judicial decisions or serve as the template
for negotiating hard treaty law, and thus ripen into constraints on
non-national authority. Even prior to that time, however, respectful
treatment of soft-law developments is appropriate, both as sources
of persuasive authority to help resolve non-national disputes
between private parties and as inspiration for generating complementary non-national norms.
Public international law may also inspire competition with nonnational systems, either through developing alternative substantive
rules or through establishing institutional structures that facilitate
the generation of new rules applicable to transborder situations.
With respect to the former, for example, the WIPO Standing
Committee on Trademarks proposed rules on resolving competing
legitimate rights on the Internet only after that issue was omitted
at an interim stage of the WIPO UDRP process. The latter issue is
implicated by the relationship of non-national dispute settlement
systems to existing and future international cooperative regimes for
the enforcement of judgments.

407. See Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs and
Geographical Indications, ProtectionofIndustrialPropertyRights in Relation to the Use of
Signs on the Internet, WIPO Doc. No. SCT5/2 (June 21, 2000), available at http'/www.
wipo.org/sctlen/documents/session_5/doe/set5_2.doc; Standing Committee on the Law of
Trademarks, Industrial Designs and Geographical Indications, Summary by the Chair,WIPO
Doc. No. SCT/5/5 (Sept. 15, 2000), available at httpl/www.wipo.org/sct/en/documents/
session_5/doctsct5_5.doc; Wel-Known Marks JointResolution, supranote 392, if 171-83.
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Efforts are currently underway in the Hague Conference on
Private International Law to draft a convention that addresses
both jurisdiction and recognition of judgments. 4"8 The draft
Convention is based upon the Brussels Convention, 40 9 which
governs jurisdiction and recognition of judgments in commercial
matters throughout the EU." In recent years, the Dutch courts
have used the language of the Convention to support the award of
pan-European relief in patents (and in one instance, trademark)
cases."' The possibility of transborder relief from a single national
court clearly implicates the importance of the non-national model
reflected in the UDRP system. The Convention effectively enables
national courts to assume jurisdiction not only over claims of
infringement in their own countries, but also over related claims of
infringement elsewhere in Europe."' For example, a company
holding various patents on the same invention throughout Europe
could bring an action in the Dutch courts not only against the
alleged Dutch infringer, but also against any alleged German or
U.K. infringer.
Although the case law under the Brussels Convention has not yet
fully developed because of a provision requiring deference to the
408. See Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters (adopted by Special Commission on Oct. 30,1999) [hereinafter
Draft Hague Convention], available at http'/www.hcch.netelconventions/draft36e.html.
Under the current draft, the European countries would liberalize their recognition policies
and the U.S. would limit its more expansive notions ofjurisdiction. For an analysis of the
convention debate, see Kevin M. Clermont, JurisdictionalSalvation and the Hague Treaty,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 89 (1999). Questions of enforcement are closely tied to questions of
appropriate jurisdiction to adjudicate. See Draft Hague Convention, supra, arts. 25-26
(judgments based upon proper jurisdiction under the Convention are to be enforced by
participant countries).
409. Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969),
as amended by 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted as amended in 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990)
[hereinafter Brussels Convention] (applied throughout Europe).
410. CompareBrussels Convention, supra note 409, arts. 6(1), 16(4), with Draft Hague
Convention, supranote 408, art. 14.
411. See generally Expandable Grafts P'ship v. Boston Scientific BV, Court of Appeal of
the Hague (1999) FSR 352 (discussing, but appearing to limit, Dutch crossborder
jurisprudence).
412. Brussels Convention, supra note 409, art. 5(3) (providing jurisdiction "in matters
relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event
occurred"); id. art. 6(1) (a person domiciled in a Contracting State may also be sued 'where
he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is
domiciled").
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validity of acts of administrative officials in foreign states,41 there
are indications that the courts might be willing to use it in
appropriate cases to provide crossborder relief.414 Accordingly, if the
Brussels scheme were expanded to the world stage under the
auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, a
private international scheme for securing crossborder relief might
be available to rival the UDRP.
If the Hague Convention were adopted, courts might be more
willing to apply foreign laws and decide consolidated transborder
litigation. Forcing courts to consider different national laws, and
the respective claims of each, both in prescriptive force and
substantive merit, would facilitate the convergence of national laws
to generate substantive rules of intellectual property law appropriate for international disputes.41 Thus, consolidated private
international litigation might become an alternative vehicle to
public international
law for developing convergent international
416
principles.

413. The approach of the Dutch courts has had to deal, however, with a further provision
of the Convention. Article 16(4) provides that
in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade
marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered,
the courts of the Contracting State inwhich the deposit or registration has been
applied for, has taken place or is underthe terms of an international convention
deemed to have taken place shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter
notwithstanding domicile.
Id. What happens when a defendant interposes a defense challenging the validity ofa patent,
as is typical in patent infringement litigation? Do the proceedings brought under the liberal
jurisdiction provisions of Articles 5(3) and 6(1) now succumb to the "state of registration"
provision in Article 16(4), thus requiring litigation in the latter forum? In the last two years,
prompted by some related U.K. jurisprudence, the Dutch courts have stepped back from the
aggressive use ofthe Convention, in part because questions of patent validity are inevitably
implicated in many such proceedings. See, e.g., Coin Control Ltd. v. Suzo Intl (UK) Ltd., 3
All E.R. 45 (Ch. D. 1997).
414. Trademark rights, unlike patent rights, may exist in some countries without
registration, and hence implicate Article 16(4) to a lesser extent. See Pearce v. Ove Arup
P'ship, 1 All E.R. 769 (Ct. Appeal 1999) (noting that because copyright does not involve
deposit or registration, a court's analysis in a copyright case under the Brussels Convention
is not complicated by Article 16(4)); Yakult v. Danone, 1998 E.T.M.R. 465,472 & 479 (Hague
Dist. Ct. 1998) (noting that "[tihe system under the Brussels Convention requires that the
Court, even the 'own' court referred to in Article 2, must apply foreign trade mark law in the
appropriate cases" but declining to extend the injunction to France although "competent to
do so" because of a lack of urgency).
415. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, An Alert to the IntellectualPropertyBar: The Hague
Judgments Convention, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 421 (2001).
416. See Dinwoodie, supra note 108, at 58 (discussing the potential of the Hague
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Whether such a scheme would in fact develop as a rival to nonnational models such as the UDRP would depend upon a number of
variables, including the extent of treaty participation and whether

courts would be willing to adopt novel approaches to choice of
law that overcome the national nature of existing rights." 7 If

the Convention is limited to a small number of countries, or still
requires plaintiffs to plead their case under separate national laws

or in separate national fora, the non-national model would retain
significant advantages.

In addition, if the UDRP is to extend its remedial scope (as some
expansion proposals contemplate), difficult questions of enforce-

ment will arise. A non-national model that awards relief that is not
automatically self-enforcing would require some form ofrecognition
and enforcement of non-national judgments in nation states. Thus,
a treaty such as the Hague Convention could be an important
mechanism through which complainants can effectuate their nonnational judgements. Relations between the Convention and the
non-national system are thus critical.
At present, the prospects for a global convention on these matters
are uncertain. A diplomatic conference to adopt the Hague
Convention had been scheduled for late 2000, but the United States
indicated its unease with the current draft, and adoption will not
occur until 2002 at the earliest.4 1 As negotiations progress, it would
behoove non-national lawmakers to work closely with the Hague
efforts to accommodate cyberspace and other transborder issues
within the debate, 19 recognizing both that the attractiveness of the
Convention); cf Dinwoodie,ANew Copyright Order,supra note 8, at 569-71 (discussing the
possibility ofusingprivate international litigationto effect convergence in national copyright

laws).
417. Neither the Brussels Convention nor the Hague Convention addresses choice-of-law
issues.
418. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Press Release, available at
http'//www.hcch.netleevents/events.html#dipl200l (lastvisited Oct. 3,2001). An alternative
proposal of a stand-alone treaty addressing only intellectual property law issues is the
subject ofongoingwork by Professors Jane Ginsburg and Rochelle Dreyfuss and may provide
an alternative vehicle for pursuit of these objectives. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Jane C.
Ginsburg, Draft Convention on Jurisdictionand Recognition of Judgments in Intellectual
PropertyMatters,paper to be presented at Constructing International Intellectual Property
Law: The Role of National Courts, ChicagolKent College of Law, Oct. 18-19,2001, available
at http://www.kentlaw.eduldepts/ipprmtl-courts.
419. See U.S. Government Hears Widely Opposing Views on Issues to be Discussed in
Ottawa, 6 ELEC. COMM. & L. REP. 147 (Feb. 14, 2001) (discussing pressures on U.S.
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non-national model may be affected by these international
developments, and (more importantly) that any expansions of the
remedial aspects of the non-national model might require links to
international enforcement mechanisms.
CONCLUSION

The UDRP represents the leading edge of a new movement in
non-national lawmaking. Driven by the pressures of globalization
and the borderless nature of cyberspace, governments and private
parties will expand their efforts to transcend the limits of existing
dispute settlement paradigms. Therefore, the UDRP must be
evaluated not only as a vehicle for the resolution of conflicts
between domain names and trademark rights-important though
that issue is in a digital economy--but also as the likely default
template for more broad-based non-national lawmaking and dispute
settlement.
Of necessity, the nature of disputes in the digital era required the
formation of a hybrid decision-making structure. We applaud the
willingness of the architects of the UDRP to escape the conceptual
straitjacket of existing models. Yet for all its advantages of speed
and global reach, the TJDRP will see its legitimacy undermined if it
fails to incorporate checking mechanisms that control the scope of
decision making and connect non-national governors to those whom
they govern.
Just as the UDRP's hybrid structure itself transcended existing
arbitral, ministerial, and judicial models, so must the checking
mechanisms that it adopts. The answers lie not in routine
replication of existing controls, but in attending to the relationships among the institutional components of a non-national system.
The guardians of the UDRP, and the drafters of any non-national
structures that follow it, must embrace the challenge of constructing new forms of control. If they do not, the potential for
new models that match our increasingly non-national world will
be diminished by competing assertions of national sovereignty,
allegations of institutional capture, and justified complaints of
illegitimately expansive lawmaking.
delegation to Hague Convention concerning e-commerce issues in proposed treaty).

